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RECONSTRUCTING NATIONS & STATES



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Reconstructing Nations and States

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

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Contents

v Preface

John A. Hall
1 Nationalisms: Classified and Explained

Charles Tilly
29 National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us

Katherine Verdery
37 Whither "Nation" and "Nationalism"?

Liah Greenfeld
47 Transcending the Nation's Worth

Stanley Hoffmann
63 Thoughts on the French Nation Today

Douglas B. Klusmeyer
81 Aliens, Immigrants, and Citizens: The Politics of Inclusion in the Federal Republic of Germany

Michael Mann
115 Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying

Ernest Gellner
141 Homeland of the Unrevolution

Tom Nairn
155 Internationalism and the Second Coming

Martin Kramer
171 Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity

Benjamin I. Schwartz
207 Culture, Modernity, and Nationalism—Further Reflections

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Ashutosh Varshney
227 Contested Meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety

NOTES FROM THE ACADEMY

Noel Annan
263 A Review of John Charmley, *Churchill, The End of Glory: A Political Biography*

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Preface to the Issue "Reconstructing Nations and States"

NATIONALISM IS TODAY AN INTELLECTUAL growth industry. Thought to be a spent force only a few years ago, seen as both anachronistic and archaic by many who imagined themselves liberated from its dangerous embrace, it has taken on a quite new life since 1989, in Central and Eastern Europe certainly, but in many other quarters of the world as well. If the great expectations for 1992, with their promise of an expanded and more powerful European Community have been compromised, and not only because of the failure of the Maastricht accords to win the popular consent once thought guaranteed, it is the demise of the Soviet Union that has generated new reflection on all manner of subjects relating to empire, multinational states, international organization, and capitalism itself.

Whether or not Marxism is dead, 1989 becomes increasingly remote as the fair hopes of that annus mirabilis are gradually interred. In these circumstances, a *Dædalus* issue entitled "Reconstructing Nations and States" refers to more than the creation of new states, emerging from the ruins of a Soviet domination now largely extinct. Indeed, it deals with much more than the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the civil war in Yugoslavia, and other such

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events, essentially local, for all their purported cosmic significance. The events of the twentieth century's fin de siècle, largely unanticipated, are certain to require a rethinking of the concept and reality of the nation, as it developed in early modern times in Europe, as it took on new dimensions with the creation of the "first new nations" in North and South America following on the French and American revolutions.

So, also, it may require a substantial revision of our thinking on what occurred in the nineteenth century, not only because of the creation of Germany and Italy, but also in all those multinational empires which became hostage to new demands for cultural and political autonomy. Certain of the less noted events of the last part of the nineteenth century, and of the years before World War I, in all the overseas empires of the major European states take on new importance as political and cultural developments made "outsiders" suddenly conspicuous in ways they had never previously been. World War I and World War II—the two major events of the century—incomparable catastrophes on many levels, helped create the modern world system, in Asia as much as in Africa, in Europe but also in the Americas.

Nations and states—those that can claim some antiquity, which translates best as having a legitimate claim to a pretwentieth century existence—but also those that are the inventions of this century, are experiencing problems of a kind that had not been thought of by those who lived as recently as the time of Woodrow Wilson and Nikolai Lenin. While it would be a mistake to fail to discriminate between the problems common to the new states, often poor and disorganized, seeking desperately to invent political and economic institutions adequate to the demands of citizens who gaze with awe and envy on the prosperity of those in the advanced industrial societies, there are many conditions common to both. Each, for quite different reasons, is being compelled today to shape a new political agenda. The task, arduous and frustrating, requires the recognition of facts and forces in the world once thought to be antiquated, fit only for the ash heap of history.

To combine in a single issue essays on Germany and France, China and India, Scotland and Russia, is to acknowledge what many now know to be true. The conditions these several modern societies confront are in no sense identical. Yet, in each, as in any

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number of others, there is a growing concern with how the nation's identity is to be defined, preserved, and in many instances reinvented. The preoccupation today may be as much with issues of culture — citizenship and education figuring prominently—as it is with the more traditional questions relating to economic growth. These are seen to be related in wholly novel ways, creating political tensions of a kind not previously addressed.

Yet, it is not enough to dwell on the circumstances of individual nation-states. The whole study of states is today being reconfigured, responding to national and international tensions scarcely thought of during the hard years of the Cold War. Indeed, the uniqueness of the present moment, and not only in intellectual terms, may be that new attention is being given to the salience of the forces of nationalism in all their modern manifestations, at the same time that more fundamental questions are being asked about the international order said to be slowly evolving. While it may be comforting to believe that it is only the severe economic slowdown in the major prosperous industrial societies of the world that is generating a temporary pessimism, that the "recession" is certain soon to pass, those who write for this issue of *Dædalus* are concerned with other longer-term matters that relate to the evolution of modern societies.

Is it at all possible that the "global village" of yesterday is becoming more fragmented even as it becomes more unified in its systems of communication? May regionalism in quite new forms be the promise of tomorrow? If so, what will happen to the hopes for 1992, not only in Europe, but also in the world beyond that never wholly accepted Brussels as the model capital of a new and brave twenty-first century world? What will be the force of religion—and not only Islam—in this new world? What, indeed, is the future of what an earlier century so casually dismissed as old-fashioned patriotism? Must race and ethnicity be given new salience in any study of the modern nation-state?

This issue of *Dædalus* was made possible by a small grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. It serves also to inaugurate a larger study that will emerge from a grant made by The Pew Charitable Trusts. I am deeply grateful to both. Also, I wish to express my thanks to the late Father Timothy Healy who made the New York Public Library conference facilities available to us at an early stage in our deliberations. In studying both nations

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and states, we have embarked on a project that has large significance for the future, not least in bringing into the *Dædalus* family of authors a new generation of men and women from disparate parts of the world, including those parts only recently liberated from communist rule. The results of that effort to extend our net more widely—to talk about cultural and political subjects more broadly as they touch on nations and states—will be evident in 1994 in the issue that will result from The Pew Charitable Trusts' gift.

S.R.G.

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John A. Hall

Nationalisms: Classified and Explained

UNDERSTANDING NATIONALISM IS SO OBVIOUSLY an urgent necessity that there is much to be said for the provision of a clearly delineated overview of the state of play among theorists of the subject. What exactly do we know about a force whose impact on this century has been—against the expectations of mainstream social theory—greater than any other?

My overview will be active rather than passive. The use of the plural in the title gives away one central claim: no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is diverse, so too must be our concepts. This is not, it should be stressed, to suggest a move from universalism to complete particularism, from a general theory to national histories. To the contrary, middle ground can be cultivated by delineating various ideal types of nationalism, the characteristic logic and social underpinning of each of which are highlighted by a name, an exemplar, and, somewhat loosely, a characteristic theorist.[1] But I move beyond classification to explanation: a second claim is that the patterning underlying different types of nationalism is political rather than social.

The analysis that is required is similar to that which now characterizes the study of economic development. It has come to be widely recognized that there are different routes by means of which economic development can be achieved.[2] The initial path may not have been captured by Max Weber, but there is everything to be said for his insistence that it was original—in the sense that it was unconscious and unplanned. In contrast, all other forms of economic

John A. Hall is Professor of Sociology at McGill University. *This essay is for Barrington Moore on his eightieth birthday.*

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development have been imitative, seeking to copy something whose dimensions were broadly known. Such secondary imitation may, as in East Asia, benefit from entirely different qualities than those needed for invention: conformity may now matter more, for example, than rampant individualism.[3] Furthermore, we now also appreciate that late development is far from a unitary affair. The heavy industrialization of late-nineteenth century imitators—turned via Lenin's admiration for the German war economy into the general model of state socialism—seems to be markedly ineffective once the age of national mercantilism is replaced by an interdependent world economy, genuinely based on an international division of labor. We shall see that nationalism faces historical stages, albeit not to quite the same extent as does economic development. But it is important to stress a further analogy. The character of the stages of economic development is affected by history in an entirely different sense—that is, in terms of idiosyncrasy or accident. More particularly, the modern world political economy has been and continues to be deeply affected by the political style of the United States.[4] Similarly, some types of nationalism have been affected by particular historical combinations of analytic factors, whose conjunction may not recur.

NATIONALISM DEFINED, ITS MODERNITY EMPHASIZED

Just as differences in routes need not entail the absence of a singular sense of economic development, so too the variety of nationalisms does not rule out a unitary definition. Nationalism is considered here very conventionally.[5] It is the belief in the primacy of a particular nation, real or constructed; the logic of this position tends to move nationalism from cultural to political forms, and to entail popular mobilization. This is meant to be an omnibus definition, but it is important to note two further presuppositions which distinctively prejudge key issues.

First, the definition is often linked to the view that there have been three great ages of nationalism: the foundation of new states in Latin America in the early nineteenth century; the enlargement engineered by Woodrow Wilson at Versailles; and the much greater and more genuinely creative expansion of the international order as the result of decolonization.[6] There is indeed much to be said for

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the view that nationalism flourishes as the result of the collapse of empires, a view which makes us realize that the collapse of the Russian empire means that we are faced now with a fourth great moment in the history of nationalism. Nonetheless, the omnibus definition should not be linked to the idea that nationalism is in any absolute sense linked to separatism. Very much to the contrary, the spirit of nationalism can dominate established states. For example, if the contemporary United States becomes mobilized, either as the result of incautious elite manipulation or of sentiment genuinely coming from below, around the conviction that Japan is an economic enemy, then this deserves to be considered as an example of nationalism.

Second, there seems to be everything to be said, despite the works of John Armstrong and Anthony Smith, for the view that nationalism is modern.[7] There have always, of course, been distinctive cultures, and particular upper classes have had some sense of shared ethnic solidarity. But the power of the nationalist idea—that people should share a culture and be ruled only by someone co-cultural with themselves—seems historically novel. The crude logistics of most societies in history—bereft of effective mass communication and cheap transport—meant that most human beings were stuck in highly particularized segments, quite unable to share a sense of destiny with people they had no chance of meeting.[8] In this connection, it is worth noting that the actual sharing of destiny came much later than is often realized, even to the core societies of northwest Europe. The much cited findings of Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen* have recently received stunning support from Susan Cotts Watkins' demonstration that fertility patterns in Western Europe became national only in the early twentieth century.[9]

The Logic of Industry

The theorist who has realized the modernity of nationalism most fully is Ernest Gellner.[10] His contribution to the study of nationalism has been fundamental, and it is accordingly sensible—not least since my argument departs from his—to consider his basic interpretation of nationalism immediately, even though this goes against the chronology that otherwise characterizes the argument. Nationalism is seen by Gellner in terms of the logic of industry. At the basis of this theory is the insistence that an industrial society de-

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pends upon a common culture and language, and certainly upon sharing an extended cultural code. The destruction of local cultures in Algeria meant an attack on French and Berber and a favoring of mass education in Arabic; more serious problems, and far greater resistance, resulted in the Nigerian case. Two analytic points are being made here. On the one hand, industrial society is held to depend upon the ability to communicate in an abstract manner with people over space, strangers whom one has not and never will meet. On the other hand, massive social engineering is required because "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist."[11]

The ferocity of this phrase led to a magisterial rebuke from Benedict Anderson: "Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity,' rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation.'"[12] While this may be correct, as is the related point that a history of imagining makes nation-building easier,[13] it should not be allowed to detract from the essential correctness of Gellner's point. There is no firm sociological mooring to the nation,[14] not in language, not in religion, and not in ethnicity, and Gellner is quite correct to insist that nation is far harder to define than is nationalism.[15] There is no reason to accept the sleeping beauty view propounded by nationalist ideology, that is, the view that nationalism is the awakening of something extant which had merely been dormant. Gellner needs to be defended quite as much on another point. A characteristic attack has been directed against Gellner's position, namely that it fails because it is functionalist. It is certainly true that functionalism cannot be intellectually correct; any theory of this type must be ruled out. Logically, functionalism takes a consequence as a cause, the expression of a societal need as a reason for the existence of institutions that seek to look after it. Life is not like that—I have plenty of needs, many of which go unmet—and neither is history. But proper specification of Gellner's theory can point to a mechanism explaining why attempts to meet a need are met, and this ensures that the theory does not fail. The mechanism is simple. Many nationalist leaders in the twentieth century have been aware of the connection established by Gellner; they are modernizers, consciously aware of how to create an industrial society. They seek to break down the segments of the traditional order to create a common

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culture capable of integrating all citizens. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, as American ambassador to the United Nations, realized this in his famous complaint that many Third World nationalists had been trained at the London School of Economics. Certainly Jomo Kenyatta, former president of Kenya, who can serve as the exemplar of this type of nationalism, was trained there—and by no less a figure than Bronislaw Malinowski, the renowned British anthropologist.[16] An interesting footnote in Jadwiga Staniszkis's *Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe* notes that Alexander Jakovlev changed his mind about the nationalities' question in the former Soviet Union because reading Gellner convinced him that nationalism had to be recognized in order to reach capitalist development.[17] This is perhaps less empirical support for Gellner's theory than direct creation of the evidence! But that is a distraction. The general claim I am making is that Gellner's account of this type of nationalism is a great success; it goes a very long way to explaining the third wave of nationalism identified. It may well be that the theory originates from the periods that Gellner spent in North Africa in the 1950s and 1960s; it is that sort of experience which is being theorized.

CLASSICAL PATTERNS

The Logic of the Asocial Society

One reason why Gellner's theory is not a truly universal one is that it fails to explain the very first emergence of nationalism in eighteenth century Britain and France. The nature of the failure is obvious: nationalist sentiments are clearly in place before the emergence of industry. This type of nationalism can be explained in terms of the logic of the asocial society, an expression of Immanuel Kant's, referring to the multipolarity, unique in civilizational terms to northwest Europe, which led to endless competition between states.[18] The general character of this system has been theorized most powerfully by the German historian Otto Hintze and the sociologist Charles Tilly.[19] Their finding is that wars make states quite as much as states make war. Continual competition between states leads to an arms race requiring ever greater funding. Kings are thereby forced not just to sit on top of the various cultural segments within their territories, but rather to interact with them

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more closely in order to extract greater funds. One way in which monies were extracted was through the provision of the services of justice. Another was through the increasing territorialization of social life: one example of this was a burgeoning ability to provide order, that is, to successfully claim a monopoly of violence; another was an incipient economic nationalism which increased the customs and excise revenues on which monarchs relied. Over time, those states able to consolidate their territories into a single unit subject to bureaucratic rules fared best in warfare. Such national states often gained strength through cooperating with civil societies that they could not completely control—the absence of great despotic power did a great deal to increase their infrastructural reach.[20]

A characteristically brilliant essay by Michael Mann, the theorist of this type of nationalism, begins by noting that the eighteenth century bred marked increases in the communicative capacities of civil society.[21] These were pioneered from below in England by the creation of a unique preindustrial commercial revolution and from above on the continent by both the military and economic demands of enlightened absolutism. The entry of the people onto the political stage accordingly became possible, rather against the expectations of such leading theorists as Adam Smith and David Hume. One such entry led to the creation of the United States, whose political culture remained overwhelmingly universalistic despite the change from "people" to "nation" in the key founding documents of 1776 and 1789. The French Revolution was also universalistic given that one could choose to become French, but the body to which people were to belong was on this occasion clearly that of a particular nation-state—with some Jacobins proving unwilling to trust those who had not learned French.[22]

This concentration on the nation is best explained by the fact that civil society increased its capacities at the very time in which Europe was torn apart by the War of the Atlantic, that is, the visceral struggle between Britain and France during the long eighteenth century. States were forced to extract historically unprecedented amounts from their societies.[23] One consequence of this was state reform, by the ending of "old corruption" in Britain and by revolution in France. Another consequence was, however, the emergence of nationalism. It is of the crux of the matter that both processes were

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entwined, that the struggle for representation raised the question of identity.

A very full portrait of the processes, coming both from below and from above, involved for Britain has now been provided by Linda Colley. This was a complex affair. A British nationalism certainly existed first, founded on the notion of a Protestant people under attack from Europe's Catholic monarchies.[24] But there was also an English nationalism, often directed against the Scots—not least as they did so well out of their connection with Britain.[25] In many ways, John Wilkes is the best exemplar of such nationalism.[26] He was an apologist for the blunt ways of John Bull, for roast beef and Yorkshire pudding, and for the liberties established in 1688. It was entirely characteristic that a typical procession of Wilkite supporters in 1768 assembled at a tavern named after William of Orange before setting out to vote for their hero under banners of the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights; equally many Wilkite songs were sung to the tunes of "Rule Britannia" and "God Save the King."[27] All this was, of course, contrasted to the mannered artificialities of the French aristocracy and, somewhat later, to the geopolitical greed of Napoleon. It is scarcely surprising that the French replied in kind by inventing the image of Perfidious Albion.

Revolution from Above

While there can be no doubt about the impact of the ideals of social mobility represented by Napoleon, we can best approach the next type of nationalism, revolution from above, by noting recent scholarship on the logistics of the French armies.[28] It is not the case, as was once believed, that the French armies spread nationalism by design. To the contrary, the fiscal crisis of the French state meant that its armies plundered huge amounts from territories it was forced to conquer—and continued to do so for years as such territories were made to pay for occupying French troops. French rule was imperial, and it accordingly led to nationalist reactions.

The concept of a revolution from above is, of course, taken from Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.[29] It is of use here in highlighting a type of nationalism pioneered by states with previous histories, choosing to change their social structures in order to survive. If this is to say that the logic of state competition is at work here as it was with the previous type, the social base of

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this type of nationalism is distinctively different. This third type of nationalism has been recognized best by John Breuilly in his treatment of the Meiji reformers reacting to the incursion of Commander Perry and of their Prussian predecessors responding to the possibility that their state might actually disappear after its defeat at Jena and Auerstadt.[30]

I take as the exemplar of such nationalism Carl von Clausewitz, a member of the circle which included Scharnhorst and Gneisenau but better known to us because of his stature as the theorist of war.[31] That theory was necessitated by the appearance in 1793 of a force:

> that beggared all imagination. Suddenly war again became the business of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered themselves to be citizens. . . .The people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance. The resources and efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional limits; nothing now impeded the vigor with which war could be waged. . . .[32]

The diagnosis that the reformers made after their own defeat stressed the need to completely change society if Prussia was to survive. The professional armies of Frederick the Great would never be able to compete against citizens in arms. It was accordingly necessary to abolish feudalism, and to contemplate arming the people so that something similar to the Spanish guerrilla resistance would become possible. Frederick William III disliked this latter proposal, but the curtailment possibly placed on Clausewitz's career was occasioned by a different matter. In 1812, Prussia briefly made peace with Napoleon. Clausewitz, appalled that a peace had been made against the national enemy, resigned his commission and fought in the Russian army against the French. All of this perhaps reflects the fact that Clausewitz was something of an outsider. It may well be important that Clausewitz's family was not a member of the grand aristocracy: he himself depended upon state service quite as much as did the lesser samurai of the Meiji Restoration.[33] But if on this occasion the old regime—scared of the popular mobilization that the call

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to the nation entailed—won, in the long run Germany was created as the result of revolution from above.

Desire and Fear Blessed by Opportunity

The creation of completely new states in Latin America resulted from a very different type of nationalism—a curious compound of desire and fear blessed by opportunity—that is exemplified in Simon Bolívar himself and particularly well understood by John Lynch.[34] The desire for independence had two sources. On the one hand, the ideas of the Enlightenment, gained more from the United States (whose importance as a model cannot be overly stressed) than from Spain, gave an impetus to ideas of freedom, reason, and order. Much more important, on the other hand, was extreme disenchantment with a metropolis, at once corrupt and underdeveloped. One element here was economic. Spain wished its colonies to produce bullion and to absorb its own manufacturing products, and to that end increasingly attacked local economic development, not least since its involvement in European war increased its own fiscal needs. For a long period, trade was monopolized by a Spanish elite who consistently overcharged for imports while underpaying for exports. Another element was social. Attempts to increase control by sending out officials from Europe were particularly humiliating to local Creoles whose standards of education and attainment were habitually far greater: "the lowest, least educated and uncultivated European," Alexander von Humboldt observed, "believes himself superior to the white born in the New World."[35] Added to these sentiments was fear. The Creole planters were a small minority sitting atop large Indian and slave populations upon whose continued quiescence their position depended. The revolt of Tupac Amuru showed them the dangers of an assault on their privileges in their own lands, but it was the use made by Toussaint l'Ouverture of the slogans of the French Revolution that really terrified them. Their adherence to Enlightenment ideals did not go so far as to countenance the loss of their land, let alone self-destruction. Hence, their own nationalist revolutions in the early years of the nineteenth century—suddenly made possible by Nelson's breaking of the link with the Peninsula and by Napoleon's invasion—were socially exceptionally conservative. While sheer logistics entailed the creation

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of separate states, the mobilization of the people, generally characteristic of nationalist politics, was strenuously avoided.[36] This segmentation of social life has continued to characterize Latin America, not least since the relative absence of geopolitical conflict has not made it necessary for states to increase their infrastructural powers.[37]

Risorgimento Nationalism

In contrast, what is striking about risorgimento nationalism—at least, at first sight—is that it comes from below. This type of nationalism is extremely well-known, not least because of Miroslav Hroch's demonstration in his *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* of the three-stage development from the collectors of folklore, to the ideologists of nationalism, to the final moment at which cultural revival becomes political demand.[38] Two particular forces fueled movement from below. First, there was a notable increase in the number of educated people in nineteenth-century Europe, an increase which often began before states sought to create normative integration within their territories.[39] Second, economic development moved many from the countryside to the city: the destruction of the traditional segmentary cultures of such people made them available for nationalist propaganda.[40] An important point to be made about this type of nationalism is that it deserves to be classified as liberal, that is, it stressed civic loyalty within a democratic regime rather than ethnicity. Both John Stuart Mill and Mazzini were famously among its numbers, and the conjunction of their names makes it clear that the hope of the age was that the release of oppressed peoples would usher in a reign of peace.[41] There is a blissful innocence about their particular dreams—which came to be exploded once nonhistoric nations, most notably the Irish, insisted on their right to a state.

Hroch's marvelous phenomenology of nationalism does not say very much as to why there was a transition from cultural to political nationalism. But it is not hard to see what is happening, especially if we consider the career of František Palacký, the Czech historian who followed Herder in seeing the Czechs as a peaceful people oppressed by both Magyars and Germans.[42] Palacký began working for the Bohemian Museum in the 1830s, and his great history began in German. Increasing anti-German feeling, consequent on the state's attempt to make German the language of officialdom, led

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him in the 1840s to start writing in Czech. But it was the events of 1848 which pushed him into politics. The Czechs refused to join the National Assembly in Frankfurt; they felt threatened by plans concocted there that might have led to their cultural demise. They participated instead in a countermeeting in Prague, which firmly stressed that the best hopes for the Slavs, given their geopolitical position between Russia and Germany, remained with the Habsburgs.[43]

Reflection on this episode leads to two analytical points. First, the move from cultural to political nationalism was occasioned by blocked social mobility. This should not, as wise words of Ernest Gellner emphasize, be seen in purely economistic terms—as if people became nationalists in order to acquire better jobs, true though that sometimes has been.[44] What matters is the prospect of humiliation and the fear that one's children's lives will suffer. In the Habsburg lands, the switch to political nationalism did not, in a sense, come from below. Rather, it was the desire of a modernizing state to conduct official business in a single language that suddenly placed some in the position of facing blocked or perhaps downward mobility. State intervention occasioned popular response.

The second analytical point is much more general, but it can be approached by asking whether the Habsburg enterprise was doomed by nationalism to collapse. General considerations suggest a negative answer, at least for a particular sort of Habsburg enterprise. By that I have in mind the Kremsier reform proposals of 1849, the key clause of which asserted that:

> All peoples of the Empire are equal in rights. Each people has an inviolable right to preserve and activate its nationality in general and its language in particular. The equality of rights in the school, administrative and public life of every language in local usage is guaranteed by the state.[45]

Had this been enacted, different nationalities may not have sought to escape the empire. The analytical point is best described with reference to Albert Hirschman's classic distinction between exit, voice, and loyalty: when it is possible to have voice inside a system, exit loses its attraction.[46] Differently put, the nature of a political regime matters: nationalism has historically involved separation from authoritarian polities. The general point is then hopeful, given

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the problem of minorities: multinationalism may be possible, as Switzerland indicates, albeit limitations to the linguistic capacities of most human beings suggest that it is scarcely likely to become the norm.

The Habsburgs did not, of course, consistently take this liberal option.[47] The explanation of their failure has everything to do with geopolitics. First, defeat by Prussia allowed Hungary to gain its historic rights. The fact that Hungarians felt threatened by perhaps not forming a majority in their own lands led to that policy of forced magyarization which gave impetus to southern Slav nationalism.[48] The creation of Austro-Hungary effectively ruled out federal reform. Such reform was probably unlikely for a second reason. The Habsburgs were not prepared to retrench, to allow some territories to leave and to concentrate on economic development rather than geopolitical prestige. The raison d'être of the monarchy had been and remained that of being a great power. Still, it is noticeable that after 1867 the empire did not look set to fall apart. Its elements were clearly unable to agree, but geopolitical facts remained, and the Czechs did not look as if they were prepared to risk going it alone. What changed everything was defeat in war.

Integral Nationalism

The last classic type of nationalism is integral nationalism. This has sometimes been seen as a reaction to Versailles, or more generally as a response that had logically to follow given that the drives for social integration of the new nations founded at that time were always likely to disadvantage minorities. There is certainly a change in mood with regard to integral nationalism: it is illiberal. There is no longer room for the belief that human beings, seen as possessing inalienable rights, need the carapace of a nation—but that all nations can develop together in a positive sum game. To the contrary, universalism is held to be a febrile myth: the fact that one should think with one's blood naturally turned nationalist quarrels into Darwinian zero-sum affairs. Ethnicity has now completely taken over from civic obligation.

The theorist of this type of nationalism is Ernst Nolte.[49] This form of nationalism was well in place before it received its ultimate form in German national socialism, and accordingly cannot be completely explained in terms of a reaction to Versailles. It may

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well be that integral nationalism is bred more generally by the trauma of defeat: it certainly seems to help explain the life and deeds of the Action Française and its leader, Maurras—who invented the name of this type of nationalism and who stands as its best exemplar.[50] But this is too partial an explanation. We can see what has been missed from the explanation of its classical turn of the century form by considering carefully Max Weber's admonition in his 1895 inaugural address:

> We must grasp that the unification of Germany was a youthful spree, indulged in by the nation in its old age; it would have been better if it had never taken place, since it would have been a costly extravagance, if it was the conclusion rather than the starting-point for German power-politics on a global scale.[51]

In the context of his time, Weber's nationalism was, of course, liberal—although Poles familiar with Weber's wartime views as to how Germans should behave in the East are not likely to accord him that epithet.[52] Nonetheless, it is crucial to stress that the context of that time included the myth of imperialist mercantilism. A newly industrialized country like Germany had risen in part through trade, and its future could have been assured by continued adherence to that trading route: but some voices argued that secure sources of supply and sale necessitated territorial possession. Germans preferred to act as "heroes" rather than as "traders."[53] The fact that Bethmann-Hollweg listened to such voices was one element in the pattern that led to disaster in 1914.[54]

Something needs to be said about the social base of this integral nationalism. Studies of the popular leagues pressing for expansion to the East and for a Weltpolitik in late Wilhelmine Germany have shown us that these views were attractive to the educated, to those whose careers were associated with a German state of which they were proud—a fact which undermines Hobsbawm's view that nationalism turns nasty towards the end of the nineteenth century because it comes to be rooted in the lesser bourgeoisie.[55] This respectable but radical-right nationalism played some part in limiting the Wilhelmine state's room to maneuver in the years immediately prior to 1914, and this helped cause the outbreak of war.[56] The rules of diplomacy depend upon key state actors being part of international society: academic realism rests upon the presence of

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transnational identity. What radical nationalists at this time were demanding was an end to transnational identity so that national society could be favored—in a world seen, as much by Sidney Webb as by Maurras or Max Weber, largely in Darwinian terms.

This emphasis on the pre-1914 origins of integral nationalism is not meant to detract from its intensification after 1919. It is, of course, true that many of Wilson's borders are still intact, though this is in part because of the ethnic cleansings unleashed by the two great revolutions of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, one cannot help but note how disastrous was the Versailles settlement in East Central Europe. Regimes were created which were geopolitically unviable, lacking firm guarantees, prone to quarrel among themselves, and composed of minorities whose suppression invited irredentist claims.[57] In a sense, this provided Hitler with a set of cards, the playing of which allowed for such viciousness that nationalism thereby gained a reputation from which it has not recovered.

REPRISE: FROM SOCIETY TO STATE AND REGIME

Any specification of the different types of nationalism needs to be fairly close to historical reality if it is to fulfill its purpose, that of helping general thought and the understanding of particular cases. The typology offered to this point is close to reality and I stand by it, and by the claim that nationalism is not one but many. Nonetheless, I wish to look at the two obvious ways in which this typology might be criticized. A measure of disagreement with the second criticism will move my argument beyond phenomenology towards underscoring key theoretical points.

The first type of criticism is obvious, namely, that the typology should be expanded. John Breuilly's complete treatment of nationalism makes systematic use not just of "revolution from above" but also of the distinction between separatist and unification nationalism, and it does so for social worlds with and without nation-states.[58] The most recent work of Ernest Gellner, critical to understanding nationalism in postcommunist societies, has made much of a brilliant essay by John Plamenatz to note differences within risorgimento nationalism between the German and the Italian cases, definitively possessed of extant high cultures, and of the situation further to the East, where cultures were almost completely in-

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vented.[59] Finer analyses would also result from distinguishing more clearly between popular sentiment, the dreams of intellectuals, and the manipulative practices of politicians.[60] The validity and helpfulness of these distinctions do not, however, seem to be such that they could not be included within the typology presented, were greater space available to allow for its full elaboration.

The fact that there are so many types might well encourage exactly the opposite comment, somewhat in the spirit of Pirandello, to the effect that these types need an integrating general theory. This would, I suspect, be the response of Ernest Gellner, and this is accordingly a good moment to return to his theory. It is not, in fact, difficult to see how one can diminish the number of cases. Some mileage can be had by extending the notion of industrialism in the logic of industry to include the capitalist development that provided the human matériel for risorgimento nationalism. Better still, I believe, would be to take the notion of blocked mobility, properly understood in the sense of humiliation, and say that it is an essential part of what is going on within the logic of industry.[61] That link is precisely at the heart of Gellner's real and best attempt to produce a general theory of nationalism—that is, a second and more general theory which does not fall foul of the functionalism of the industrial society school to which he is somewhat prone.[62] More particularly, that connection is necessary for him, for otherwise the logic of industry could in principle take place within large empires: it has no need to take on the national form. The actors in this category seek to modernize apart from and even against metropolises which had discriminated against their talents. All this is to say that Gellner theorizes his own Czech background as much as he does his North African experiences, and that he has accordingly been unfairly treated on this point by being considered the theorist only of the logic of industry.

The logic of this type of integrating argument is clear, and I can think of additional reasons to avoid dogmatism about my own concepts. First, we can now see that the types represent in part stages, with the logic of asocial society, for example, being unique and thereby unavailable for later use. Second, it may soon be seen that integral nationalism in the contemporary world sometimes loses its bite because its drive for ethnic homogeneity is often not connected to economic mercantilism—nor is it so easily able to cage

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its politicians that they are forced to ignore the realities of transnational society. Nonetheless, I still think that the logic of asocial society, revolution from above, desire and fear blessed by opportunity, and integral nationalism escape the integrating argument outlined here.[63] I prefer my types of nationalism on phenomenological grounds: my exemplars are very different sorts of people, and they would have been uneasy in each other's company. But it is neither desirable nor necessary to leave matters at this point. A certain amount of patterning is implicit within the types presented: explanation has rested less on social than on political factors, notably those concerned with state and regime.

We can begin to highlight this by noting that Gellner's trinitarian view of human history is too simple: he is too much of an economic materialist, almost a Marxist in reverse, in imagining that history is structured simply by evolution from foraging-hunting to agrarian production and then to modern industry—powerful as these forces undoubtedly were.[64] More particularly, there are two notable ways in which modernity has been seen to predate the coming of industry. First, civil society connections expanded in the eighteenth century, most spectacularly in Britain as the result of a commercial revolution which preceded the advent of the Industrial era.[65] Second, multipolar state competition was born in the Agrarian era and flowed into the Industrial era: it was never a merely superstructural affair, being often powerful enough to disrupt the histories of economy and society.[66] States certainly mattered for nationalism. A long process of state-building in northwest Europe created national states and territorialized social relations. Still more importantly, it was the fiscal needs of states, ever engaged in war, that led to those fights for representation which encouraged the emergence of national sentiment. The forces of civil society, left to themselves, tend not to breed political action. What mattered was their interaction with the demands of states.

But the nature of the regime has as important an impact as does the state. We know that working classes differed in their levels of militancy at the turn of the century according to the regimes with which they interacted: the presence of a liberal regime meant that class conflict took on an industrial rather than a political character, whereas the political exclusion of autocracy and authoritarianism concentrated attention on the state both because of its arbitrariness

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and its refusal to allow unions to organize.[67] Early realization of this point lay behind Max Weber's call for limits to Wilhelmine authoritarianism. Neither capitalists nor the state had anything to fear from liberal measures towards the working class: the more that class felt itself to be part of society, the less likely it was to embrace radicalism.[68] The same paradoxical principle—that openness increases cohesion—applies to nationalism.[69] The omnibus definition given at the start carefully noted that cultural nationalism *tends* to become political. In fact, we have seen that a liberal option was available within the Habsburg domains which, had it been adopted, would probably have satisfied the key nationalities by respecting their historic rights. Nationalism might not have become political. This option was ruled out by the Habsburgs, convinced that federalism would have undermined their geopolitical dreams. My guess is that this perception may have been inaccurate, as most certainly was the case with that of the Wilhelmine politicians who failed to sense that their working class could be best co-opted by reform. Might the empire actually have been strengthened, as Masaryk thought, if it had embraced this liberal option? Obviously, this question can never be answered. But there is much to be said for endorsing the ethic of eighteenth- rather than of nineteenth-century theorists: political arbitrariness creates much more anger than does social inequality. People prefer reform to revolution, the possibility of peaceful change to the dangers of the barricades. Liberalism thus diffuses conflict through society whereas authoritarianism concentrates it.

MODERN VARIATIONS

The first modern variation has already been encountered as the logic of industry, but analysis of the impact of the United States within its sphere of influence in the postwar era can enhance understanding of its character. Decolonizing nationalism owed something to American dislike, for ideological and economic reasons, for European empires. This clearly hastened the end of the Dutch empire, and it was not without influence in the British case. Nonetheless, the logic of the situation favored decolonization. Empire became costly as soon as European troops had to be used, as was the case when faced even with relatively minor rebellions. The British, once deprived of the Indian army, understood this almost

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immediately, and quickly handed over territories to groups whose claims to represent "nations" they often knew to be farcical. In contrast, the French fought longer and harder, and even dreamed of a greater France within which modernization could take place. One of Raymond Aron's most impressive and influential exercises in logic— demonstrating that this policy would significantly lower the standard of living within France itself— effectively destroyed that illusion.[70] All the same, the subsequent career of these new states was deeply influenced by the terms of the American system. The world polity for most of the postwar period has been extraordinarily conservative. A truly amazing obeisance was given to the norm of sovereignty, with the result being that very few boundaries were changed; if the United States supported this norm, it was, of course, as much in the interests of the postcolonial states themselves. This is not to deny that the American system sometimes coped poorly with the postcolonial world. The rules of the international market upon which it insisted helped advanced countries far more than those seeking to develop.[71] More importantly, the United States was prone to consider nationalism as if it were communism, thereby letting itself get trapped in Vietnam and landing itself with the Ayatollah Khomeini rather than settling for Mossadeq. Still, in historical terms the United States favors trade more than it does heroism, and its empire is now almost completely nonterritorial. By and large, the Third World is less exploited than ignored.

The fact that the United States has been the sole genuine hegemony that capitalist society has ever possessed has had a fundamental impact on the states of the advanced world.[72] Trading has quite generally replaced heroism, economic ambition now mattering more than geopolitical dreams. Some mercantilist tricks are still practiced by Japan and far more by the European Community in this present moment of uncertainty, but these are difficulties facing the world political economy rather than disasters likely to engulf it. The situation remains the exact opposite of that of the interwar years: the fundamental stability of the geopolitical settlement is likely to allow for compromise in the economic arena. If this decline of economic imperialism is likely to curtail any revival of integral nationalism, so too is the undoubted fact that the American system has encouraged the internationalization of key elites—who are most distinctively no longer caged by nationalist pressure groups. But

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concentration on established states should not be so overdone as to detract attention from a final and essentially novel ideal type of nationalism, that of *nationalism by trade.* The boldest theorist of this type is Tom Nairn, but Hudson Meadwell's recent arguments point in the same direction.[73] Such nationalism by trade is novel in seeking separation for regions of advanced societies. Nairn stresses that such nationalism is likely to do best when the region in question has a chance for economic prosperity: just as the six counties of Northern Ireland had no desire to be impoverished through connection with poor Catholic peasants, so too Catalans and Spanish Basques, perhaps even northern Italians, wish to protect their economic interests. A representative of this sort of nationalism is the leader of the *Parti Québecois,* Jacques Parizeau, whose strategy is that of convincing the Quebecois that they would be richer without the rest of Canada. The likely career of this sort of nationalism is hard to predict. There have been very few exits from liberal systems, and the diminished geopolitical need for centralized and unitary states makes it possible to allow for the introduction of federal and consociational deals capable of appeasing discontent.[74] If this has happened in Spain, it most certainly has not in Scotland—where the absence of a local assembly has meant that the majority has been governed for many years by leaders distinctively not co-cultural with themselves. But economic changes may increase the opportunities for this type of nationalism by diminishing the costs of transition that it would involve. If Adam Smith is right, the limitation of the size of the market decreases affluence: if one can separate and stay within a larger market, as in Europe but not yet in North America, nationalism by trade begins to look promising. But if this happens, it is important to note that it does not have a significant, general impact. Political democracy and an open trading system are unlikely to be impaired by this sort of nationalism.

No survey of nationalism can omit the mention of two unfolding situations—one obvious but the other potentially still more important, with both being hard to conceptualize—which may give rise to novel types of nationalism. The first of these situations is that facing the postcommunist world and the second is that confronting many postcolonial states.

In retrospect, it is obvious that the Bolsheviks continued the work of the Czars, thereby so delaying nation-building that its contempo-

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rary incidence is that much sharper and more determined. The postcommunist situation as a whole is complex, but it seems as if it is a curious mélange of both old and new factors. There is much to the view, already noted, that nationalism in this part of the world, and particularly in Yugoslavia, was likely to be vicious, given that nations are being constructed ab initio, that is, from a peasant base rather than from an extant high culture. The peoples of the former Soviet Union were always prone to be attracted to nationalism because the imperial system which dominated them was led by Russians—whose depredations were not merely political and economic but also ecological.[75] These two cases are stressed to suggest that an important argument of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, suggesting that the early calling of elections would have held together the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as they did Spain, is overdone.[76] It is certainly true that neither Gorbachev nor Milošević accepted the need for immediate federal elections, but these authors miss the salience of a backlog of hatred. They are blind to a crucial general difference between liberalization attempts in socialism and in capitalism. Liberalization had far less of a chance in socialist societies because they had so systematically destroyed civil society.[77] The vacuum created by the collapse of the socialist project was always most likely to be filled by nationalism. If that is one novel feature of nationalism in postcommunist societies, another is that of the character of certain leaders. It is very noticeable that former communists unable to make it in the market have been attracted to nationalism for the most self-interested reasons. One has the impression that Vladimir Mečiar, the Slovak Premier, at times scarcely believed in the manipulative tricks in which he was engaged.

A very great deal in this world remains open. What is noticeable at present is that nationalism in the territories of the former Soviet Union is, at least in comparison to those of former Yugoslavia, by no means utterly violent. The initial group of successor states are based on the union republics. Of course, it is extremely easy to point to the potentialities for matrioshka nationalism, that is, the process whereby successful new national entities themselves become subject to separatist claims—a process which quite literally might have no ending.[78] That this looks most likely in the North Caucasus may well have something to do with Georgia's decidedly integralist nationalism.[79] In contrast, matrioshka nationalism is somewhat

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curtailed in Russia by Yeltsin's adherence to democracy: the desire to exit is again held in abeyance by the possibility of voice. This factor too explains the remarkable success of the Ukraine in holding together different religions, languages, and ethnicities within a single state.[80] This theme raises a final consideration. The softer, more federalist, and more democratic route is made possible by the remarkable fact that geopolitical conflict has been controlled and limited in this part of the world since the end of the Cold War. Were Russia again to embrace heroism, the protection of powerful states would become vital. Such states would likely pay little heed to the demands of their own nationalities.

The considerations raised here bring us to the postcolonial situation. Anthony Smith is surely correct to stress that nation-building and state-building in postcolonial societies have often been very difficult.[81] We need not accept his positive thesis—that European nations depended on a single ethnic core—to endorse the view that the absence of any shared political history and the presence of tribalism presents unique problems. The extraordinary stability that resulted from obeisance to the norm of nonintervention—endorsed by the Organization of African States even at the price of accepting Idi Amin—has a sting in its tail at this point. Acceptance of this norm has meant that there have been extraordinarily few interstate wars within the Third World since 1945—which should not for a moment detract from the vast numbers of deaths in civil wars.[82] A consequence of that state of affairs is that states have often been content to rest on top of differential segments rather than to rationalize their societies. In a horrible sense, Third World countries have not had enough war, or, perhaps enough war of the right type. They are quasi-societies, not nation-states.[83] Their states desperately need to be strengthened so that they can provide that basic order which we have come to take for granted.

This consideration suggests a worrying conclusion. It looks as if the ordering of world politics may be about to change. The norms of sovereignty and nonintervention are now at something of a discount, and it may well be that rules for intervention, made possible by a concert of the Great Powers, will now come to the fore. In one way, this is profoundly to be welcomed: it may make liberalism more real. But perhaps in another way, this new development may not be such good news. There are many minorities

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whose cause could call for intervention: not just Bosnian Serbs nor Palestinians and Kurds, but, according to one recent survey, at least 250 other minorities currently at risk.[84] To give statehood to all such minorities would more than double the number of states in the world. Furthermore, we should remember that there are perhaps eight thousand languages in the world, most of which could be used to put forward nationalist claims.[85] Given that not every language can have a state, one wonders as to the wisdom of interventionist policies which may weaken states which need to be strengthened. We are not, thankfully, completely without intellectual resources at this point: if the breakup of Yugoslavia teaches us one thing, it is that international recognition should be withheld from a state until it puts in place internationally acceptable protection for minority rights. Genscher failed to do this with Croatia. But this is a single point. The dilemma as a whole—between universal liberalism and the building of states, whose creation may still be humanity's best hope—is far too complex, at least for me at this particular moment, to solve.

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ENDNOTES

[1]The typology offered here incorporates and adds to that in Peter Alter's fine but insufficiently known *Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1990). My argument as a whole resembles that of Wolfgang Mommsen, "The Varieties of the Nation State in Modern History: Liberal, Imperialist, Fascist and Contemporary Notions of Nation and Nationality," in Michael Mann, ed., *The Rise and Decline of the Nation State* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). The looseness in question comes from citing some theorists in connection with a single type of nationalism when in fact their approach considers varied nationalisms. Injustices on this point are corrected in the course of this essay.

[2]Ding-xin Zhao and John A. Hall, "State Power and Patterns of Late Development," *Sociology* (forthcoming, 1993).

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[3]Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan Turner, *Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1988).

[4]A point made on many occasions, and with ever greater force, by Susan Strange. See particularly "The persistent myth of lost hegemony," *International Organization* 41 (1987).

[5]Cf. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), chap. one; John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), chap. one; and Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 9–13, chap. one.

[6]James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 64. The excellence of this book is marred by the declaration that "there are no more empires to collapse and therefore very limited possibilities for further state creation by this route."

[7]John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); and Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

[8]Patricia Crone, *Pre-Industrial Societies* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Michael Mann, *Sources of Social Power. Volume One: From the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983); and Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* chap. two.

[9]Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1979); and Susan Cotts Watkins, *From Provinces into Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).

[10]Ernest Gellner's earliest statement is in his *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1964), chap. seven. A slightly revised version of his position appeared as "Scale and Nation," *Philosophy of Social Sciences* 3 (1973). The most complete statement of his position is *Nations and Nationalism.* Important differences between these statements are noted by Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic persistence and national transformation," *British Journal of Sociology* 35 (1984). Gellner's position continues to change, as can be seen from "Nationalism and Politics in Eastern Europe," *New Left Review* 189 (1991); "Nationalism reconsidered and E. H. Carr," *Review of International Studies* 18 (1992); and "L'avvento del nazionalismo, e la sua interpretazione. I miti della nazione e della classe," in Perry Anderson, ed., *Storia d'europa* (Torino: Einaudi, 1993).

[11]Gellner, *Thought and Change,* 169.

[12]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 6.

[13]Analyses of earlier imaginings are contained in Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism,* and Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Cf. Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). It seems to me that Gellner now accepts the spirit of this point: his most recent essays cited above make much of the difference between national awakening in Germany and Italy, already possessed of high cultures, and in the "time zone" further to the East—where invention was complete.

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[14]I owe this point, that nationalism "lacks sociological moorings and depends upon strong political projects," to Nick Stargardt.

[15]Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* passim but especially chap. five.

[16]Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State,* offers several interesting comments on Kenyatta. A related article, both powerful and disturbing, is that of Susan Pederson, "National Bodies, Unspeakable Acts: The Sexual Politics of Colonial Policy Making," *Journal of Modern History* 63 (1991).

[17]Jadwiga Staniszkis, *The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1991), 294.

[18]John A. Hall, *Powers and Liberties* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

[19]Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 990–1990* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). Cf. Mann, *Sources of Social Power. Volume One.*

[20]These dimensions of state power were identified by Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Powers of the State: Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology* 25 (1984). For an attempt to remove confusion from these categories and to push them a little further, see John A. Hall, "Understanding States," in John A. Hall, ed., *The State* (London: Routledge, forthcoming, 1993).

[21]Michael Mann, "The emergence of modern European nationalism," in John A. Hall and Ian Jarvie, eds., *Transition to Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Cf. Michael Mann, *Sources of Social Power. Volume Two: The Rise of Modern Nations and Classes, 1760–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, 1993).

[22]Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780,* 18–23.

[23]Full details are available in the tables in Mann, *Sources of Social Power. Volume Two.*

[24]Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), 18.

[25]Ibid., 117–32.

[26]John Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

[27]These details are taken from Colley, *Britons,* 111, 112.

[28]T. C. W. Blanning, *The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792–1802* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); and Simon Schama, *Patriots and Liberators* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1977). On this topic more generally, see David Kaiser, *Politics and War,* pt. three (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).

[29]Barrington Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1966).

[30]Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State,* chaps. nine and thirteen. Cf. Alter, *Nationalism,* 34–37. Both prefer the term "reform nationalism."

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[31]This paragraph draws heavily on Peter Paret's superb *Clausewitz and the State* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[32]Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 591–92.

[33] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State,* chap. fifteen.

[34]I have relied most heavily here on Gerhard Masur, *Simon Bolívar* (Albuquerque, N.Mex.: University of New Mexico Press, 1969); John Lynch, *The Spanish-American Revolutions: 1808–1826* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973); and L. Bethell, ed., *The Independence of Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). José Merquior, "Politics of Transition," *Government and Opposition* 16 (1981), noted some time ago that Gellner's theory of nationalism failed to confront the first great wave of state creation; Gellner admits as much in *Nations and Nationalism,* 135. A first attempt to bring the Latin American experience into the center of nationalist studies was made by Benedict Anderson: the rev. ed. of *Imagined Communities* changed the title of the fourth chapter to "Creole Pioneers" in an attempt to underscore the importance of this historical experience.

[35]John Lynch, "The origins of Spanish American Independence," in Bethell, ed., *The Independence of Latin America,* 25.

[36]This point about logistics is made by Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* chap. four.

[37]Kalevi J. Holsti, "Armed Conflicts in the Third World: Assessing Analytical Approaches and Anomalies," paper given at McGill University, March 1993.

[38]Miroslav Hroch, *The Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Gellner's "L'avvento del nazionalismo, e la sua interpretazione" critically evaluates Hroch's argument, albeit so as to underscore nationalism's social roots. Later in this essay it will become clear that the weakness of both Gellner and Hroch resides in their downplaying of political determinants of nationalism.

[39]Linda O'Boyle, "The problem of an excess of educated men in Western Europe, 1800–1850," *Journal of Modern History* 42 (1970).

[40]Hroch's work on this point is, of course, superb.

[41]John Stuart Mill, "Of Nationality, as Connected with Representative Government," in John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government* (London: Oxford University Press, 1861), chap. sixteen. Mazzini's views are amusingly described in Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780,* chaps. one and four. Cf. Alter, *Nationalism,* chap. three.

[42]In so doing, I am following Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State,* 100.

[43]Alan J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918* (London: H. Hamilton, 1948), chaps. five to seven, gives details both of the particulars and the general context of this story.

[44]Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* 60 – 62.

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[45]This is cited in A. Sked, "Historians, the nationality question and the downfall of the Habsburg Empire," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 31 (1981). I am indebted to this article and to A. Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918* (London: Longman, 1989).

[46]Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). Hirschman has recently claimed—"Exit, Voice and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History," *World Politics* 45 (1991): 194 — that exit is quintessentially a private matter. Nationalism shows that this is not necessarily so.

[47]Oszkar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1961); and Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power. Volume 2,* chap. 10.

[48]Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy,* 290.

[49]Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965). Cf. Alter, *Nationalism,* chaps. two and four.

[50]Alter stresses the importance of defeat in *Nationalism,* 46–56, following Eugen Lemberg, *Nationalismus* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1964). Sources used for Maurras include Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism,* Eugen Weber, *Action Française* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), and Michael Curtis, *Three Against the Third Republic* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959).

[51]Walter Garrison Runciman, ed., *Max Weber: Selections in Translation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 266. Cf. Wolfgang Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

[52]For details, see Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890–1920,* 211–27.

[53]Werner Sombart, *Händler und Helden* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1915). Cf. John A. Hall, *International Orders* (Oxford: Polity Press, forthcoming, 1994), chap. four.

[54]A particularly powerful appreciation of this point is given by Kaiser, *Politics and War,* pt. four.

[55]The two most important studies of popular nationalism are Geoffrey Eley, *Reshaping the German Right* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1980) and Roger Chickering, *We Who Feel Most German* (Boston, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1984). Hobsbawm's views are spelled out most fully in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780,* chap. four, 118.

[56]Mann, *Sources of Social Power. Volume 2,* chap. twenty. I rely on Mann's argument for the rest of this paragraph. Cf. Geoffrey Eley, "Some thoughts on the nationalist pressure groups in Imperial Germany," in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls, eds., *Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914* (London: Macmillan, 1981).

[57]Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chaps. eight and nine; and Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1939).

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[58]Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State.*

[59]John Plamentatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in Eugene Kamenka, ed., *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea* (London: Edward Arnold, 1976). The essay is discussed in Ernest Gellner, "L'avvento del nazionalismo, e la sua interpretazione." Gellner's arguments echo those of Theodor Schieder, *Der Nationalstaat in Europa als historisches Phänomem* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964).

[60]I owe this point to Wlodek Wesołowski.

[61]Humiliation is also distinctively part of Latin American nationalism—which lacks, however, a modernizing impulse. Nationalism by trade, discussed below, is as prone to draw on such feelings, despite its overtly more instrumental approach.

[62]This general theory is most clearly present in Gellner, *Thought and Change*—which I find generally to be more convincing than Gellner's later *Nations and Nationalism.*

[63]An extraordinary essay by Perry Anderson, "Science, politics, disenchantment," in Hall and Jarvie, eds., *Transition to Modernity,* compares Gellner and Weber on nationalism and reaches the conclusion that the former's theory is generically functionalist, failing to make the viciousness to which nationalism can be prone part of its conceptual apparatus.

[64]Ernest Gellner, *Plough, Sword and Book* (London: Collins Harvill, 1988).

[65]This is made particularly clear in Anthony Wrigley, *Continuity, Chance and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Benedict Anderson's sociology of nationalism differs from that of Gellner's on this point: what matters to him is the advent of print culture rather than industry per se.

[66]For a criticism of Gellner on this point, see John A. Hall, "Peace, peace at last?," in Hall and Jarvie, eds., *Transition to Modernity.*

[67]There is a large literature on this point. See, inter alia, Dick Geary, *European Labour Protest 1848–1945* (London: Methuen & Co., 1984); Ross McKibbin, *The Ideologies of Class* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Mann, *Sources of Social Power. Volume Two*; Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg, eds., *Working Class Formation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Tim McDaniel, *Capitalism, Autocracy and Revolution* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988).

[68]Weber made his views especially clear in his wartime reflections on the historical sociology of Wilhelmine Germany. See Max Weber, "Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany," in Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, trans. G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1978), 1391.

[69]This point lies at the heart of Mann, *Sources of Social Power. Volume Two.*

[70]Raymond Aron, *La tragédie algérienne* (Paris: Plon, 1957).

[71]John G. Ruggie, "International regimes, transactions and change," *International Organization* 36 (1982).

[72]Hall, *International Orders,* chaps. three and four.

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[73]Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain* (London: New Left Books, 1977); and Hudson Meadwell, "The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec," *World Politics* 45 (1993).

[74]I owe this point to Michael Mann.

[75]Anatoly Khazanov, "The Collapse of the Soviet Union," *Nationalities Papers* (forthcoming, 1993).

[76]Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia," *Dædalus* 121 (2) (1992).

[77]Russell Bova, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective," *World Politics* 44 (1991): 131–32.

[78]Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Roman Szporluk, "The National Question," in Timothy J. Colton and Robert Legvold, eds., *After the Soviet Union* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1992); USSR Academy of Sciences, *National Processes in the USSR: Problems and Trends* (Moscow: Nauka, 1992); Anatoly Khazanov, *Soviet Nationality Policy During Perestroika* (Virginia: The University Press of Virginia, 1991); and "A Country of Countries," *Economist,* 27 March 1993.

[79]Stephen Jones, "Georgia: a failed democratic transition," in Bremmer and Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States.*

[80]Bogdan Krawchenko, "Ukraine: the politics of independence," in Ibid.

[81]Anthony D. Smith, "State-Making and Nation-Building," in John A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

[82]Holsti, "Armed Conflicts in the Third World" provides figures on this point.

[83]Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[84]Ted Robert Gurr and James R. Scarritt, "Minority Rights at Risk: A Global Survey," *Human Rights Quarterly* 11 (1989). This survey is cited by Holsti, "Armed Conflicts in the Third World."

[85]Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* 43–50.

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Charles Tilly

National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us

LET ME MAKE THE CASE FOR FLEEING from conventional discussions of nationalism to an analysis of national self-determination as a justification for political action. Every place we turn these days someone is discussing nationalism: its origins, its varieties, its intellectual history, its proper conceptualization. I have myself spilled many words on those topics. But surprisingly few of the discussions I have heard, read, or participated in have directly addressed the principle of national self-determination itself. By this I mean a principle operating in roughly these terms:

1. Each distinct, homogenous people has a right to political autonomy, even to a state of its own.
2. If such a people controls a state of its own, it has the collective right to exclude or subordinate members of other populations with respect to the territory and benefits under control of that state.
3. In that case, furthermore, even small or weak states have the right to formulate domestic and international policies without interference from other states.
4. If, however, such a people *lacks* a state, or at least substantial political autonomy, it has the right to struggle for independence or autonomy by extraordinary means.
5. Outside peoples and their states have the right and obligation to forward such struggles.

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6. If the representatives of such a people establish a state of their own or seize control of a state previously controlled by alien powers, outside peoples and their states have the right and obligation to recognize the new regime.

In its extreme (but not necessary) form, the principle of national self-determination assumes that the earth's entire population, or most of it, divides into a finite number of distinct, homogeneous peoples. It follows that the world's ideal condition consists of that finite number of nation-states.

Scholars can have a wonderful time puncturing each of the balloons in this bundle: demonstrating the composite character of almost all existing states; pointing out how few of the world's linguistic, religious, and cultural groups either possess their own states or are making claims for their own states; describing the selectivity with which Great Powers apply the principle in support of nationalist demands; underlining the contradiction between sovereignty and external intervention; analyzing the dependence of policy and welfare within small states on the actions of their powerful neighbors; noting how easily the principles become a virtual vindication of victimizing violence. I have often delighted in applying needles to these ideas.

Such exercises, however, miss a crucial point: for almost two centuries, this set of principles has had extraordinary force as a justification for political action by ostensible leaders of peoples who lack states, by rulers of states who speak in a nation's name, and by third parties— outside rulers, conspirators, international organizations, and many more—who intervene in the political struggles of particular states. Although it did not stop Austria, Prussia, and Russia from carving up Poland during the 1790s, the principle of national self-determination justified many French conquests during the period, and survived to become a major lever for prying apart the Ottoman Empire during the next century. However odd the principle's application sometimes seemed in culturally heterogeneous territories of Africa or Asia, the appeal of national self-determination informed and justified much of the massive decolonization that followed World War II.

When two or more competing versions of the principles come into play simultaneously (as they have acutely in disintegrating

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Yugoslavia and may well soon in South Africa), they cause distress at home and abroad. When the population under the jurisdiction of a given state is strongly segmented, principles of democracy, human rights, and national self-determination commonly conflict, with partisans of each prepared to take drastic steps on behalf of their causes. In recent years, people have been slaughtering each other over the proper application of national self-determination in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan, Vietnam, and many other parts of the world.

Confronted with heroism and murder in the name of national self-determination, scholars, journalists, and politicians whose attachments to all causes are quite contingent often ask why and how people form such strong commitments. That is an important inquiry, and should continue. But students of nationalism can perform a magnificent service by displacing some of their attention to the principles that advocates and combatants so frequently invoke—the principles of national self-determination. In the same sense that the principles of democracy, human rights, and just war deserve scrutiny for their own sake, so too do the principles of self-determination. The set of principles has a history, a philosophical structure, a relation to international law, a range of practical applications, and a characteristic packet of difficulties that will reward a collective investigation.

Let me mention some problems raised by principles of national self-determination that deserve critical discussion and empirical investigation.

Intellectual History. How, where, and why did ideas of national self-determination form, crystallize, change, and gain a following? How have they connected with ideas of sovereignty, national interest, freedom of the seas, war, and revolution? With what ideas have they competed most vigorously? What are the standard critiques and debates?

Normative Questions. What coherent case can one make for national self-determination as a right and obligation? What are the chief objections to that case? What further principles or conditions of fact does it entail? To what degree, and in what ways, does it conflict with principles of human rights, democracy, and sovereignty? How might one mitigate or eliminate such conflicts? How

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does one go about implementing the principles of national self-determination, and what are the likely practical consequences of doing so?

International Law. What standing do principles of national self-determination have in international law? What mechanisms exist for their enforcement? What happens when they conflict with other principles and interests, such as collective security, environmental protection, human rights, or freedom of the seas?

Relation to Existing Political Processes and Conflicts. Where in today's world do claims in terms of national self-determination justify major political movements or motivate significant conflicts? Why and with what consequences? Sociologist Helen Fein has catalogued human rights violations, while political scientists Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr have inventoried what they call politicide, genocide, and ethnic mobilization; how often do their cases involve claims for national self-determination on one side or the other? Can we make any generalizations about the conditions under which such claims *a)* arise, *b)* have strong appeal, and *c)* succeed? Martin van Creveld argues that what he calls Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) has become the predominant form of warfare in the world while major powers have continued to prepare for wars in which massed armies, navies, and air forces zap each other with high technology; how often does LIC involve claims for national self-determination?

The Future of States, of National Self-Determination. If such changes as the breakup of the Soviet Union, the creation of the European Community, the globalization of capital, and the acceleration of international migration are altering the character of states and of international relations (as many of us have been arguing), the conditions for viable national self-determination must be shifting as well. What alternative futures are possible? Likely? What institutional changes do they imply? In a more utopian vein, by what means other than establishing one independent state per mobilized nation might we guarantee cultural variability, civic connectedness, protection of minorities, and other desiderata commonly portrayed as benefits of national self-determination?

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Katherine Verdery

Whither "Nation" and "Nationalism"?

NATION AND NATIONALISM: WHAT ARE THEY?

DURING THE 1980S AND 1990S, THE SCHOLARLY industry, built up around the concepts of nation and nationalism, became so vast and so interdisciplinary as to rival all other contemporary foci of intellectual production. I take "nation," anthropologically, as a basic operator in a widespread system of social classification. Systems of social classification not only classify; in institutionalized form, they also establish grounds for authority and legitimacy through the categories they set down, and they make their categories seem both natural and socially real. Nation is therefore an aspect of the political and symbolic/ideological order and also of the world of social interaction and feeling. It has been an important element of systems of social classification for many centuries. This is not surprising, given its root meaning, "to be born"—an idea crucial to making any system of categories appear natural. As the historian Eric Hobsbawm among others reminds us, however, it has had many different meanings historically: it has been employed in reference to guilds, corporations, units within ancient universities, feudal estates, congeries of citizens, and groupings based in ostensibly common culture and history.[1] In all cases, it was a sorting device—something that lumped together those who were to be distinguished from those with whom they coexisted[2]—but the criteria to be employed in this sorting, the thing into or for which being born mattered, such as the transmission of craftsmanship, aristocratic privilege, citizenly responsibility, and cultural-historical community, varied across time and context.

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In the modern period, nation has become a potent symbol and basis of classification within an international system of nation-states. It names the relation between states and their subjects and between states and other states; it is an ideological construct essential to assigning subject positions in the modern state, as well as in the international order. That is, nation is crucial to the way a state is linked to its subjects, distinguishing them from the subjects of other states, and to the state's larger environment. As a symbol, nation has come to legitimate numerous social actions and movements, often having very diverse aims. It works as a symbol for two reasons. First, like all symbols, its meaning is ambiguous. Therefore, people who use it differently can mobilize disparate audiences (both internal and international) who think that they understand the same thing by it. Second, its use evokes sentiments and dispositions that have been formed in relation to it throughout decades of so-called nation-building.

Nationalism, in this perspective, is the political utilization of the symbol nation through discourse and political activity, as well as the sentiment that draws people into responding to this symbol's use. Nationalism is a quintessentially homogenizing, differentiating, or classifying discourse: one that aims its appeal at people presumed to have certain things in common as against people thought not to have any mutual connections. In modern nationalisms, among the most important things to have in common are certain forms of culture and tradition, and a specific history.

But modern nationalisms have operated in the name of at least two major meanings of nation as a state-subject relation. Eric Hobsbawm identifies the two principal senses of nation in modern times as: a relation known as citizenship, in which the nation consists of collective sovereignty based in common political participation, and a relation known as ethnicity, in which the nation comprises all those of supposedly common language, history, or broader cultural identity.[3] The latter is the one most often invoked with the term nationalism, but it is not the only meaning. The confusion and overlap of these meanings in politics has confounded scholarship whenever it takes nation and nationalism to mean only one thing. We can identify additional meanings of nation that have insinuated themselves into political discourse, such as the state-subject relation attempted under state socialism, emphasizing a quasi-familial de-

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pendency I call *socialist paternalism.*[4] Any of these (or other) meanings, or some combination of them, might apply in a particular use of the symbol nation; its meaning cannot simply be presumed.

These observations suggest three pitfalls that scholarship on nation might strive (and has often not managed) to avoid. First, it should explore which sense of nation is apt to the context in question, rather than imposing a modern sense on a medieval reality, a French sense on a Kenyan reality, or a nineteenth-century sense on the evolving reality of today. Second, it should treat nation as a symbol and any given nationalism as having multiple meanings, offered as alternatives and competed over by different groups maneuvering to capture the symbol's definition and its legitimating effects. This means we should not treat nationalism itself as a social actor and ask whether it is good or bad, liberal or radical, or conducive to democratic politics. Rather we should ask: What is the global, societal, and institutional context in which different groups compete to control this symbol and its meanings? What are the programs of the different groups? Radical? Liberal? Reactionary? What are the social conditions that predispose towards success for one group and one program over another? This approach takes the "ism" out of nationalism and lodges agency back in human beings, constrained by social structures. It also leads us to wonder if the term nationalism is adequate to the inflation of its meanings and uses. Third, given the crucial ideological role of nation in linking states with their subjects, scholarship should make a concerted effort not to be conned by the terms of national ideologies: not to treat nations as actually defined, for example, by culture, or descent, or history. We should take those terms instead as objects of study and ask: What is the context in which one or another definition or symbolization of nation operates? What is it accomplishing? Is it doing work for arguments aimed elsewhere rather than at national questions per se? This third point can be illustrated by exploring five possible areas for inquiry into nations and nationalism.

HOW SHOULD WE BE STUDYING NATIONS AND NATIONALISM NOW?

What Underlies the Notion of Identity?

We tend to write about national identity as if the second term were not problematic, as if everyone ought to have identities or to have

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certain kinds of identities, and not too much of some of them. Where has the notion of identity come from, and why has it become important for human beings to possess them? What specific notion of person or human being is implied in the concept of identity, and what is the historical specificity of this concept? By what political, economic, social, and symbolic context is it informed? How are identities socially constructed, and how are persons made who have identities?

This inquiry overlaps with the notion of "possessive individualism"—with the historical rise of monads called individuals for whom possessing was to be a defining trait—and it joins the matter of nation because nations are conceived as collective individuals.[5] Since at least the writings of the German philosopher and theologian Johann Gottfried von Herder, nations are conceived—like individuals—as historical actors, having spirits or souls, missions, wills, geniuses; they have places of origin/birth (cradles, often, in the national myth) and lineages (usually *patri*lineages), as well as life cycles that include birth, periods of blossoming and decay, and fears of death; they have as their physical referent territories that are bounded like human bodies. Nations, like individuals, are thought to have identities, often based in so-called national characters. National identity thus exists at two levels: the individual's sense of self as national, and the identity of the collective whole in relation to others of like kind. What is this peculiar concatenation of ideas all about? What is the sociohistorical efficacy of the notion of identity, with its seemingly contradictory root meanings of same, as in identical, and unique—root meanings that, like national ideologies, simultaneously homogenize and differentiate?

How Do People Become National?

How is a sense of the self as national developed? We might call this the problem of national subjectivities—in the plural, because we cannot assume that there is only one form of self-experience as national. This issue relates directly to the preceding one: it asks how the homology between the nation and the individual becomes internalized and is assimilated by the individual, entering his or her "inside." My phrasing presupposes, of course, that a notion of inside is socioculturally available. Not all human societies have thought of people as having a separate realm of the inside.[6]

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Exceedingly helpful here is a distinction the anthropologist John Borneman makes between nationalism and nationness, the former referring to conscious sentiments that take the nation as an object of active devotion, the latter to daily interactions and practices that produce an inherent and often unarticulated feeling of belonging, of being at home.[7] These practices and routines may range from the relatively mundane rituals of courtship and family-making, as influenced by the policies of the state,[8] to the relatively rare and spectacular, such as participation in warfare, which may have been essential to building devotion to the nation during the early-modern period so that such devotion could be presupposed by war-makers later on.[9] Beneath this inquiry rests a Foucauldian premise about the creation of modern subjects through the often invisible practices (what Foucault calls microphysics) of power. To research it would direct attention away from the noisy and visible rhetorics of nationalists and toward the techniques through which receptive dispositions have been quietly laid down in those to whom they appeal.

How Variously is Nation Symbolized?

What do we gain by seeing the nation as a symbol rather than as a thing? In recent anthropological writings, a concern with nationalism has given way to seeing national rhetorics as plural, as elements in larger contests to define the meaning of national symbols and to define the nation-as-symbol itself. For such an objective it no longer makes sense to use the term national*ism,* for the point is to see how a single symbol, nation, takes on multiple meanings. Groups orienting to it all take the nation to be the paramount symbol, but they have different intentions for it. Various things enter into their conflicts—contrasting ideas about authenticity, about the nation's true mission, about cultural patrimony or heritage, about national character, and so forth.[10] This research asks how ideas about nation and identity are produced and reproduced as central elements in a political struggle. It sees nation as a construct, whose meaning is never stable but shifts with the changing balance of social forces, and it asks what kind of leverage this construct has afforded certain groups—and why those groups rather than others.

To take seriously the use of nation as a symbol means a close inspection of the social tensions and struggles within which it has become a significant idiom—a form of currency, used to trade on

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issues that may not be about the nation at all. For example, in postsocialist Eastern Europe there is widespread stereotyping and scapegoating of Gypsies, seen as lazy and thieving. If one thinks ethnographically about these stereotypes, it becomes apparent that people use Gypsies to symbolize the dislocating introduction of markets into the former Socialist bloc. Gypsies are not the only ones engaged in trade, yet responsibility is assigned to them for much that people find confusing and upsetting in the new postsocialist order. This kind of approach helps to account for why group boundaries or categorizations can persist even in the absence of members of the group in question, as with anti-Semitism in many Eastern European countries having scarcely any Jews.[11]

National symbolization includes as well the processes whereby groups within a society are rendered visible or invisible. For the project of nation-building, nonconforming elements must be first rendered visible, then assimilated or eliminated. Some of this can occur quite physically, through the violence most recently associated with "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But short of this are other, symbolic violences through which difference is highlighted and then obliterated. Notions of purity and contamination, of blood as a carrier of culture, or of pollution are fundamental to the projects of nation-making. They merit more attention than scholars have accorded them.

How Can We Understand the Intersection of Nation with Other Social Operators?

Ethnicity, race, gender, and class can be seen, like nation, as aspects of identity formation, but they are also at the same time axes of social classification, which often appear alongside one another, interacting in complex ways. In a brilliant review article, the anthropologist Brackette Williams discusses how the projects and policies of state-making implicate many of these different axes in the homogenizing process basic to the modern nation-state's form of rule.[12] She sees the state as the encompassing frame within which symbolic conventions are established and fought over, legitimacies striven for, group relations and the distributions associated with them fixed. The state is the frame for producing visibility, the anchor for what prove to be politically effective notions such as culture, authentic, tradition, common/shared, or barbarian. As she

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writes, "concepts of race, ethnicity, locality, and nationality competitively label different aspects of [the identity-forming] process"; their context is a state that motivates differences as it inscribes boundaries, demarcating inside from outside, self from other.[13]

Following Williams, we should see the modern state as produced through a totalizing process that entails a relentless press toward homogeneity, which is simultaneously a process of exclusion. Such homogeneity is not necessarily pursued for its own sake; it may serve various ends, such as creating a common foundation of skills for a work force or a space amenable to managing the state.[14] In the latter case, a homogenizing thrust creates the nation as all those the state should administer, because they all supposedly have something in common. States vary in the intensity of their homogenizing efforts, partly as a function of the power held by political elites and the resistances they encounter. This equation may explain why certain, especially Third World, states pursue less radical homogenizations than do others.[15]

Nevertheless, to institutionalize a notion of commonality is to render visible all those who fail to hold a given feature in common. Thus, by instituting homogeneity or commonality as normative, state-building renders difference sociopolitically significant—that is, it creates the significance of differences such as ethnicity, gender, locality, and race, each of them defined as particular kinds of differencing with respect to the state's homogenizing project. The most comprehensive possible agenda for the study of nationalism is, therefore, the study of historical processes that have produced a particular political form—nation-states—differently in different contexts, and of the internal homogenizations that these nation-states have sought to realize in their different contexts. In each case, they pursued their homogenizations within locally varied understandings of same and different that implicated class, gender, ethnicity, and race—but did so variously in each place.

How Does the Dissolution of the Nation-State Affect the Viability and Deployment of Nation as a Legitimating Symbol in Politics?

In the world of today, participation is legitimated by the idea of nation—nation-states—even when a given empirical case realizes the classic nation-state form only imperfectly. Yet scholars and others have begun to suspect that the modern state form is, if not

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dying out, undergoing a major reconfiguration.[16] The international weapons trade has made a mockery of the state's supposed monopoly on the means of violence. Capital's extraordinary mobility means that as it moves from areas of higher to areas of lower taxation, many states lose some of their revenue and industrial base, and this constrains their ability to attract capital or shape its flow. Capital flight can now discipline all nation-state governments.[17] The increased flow of capital—and of populations, in its wake, producing the much commented phenomenon of transnationalism—calls into question in an unprecedented way all those arbitrary, taken-for-granted nation-state boundaries.[18] The result is both real-world changes in those boundaries—as with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, not to mention the threatened secession of Quebec from Canada, of the Celtic Fringe from Great Britain, and so forth—and also frenzies of national relegitimation, both where the boundaries are in question and elsewhere as well.[19] On this reading, the turmoil in former Yugoslavia merely sets in bold relief what it means to create a nation-state, with all the most violent forms of homogenizing and purification and the forcible imposition and legitimation of boundaries.

But all this is happening, paradoxically, at a moment when the nation-state form itself is being superseded. If, as geographer and social theorist David Harvey claims, the new world order is one in which finance capital rather than bounded nation-states will play the chief coordinating role,[20] what might be the consequences of this for the legitimating significance of nation as a symbol in international politics? Is nation, too, headed for the exit, as Eric Hobsbawm argues?[21]

I have my doubts. It seems more likely that nation is once again changing its referent (as well as its articulation with capital), a sign of this change being the novel grounds for which it is now being proposed, such as the Arab Nation or Queer Nation. The size requirements of viable nationhood are decreasing. In addition, persons are being compelled into single identities—alternatives are being stripped away from those who would have multiple allegiances (think of the offspring of mixed marriages in former Yugoslavia, for example)—while xenophobia and multiculturalism normalize these identities as the basic elements in socioeconomic competition and conflict. This suggests that although the idea of

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nation with which we have been familiar may indeed be past its peak, being born into something as a natural condition will remain fundamental to human experience and to scholarship, even if in new ways.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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ENDNOTES

[1]See Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16–24.

[2]Ibid., 16.

[3]Ibid., 18–20.

[4]This form of state-subject relation was referred to, in the Romanian case, as the "socialist nation." Instead of emphasizing political rights or ethnocultural similarity, socialist paternalism posited a moral tie linking subjects with the state through their rights to a share in the redistributed social product. Subjects were presumed to be neither politically active, as with citizenship, nor ethnically similar to each other: they were presumed to be grateful recipients—like small children in a family—of benefits their rulers decided upon for them. The subject disposition this produced was dependency, rather than the agency cultivated by citizenship or the solidarity of ethnonationalism.

[5]See C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Louis Dumont, "Religion, Politics, and Society in the Individualistic Universe," *Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* (London) (1970): 31–45; and Richard Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

[6]The notion of an "inside" relates to the historical rise of a notion of personality, among other things; this emerging inside was provided by the psychological investigations of Freud and others, who discovered the notion of the unconscious. See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian, 1958).

[7]John Borneman, *Belonging in the Two Berlins: Kin, State, Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 339 n. 19.

[8]This is the focus of attention in Ibid.

[9]This point is made by Charles Tilly, among others. See the papers in Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

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[10]See, for example, Virginia Dominguez, *People as Subject, People as Object* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990); Handler, *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*; Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991); and Brackette F. Williams, *Stains on My Name, War in My Veins: Guyana and the Politics of Cultural Struggle* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991).

[11]For more on this point, see Katherine Verdery, "Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania," *Slavic Review* 52 (summer 1993).

[12]See Brackette F. Williams, "A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Across Ethnic Terrain," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18 (1989): 401–44.

[13]Ibid., 426. See also David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 8.

[14]Cf. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[15]This point emerged from dialogue with Michel-Rolph Trouillot.

[16]See Hobsbawm's predictions at the end of *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, and any number of the writings of Charles Tilly, such as "Prisoners of the State," *International Social Science Journal* 44 (1992): 329–42, and *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

[17]David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 164.

[18]For consistency's sake, this ought to be called "trans-statism."

[19]See Kira Kosnick, "Boundaries and the Production of National Identity," manuscript, author's files.

[20]Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity,* 164–65.

[21]Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780,* 181–83.

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Liah Greenfeld

Transcending the Nation's Worth

ABOUT A CENTURY AND A HALF AGO, during the time which was called "the spring of the nations," when nationalism seemed to be the ruling passion on the continent of Europe, daily strengthening its grip on the hearts and minds of people, young Karl Marx asserted in the "Manifesto of the Communist Party" that the days of nationalism and nations were counted.[1] He wrote:

> The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. . . .it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. . . .[2]

Marx's argument, in short, was that the speedy and imminent demise of nationalism was made inevitable by the globalization of the economy implied in the spread of capitalism.

In the 1990s, this same assertion and argument are gaining new popularity. Nationalism, we hear, is a dying phenomenon; it is in a

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longtime inevitable decline. The time of nations has passed, their worth transcended, for they have outlived their—essentially economic—purpose.[3]

As in 1848, what we see today offers little to justify such an assertion. A new "spring of the nations" seems to be upon us—new nations springing up wherever one turns—and after another revolution, nationalism appears to be the ruling passion on the continent of Europe. This is not to say that it rules within every heart or even within the hearts of the overwhelming majority of Europeans, but only that, as a collective sentiment, it certainly has no rivals. It is safe to say that nationalism transcends the worth of its universalistic alternatives, whether of the liberal or of the socialist variety. And the conservative alternatives to nationalism have been dead—and, I would propose, forgotten—for at least a century. But, as in 1848, we doubt what we see.[4]

The continuing vitality of nationalism is, obviously, not a convincing argument against the assertion of nationalism's imminent demise. "Imminent" is a relative concept. The believers in nationalism's doom have persisted in their belief for a century and a half, undaunted by the show of this vitality. In fact, the persistence of nationalism has been at least matched by the persistence of the belief in its speedy disappearance. Perhaps, if we wait long enough, we will see nationalism disappear. But we cannot leave this issue to the judgment of history; we must deal with it now.

The fact is that the nation's worth has not yet been transcended. For that reason the question when and under what conditions it may be transcended cannot be answered empirically. But, empirical resolution pending, seeing or not seeing in the present signs that the nation's worth is being transcended depends on one's interpretation of the nation and one's understanding of the basis for its worth in the first place.[5]

A nation is a historically recent phenomenon. In other words, it had no worth for most of human history. What has made it worthwhile? I beg to differ with the prevalent view that nationalism is a functional requirement of industrialization, called forth by the needs of industrializing economy and political structure that it makes possible or necessary.[6] My reason for doing so is that, historically, industrialization was preceded by the emergence of nationalism. For this same reason, I beg to differ from another

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widespread view that nationalism, which may be considered a functional equivalent of great religions, is (or was) a functional requirement of secularizing societies.[7] Nationalism emerged in a time of ardent religious sentiment, when questions of religious identity grew more, rather than less, acute, and faith became more significant—the time of the Reformation. It was able to develop and become established owing to the support of religion, and, if it later replaced it as the governing passion, in many cases it incorporated religion as a part of the national consciousness.

The worth of the nation—the psychological gratification afforded by national identity and therefore its importance—is related to the experience of dignity by wide and ever widening sectors of humanity. Nationalism originated as a reaction—one of many possible reactions—to the structural contradictions of the society of orders. It was a response of individuals in elite sectors of society, who were personally affected by these contradictions and were placed by them in a state of status-inconsistency. The inventors of nationalism were members of the new—Henrician—aristocracy in England. Upwardly mobile commoners who reached the top of the social ladder, they found unacceptable the traditional image of society in which social mobility was an anomaly, and substituted a new image for it, that of a *nation* as it came to be understood in modern times. When this happened, the word "nation" meant something entirely different; it referred to a political and cultural elite, rather than to a society as a whole. Henrician aristocrats, however, made it synonymous with the "people" of England, a concept which—in English as in other European languages—referred specifically to the lower orders, the rabble or plebs, of which so many of them were born. As a result of this inspired redefinition (it was a matter of inspiration, in no way inevitable and therefore in no way predictable), every member of the people was elevated to the dignity of the elite, becoming, in principle, equal to any other member. The remarkable quality of national identity which distinguishes it from other identities—and also its essential quality—is that it guarantees status with dignity to every member of whatever is defined as a polity or society. It is this quality that recommended nationalism to European (and later other) elites whose status was threatened or who were prevented from achieving the status they aspired to, that ensured the spread of nationalism throughout the world in the last

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two centuries, and that explains its staying power in the face of the economic interests that ostensibly pull in the other direction.

I would not claim, as does Francis Fukuyama, that the experience of dignity (or social recognition) is essential to human life, since during most of recorded history most men and women lived without dignity. It is not status attainment, but rather status maintenance—which applies to low status as much as to high status—which is essential. During most of human history, only high status, that is, a very small minority of social positions, was associated with dignity. Yet, dignity is addictive: having known it, one can no longer be happy without it. Who better to quote in support of this claim than the founding father of the discipline of economics and the author of the *Wealth of Nations,* Adam Smith. However disagreeable this may be to those who see him as the advocate of the primacy of economic factors, he considered status to be "the cause of all the tumult and bustle, all the rapine and injustice, which avarice and ambition have introduced into this world." Dignity, says Smith, "when once it has got entire possession of the breast, will admit neither a rival nor a successor. To those who have been accustomed to the possession or even to the hope of public admiration, all other pleasures sicken and decay."[8]

It is safe to assume that in modern society people will never agree to be deprived of their dignity which they acquired with nationality. The possibility of the transcendence of the nation's worth, therefore, depends on the availability of alternative guarantees of dignity, on finding or inventing a functional equivalent of nationality in this respect.

In the early days of nationalism, different elite groups, exposed to nationalist ideas, reacted dissimilarly to them, in accordance with the relative ability of nationalism to aid them in their status-maintaining and status-aggrandizing pursuits. An example is furnished by the nobility in various German lands who as late as the early-nineteenth century remained indifferent to the appeal of nationalism, embracing it rather reluctantly during the Wars of Liberation. Throughout the eighteenth century, when French and Russian nobilities converted to nationalism en masse, and until the defeats by Napoleon, the German nobility enjoyed undisturbed social ascendancy. It was content, its status was as exclusive as ever, and there was no reason why it would welcome anyone else to partake

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in it. The nation had no worth for this nobility; nationalism could offer it nothing. In both France and Russia, in distinction, the status of the nobility was threatened, its exclusivity long gone, and its dignity devalued. In both countries, nobles felt humiliated by the central power and deprived of any power of their own. It was thus worthwhile for them to discard their former estate identity, which bred expectations of dignity but no longer provided means to satisfy them and so condemned one to a life of frustration and fear that whatever remained of one's status would be lost, and adopt a new—national—identity, which redefined the nobility's relations with the central power and guaranteed both status and dignity. As far as the German nobility was concerned, nationalism was not able to transcend the worth of the society of orders; but for the French and the Russian nobilities, it successfully transcended this worth.

Among nonnoble intellectuals, the second of the two elite groups that were responsible for the initial establishment of nationalism in Europe, the idea of the nation also had to compete with other status-bestowing frameworks. As long as other identities appeared to promise more dignity, the nation failed to captivate them and secure their commitments. French philosophes were above particularistic self-content. Voltaire wrote that "a philosopher has no *patrie* and belongs to no faction," that "every man is born with the natural right to choose his *patrie* for himself." Abbé Raynal believed that "the *patrie* of a great man is the universe." Great men, explained Duclos, "men of merit, whatever the nation of their origin, form one nation among themselves. They are free of puerile national vanity. They leave it to the vulgar, to those who, having no personal glory, have to content themselves with the glory of their countrymen."[9] So long as one could reasonably hope to become world famous (and French philosophes in the mid-eighteenth century still had a reasonable chance of that), it was foolish to limit oneself to a small part of the world. And if one was confident in one's superiority and felt assured of recognition, one had no need for shared dignity of a nation. In fact, one had no need for nation at all, a *republic of letters* was enough.

Ironically, at the very time when French philosophes dismissed the nation as being too small for their grand designs and exhibited such confidence in their ability to win the hearts of audiences (and, therefore, prestige) everywhere, these audiences, at least in Europe,

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were closing their hearts to them, making such conquests very difficult and the nation the only place where one could reasonably hope to make them.

Another reason why French eighteenth-century intellectuals were hesitant about nationalism was the fact that, as a result of the crisis and the redefinition of the nobility, the nobility opened its doors to talent, and for low-born luminaries noble status was dignified enough. It was nobility's giving up on itself that eventually persuaded many of them to give up their hope of joining the nobility and turn into national patriots instead.

German nationalism was a later development than French nationalism, and German intellectuals remained faithful to their cosmopolitan ideals long after their French brethren had abandoned theirs. Nicolai considered German nationalism "a political monstrosity"; Schiller claimed to have given up his fatherland in exchange "for the great world" and wrote "as a citizen of the world." Fichte was a principled cosmopolitan as late as 1799. When, accused of atheism, he lost his professorship at Jena, he hoped for a French victory in Germany (for nothing was more certain to him "than the fact that unless the French achieve the most tremendous superiority [in Germany,] no German who is known for ever having expressed a free thought will in a few years find a secure place") and asked to be employed by the French Republic.[10] Nationalism did not appeal to German intellectuals prior to the Napoleonic campaign because they were the only group interested in the redistribution of prestige in society, and without the support of the nobility and the bureaucracy, they lacked the means to enforce it. To insist on such a redistribution (implied in the idea of the nation) in this situation would have only invited ridicule and damaged the chances of social advancement which some of them had. It was more satisfying to dream that one was an equal member of a community of intellectuals and hope for the recognition of that community, even though in the case of German intellectuals such a hope in the eighteenth century was not reasonable, for this at least would not be laughed at. Nationalism was irrelevant and nation worthless. The French invasion made it worthwhile. It created a community of interest between the intellectuals and the higher classes, who, so prohibitive and inaccessible before in their superiority, now allowed the intellectuals and in fact welcomed

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them to take part in their worries and sorrows. What the nobility and the intellectuals shared, and what made the nobles look favorably on the intellectuals, was that they were Germans. While cosmopolitanism and the idea of a world intellectual community offered German intellectuals a form of escape, a possibility to dream about social fulfillment and advancement, partnership in a nation offered real possibilities of such advancement.

The argument that the nation's worth varies in accordance with the possibilities for dignified status it offers is supported, among other things, by those rare cases in modern history when the nation's worth was transcended (whether permanently or, as more often was the case, temporarily); such transcendence had very little to do with the economy and everything with status.

The architects of nationalism, those who articulated and popularized new ideas, were, unavoidably, intellectuals—articulators and disseminators of ideas, by definition—whether professional or not and whatever their social origins. In some important cases, however, this crucial role was played by professional intellectuals, and in these cases professional intellectuals were rewarded by (or, rather, secured for themselves) high social status for generations to come. They became the new aristocracy. Like the latter, they do not have to be particularly wealthy and, as a rule, do not have much power, but they enjoy great prestige, and they enjoy it because they are intellectuals. Nationality may be more worthwhile for intellectuals than for others, and this explains why, as a matter of fact, intellectuals are very rarely alienated from their societies. They may be antiestablishment and opposed to their governments, they may not like their governments' policies and may believe that they know better, but they are not, as a rule, opposed to their nations. For that reason, they very rarely emigrate, unless forced to do so.

But there are exceptions to this rule, and these exceptions help to underscore conditions under which the nation's worth may be transcended. By exceptions I do not mean individuals (there are always exceptional individuals), but societies. One such exception is America. In America, professional intellectuals did not play a central role in the articulation of national consciousness; they did not exist as a group until perhaps the 1830s. For this, as for several other reasons, American intellectuals have not enjoyed the great prestige and authority enjoyed by intellectuals in France, Germany,

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or Russia (and it is possible that even in England, where the situation is quite similar to the American one, intellectuals enjoy greater respect). American intellectuals were never recognized as an aristocracy in this society which took democracy more seriously than others (for it was, indeed, ingrained in its national consciousness) and recognized no aristocracies whatsoever. Both wealth and power carry more independent weight in America, than in any European society, and status is highly correlated with wealth and power. "It is better to be *nouveaux riches* than no *riches* at all," says an inscription on an etching by a Cape Cod artist, Carol Lummis. New money, that is money not tied to previous status, carries no stigma in this country. An etching with an inscription "It is better to be no *riches* at all, than *nouveaux riches*" is not even conceivable here. But it is conceivable in Europe. Success in business and politics are more visible, and therefore more of a success in America, than success in letters, and while Russians, Germans, and French name their streets after their great writers and poets, Americans are more likely to name them after native vegetation.

The fact is that intellectuals— especially in those intellectual professions in which criteria of excellence are ill-defined—have a problem with the ideal of equality. Their self-esteem and, in many cases, creative energy and raison d'être depend on the inner consciousness and general recognition of their very inequality, superiority to others, the belief that they possess some inherent quality that distinguishes them from and puts them above the rest. In a society based on and dedicated to the premise that all men are created equal, intellectuals are bound to be frustrated and to feel alienated.

Intellectual alienation, indeed, has been a very salient feature of American society. It expressed itself, first and foremost, in the myth of the anti-intellectualism of this society, a reflection of its alleged contempt for culture and its crass materialism. This myth was born almost as soon as American intellectuals as a group and it could not have been more of a misconception. If reality now resembles the myth, this may be because, like many prophesies born out of frustration, this one was self-fulfilling. But this does not change the fact that when it was conceived, American society, its general population, was better educated and had both more respect and more uses for learning than any of the European societies where intellectuals were held in such enviable, from the point of view of

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American intellectuals, esteem. Tocqueville wrote in *Democracy in America* that

> although America is perhaps in our days the civilized country in which literature is least attended to, still a large number of persons there take an interest in the productions of the mind and make them, if not the study of their lives, at least the charm of their leisure hours. . . .There is hardly a pioneer's hut that does not contain a few odd volumes of Shakespeare. I remember that I read the feudal drama of Henry V for the first time in a log cabin.[11]

It is hard to imagine "odd volumes of Shakespeare"— or Zhukovsky, or Racine, or Goethe—among the possessions of Russian, French, or German peasants at the time when he wrote that or decades later, yet Russian, French, and German intellectuals rarely complain about the anti-intellectualism of their respective nations. What American intellectuals have found vexing is not being "attended to," not being deferred to as intellectuals, not having the exclusive status of cultural authority, and they did not have this status, because, in America, culture was not exclusively theirs; it was widely shared.

Since their nation did not grant them the recognition they desired (and the more perfectly it realized its professed ideals, the less likely such recognition became), they did not particularly like their nation. While patriotic effusions by prominent cultural figures are conspicuously—by comparison with other nations—rare in America, its prominent intellectuals have exhibited an equally conspicuous and unparalleled penchant for social criticism—focusing on the shortcomings not just of the government, but of the nation as such.

For a significant number of American intellectuals, the nation's worth was transcended. The nation, in which the status one aspired to could not be attained, had no worth. The solution was to choose a different social framework either through emigration or cosmopolitanism. Intellectual expatriation, specifically, that of writers and artists, though not of scientists, was more characteristic of America than of many countries which supplied America with immigrants. If a French or, more commonly, a German or a Russian writer was frequently an exile, a fugitive from persecution at home, an American intellectual left his home of his own accord, finding it distasteful. A French, a German, or a Russian writer

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might not object to being translated, but wherever he lived, his primary audience remained that of his native country. Though he knew that the great majority of his people would never read his works, because they were illiterate or entirely devoid of interest in intellectual matters, he wrote, undaunted by such a state of affairs, for his country. Conversely, an American intellectual, dismayed at the condition of "*true* intellect" in his all-too-literate native land, would commonly be more concerned about "the general interests of the Republic of Letters" than his country, as was Edgar Allan Poe, and, with Poe, "insist upon regarding the world at large as the sole proper audience for the author."[12] Interestingly, in the university system, the status-sensitive intellectuals in America found their "Republic of Letters," an alternative society within the nation, however parochial, where they can legitimately seek and display status based on natural superiority and, as a result, successfully transcend the nation's worth without leaving it or aspiring to world fame.[13]

The most important reason for transcending the nation's worth, underlying the great majority of the attempts to do so, however, is the experience of *national* inferiority. When the worth of the nation was transcended for this reason (that is when a particular national identity implied indignity, rather than dignity), nationalism in the overwhelming majority of cases was replaced by Marxist socialism or communism. The alternative social framework in this case was world proletariat.

Marxism, as I have argued,[14] is a metamorphosed German nationalism. The inspiration for it, at least in part, was the uncomfortable, the untenable situation of the young Karl Marx, who was a German nationalist, in the sense that he completely agreed with the fundamental tenets of German Romantic nationalism, and a Jew at the same time. A major factor in the formation of German nationalism was the sense of inferiority vis-à-vis and resentment against the West, in Marx's phrasing the "modern" or "advanced nations" of France and England. Owing to the circumstances of its development, German nationalism from its earliest days in the late eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century also had strong racist and specifically anti-Semitic connotations. The Jews, though believed an "Asiatic folk," alien to Europe, were seen as the personification of the West and all the evil with which the latter

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was associated. Excluded from the national communities in which they resided, they were ascribed their own separate nationality quite independent of their religious affiliation, for, in the eyes of their German compatriots, neither baptism nor atheism affected it. This made being German patriots and sharing in the values of German nationalism psychologically very problematic for the Jews. Marx's theory of history, while keeping intact the underlying ideas of German nationalism (specifically its Manichaean vision and its ideas of good and evil with their respective carriers), represented it in the form which solved—or rather eliminated—the Jewish problem. Nations were replaced by classes. National rivalry was economized and represented as class struggle, in general, and in particular as the struggle between the proletariat and Capital. But the incarnation of Capital—the evil in the Marxist scheme—remained the West, and it was the West (with all its riches, power, and especially pretended liberties that made it feel superior to the rest of the world) that was doomed, while the bright future belonged to the proletariat, which whatever else it was, was the anti-West.

The Marxist economization of German nationalism also internationalized it. It became acceptable to national patriots plagued by the sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the West everywhere. This explains why Marxism was so often the program of national movements and why it so well served nationalist interests. This also explains why it has had greatest appeal in societies which had not reached the stage of socioeconomic development when, according to the Marxist theory, the adoption of Marxism would make any sense for them. The reason it was adopted, for example in Russia, had nothing to do with economics and not much more with the alleged struggle between classes. It had to do, almost exclusively, with one class—the intelligentsia—and its unbearable sense of shame for the nation's (political and moral, much more than economic) backwardness. To be a Russian in the end of the nineteenth century was an embarrassment. One way of dealing with this embarrassment was to dissolve the nation in the economically determined humanity, to transcend the nation for a class or to present it as a class, the spearhead of international proletariat, which was indeed the gist of Lenin's theory of imperialism.

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In certain conditions, socialist internationalism promised more dignity than the nation. The problem was that it transcended the nation's worth while keeping all the characteristics of the nationalisms which were the reasons for such transcendence. Socialism redefined reality and gave the unhappy nationalists new hope of transcending their sense of inferiority and triumphing over the nations they considered superior, but it did not change reality—in fact, it effectively precluded such change—and, as a result, it only perpetuated their resentments, instead of eliminating the grounds for them. It is for this reason that today, with socialism gone, it is nationalism in its old, presocialist forms, rather than democracy, that takes socialism's place, and that communists en masse move to the right-wing nationalist camps.

In Russia this transition, from nationalism camouflaged as internationalism to escape the sense of national inferiority to nationalism no longer camouflaged because the escape did not work, lasted seventy years. In other cases, it happened quicker. Perhaps the most striking example of an attempted transcendence of the nation's worth for this reason, and then return to the fold, is that of Benito Mussolini, whose nationalist credentials and exertions need no discussion, but who began as a zealous Socialist, more ardently devoted to the idea of the proletarian revolution than Rosa Luxemburg or Lenin, a comparison which should speak for itself. His revolutionary ardor was not the only score on which Mussolini compared well with Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin. Mussolini could be considered "the first communist in Europe in that he forced the reformists [those who believed that the nation was the proper framework of socialist activity and insisted on the need to recognize and defer to the national sentiment] out of the party."[15] Mussolini would not recognize the nation, because Italy was not worth recognition. It was backward, poor, and laughable in comparison with its Western neighbors. It commanded no respect, wielded no power. It was much more dignified to be a socialist than to be an Italian. But World War I gave him the hope that Italy could assert itself and take its place among those nations belonging to which brought dignity, and this hope was enough to transform him.

In the socialist front of the Russian Empire (alias the Soviet Union) to the contrary, few who attempted to transcend the worth of the nation with the help of the Marxist doctrine remained

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faithful to the idea of permanent or world revolution for long. Jews were disproportionately represented among those who did. Marxism appealed to the Jews, among other things, because it promised to deliver them from their nationality, which in those European countries where Marxism had an appeal, such as Germany or Russia, was associated with unbearable indignity. Only in this context can one understand Trotsky's proverbial response to the question: "Are you Russian or Jewish?" "Neither, I am a Socialist." It was an embarrassment enough to be a Russian at the time, but Trotsky was not a Russian, and to be a Jew in Russia was humiliating. Socialism lifted Jewish Marxists to the dignity of other men, making them equal, and it uplifted their spirit. These Jews transcended the worth of the nation, and, unlike their non-Jewish comrades, returned to national identity only because they were forced to do so.

Fluctuations in the worth of the nation have been quite independent of economic trends and changes in technology and communications, or in the "material infrastructure" of society, to which nationalism has so often been attributed. These fluctuations were related, instead, to the ability of a particular nation to guarantee and safeguard dignified status of its members (whether all, or a specific group) and to the existence of or belief in other possibilities for status-enhancement. On the whole, attempts to transcend nationalism have been very rare, both because nationalism usually has been able to satisfy people's need for dignity, and because for the great majority there were no alternative ways to satisfy this need. Economic globalization is unlikely to weaken the grip of nationalism on humanity; it is largely irrelevant to the problem of nationalism. The nation remains worthwhile, even when it is economically or otherwise irrational, and if the nation's worth is going to be transcended, it is most improbable that this will be on account of economic development.

The fact that, from an economic point of view, the world may be turning into a "global village" does not at all contradict this conclusion. Economic globalization is entirely consistent with nationalism. The belief that it spells the end of nationalism is based on the mistaken assumption of the primacy of economics in social life, the idea of economic determinism. But economic cooperation and attempts to promote economic globalization more often than not are seen and undertaken by the participants in the process as means to

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advance national interests and are not supported if perceived as threatening to the latter. Take, for example, the European Community (EC)—the Western European Community, Eastern Europe being at this moment the most convincing proof of the futility of economic considerations when opposed to nationalist passions. It can hardly be interpreted as a sign of nationalism's demise. So long as European unity was limited to economics, the idea aroused no protest and little sentiment in general. But the moment it appeared to threaten national sovereignties and undermine national prestige, the attitude dramatically changed. Now, a substantial proportion of Western Europeans do not want unification, however interdependent their economies. Moreover, it appears that even those who favor it, do so for reasons that have little to do with economics and can only be characterized as nationalistic. For example, we are told, France, which is the driving force behind the EC, sees it as the only hope of remaining a world power. While Mitterrand's "language is European, his interests remain undisguisedly national." He wants to use the EC "to amplify France's voice on the world stage, and to create strict rules" to counter German influence.[16] As to Germany's reasons for supporting the unification, some fear that it is just trying to "take over the whole of Europe" again. Through a strong federal EC, they say, Germany could pursue foreign policy without making people suspicious of its nationalistic aspirations.[17]

As to the eventual results of the unification, if it comes through and whatever the intentions of the powers behind it, bringing European nations closer may very well enkindle national sentiments and old resentments, instead of extinguishing them. It will bring together in one system societies with different international prestige, different levels of cultural achievement and political records, as well as different living standards—every variety of the haves and the have-nots—and this will create a fertile ground for envy. Envy has been a most potent inspiration for virulent, dangerous nationalism. The EC thus may give new life to the monster it is believed to have buried. It should be remembered that nationalism originally was able to spread only because a degree of globalization already existed. It is no accident that it first spread in Europe, united as it was by ties of religion, common culture, and trade.

I believe that the nation's worth is not about to be transcended as yet. But I also believe in the infinite creativity of the human mind,

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and, I believe that out of our discontent, a better means to satisfy our desire for respect may be born, which would make possible a better world, as nationalism was born out of the discontent of the sixteenth-century nobles, who made our world possible. As long as history goes on, there is hope.

ENDNOTES

[1]This paper was originally prepared for the Boston-Melbourne-Oxford Conversazione, "The Worth of Nations," held at Boston University on 12–14 November 1992, and will also appear in a collection of the conference papers.

[2]Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader,* 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 476–77.

[3]Eric Hobsbawm's *Nations and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) is perhaps the most famous recent example of this view.

[4]Those who believed what they saw, rather than what the logic of the globalization argument implied, pointed to the fact that economic unification of the world not only did not result in spiritual unity, but coincided with its very destruction. Tocqueville wrote: "It is not, I think, going too far to say that in the fourteenth century the political, social, administrative, judicial, and financial institutions—and even the literary productions—of the various European countries had more resemblance to each other than they have even in our time, when the march of progress seems to have broken down all barriers and communications between nations have so vastly improved." Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution,* trans. Stuart Gilbert, 1856 (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955), 16.

[5]This essay repeats some of the arguments made in Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[6]Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism.*

[7]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983; rev. ed., 1991).

[8]Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* ed. D. D. Raphael and L. A. Macfie (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Classics, 1982), 57.

[9]Voltaire, "Réflexions sur l'histoire," and "Annales de l'empire," in *Oeuvres complètes* XXV: 170; XIII: 513; Guillaume-Thomas-François de Raynal, *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes,* vol. V (Geneva: 1775), 10; Charles-Pinot Duclos, *Considérations sur les moeurs de ce siècle* in *Oeuvres diverses,* vol. I (Paris: Dessesartes, 1802), 10. Greenfeld, *Nationalism,* 156.

[10]G. P. Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), 33–34; Hans Kohn, "The Paradox of Fichte's Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 10 (3) (June 1949): 321 n. 5.

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[11]Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* vol. II, ed. Phillips Bradley (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), 58.

[12]Edgar Allan Poe, "Prospectus of the Stylus," in G. R. Thompson, ed., *Essays and Reviews* (New York: The Library of America, 1984), 1035; Greenfeld, *Nationalism,* 470.

[13]I am not implying that these were the sentiments of all American intellectuals. "As so often happens, three options were available to them: loyalty, voice, and exit. They could either accept their society as it was and adjust to whatever approbation and respect they got; try to change their society and make it love them more; or change their frame of reference altogether. The choice of the first option was implicit in the constantly growing number of American scholars and artists. The second was behind much of the rhetoric of American cultural nationalism. The third led to the expatriation or internal exile. Those who chose the two latter options were a minority, but they were highly noticeable, both because they articulated the arguments behind their choice, while the first group—a majority—did not, and because, in the international context, they were unique." Greenfeld, *Nationalism,* 466. I also do not wish to imply that status-seeking is the only or the main thing pursued within universities. Most intellectuals are driven by cultural interests, and universities provide an environment supportive of their pursuit.

[14]Liah Greenfeld, "Nationalism and Class Struggle: Two Forces or One?" in *Survey: A Journal of East and West Studies* 29 (3) (Autumn 1986): 153–74, and in Greenfeld, *Nationalism.*

[15]The discussion of Mussolini relies on Jacob L. Talmon, *Myth of the Nation and Vision of Revolution: Ideological Polarization in the Twentieth Century* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991).

[16]Alan Riding, "France pins hopes on European unity," *The New York Times,* 1 December 1991. France's use of internationalism—and specifically of the European unification—in the interests of French nationalism is not new. One has only to remember that it was Lafayette who, after his sojourn in the United States of America where he aided the cause of independence, on his own testimony, to spite the English, came up with the idea of the United States of Europe—under the leadership of France.

[17]Stephen Kinzer, "Germany Now Leading Campaign to Strengthen the European Community," *The New York Times,* 2 December 1991. One could bring examples from this hemisphere as well. For example, Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1991), believes economic globalization is a good reason to reconsider and redefine American *national* interests and is an opportunity to reorient national—patriotic—energies. It is significant that the epigraph of the book is a quotation from Calvin Coolidge: "Patriotism is easy to understand. . . .It means looking out for yourself by looking out for your country." Many American business leaders and authors on business view open borders trade agreements and multinational corporations as the means to advance American national interests in the conditions of global economy. J. M. Rosow, ed., *The Global Marketplace* (New York: Facts On File, 1988).

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Stanley Hoffmann

Thoughts on the French Nation Today

I

WHAT IS THE PRESENT CONDITION OF THE modern French nation which two centuries of conscious and conscientious efforts, from the Revolution to the present, have built around the *idea* of the nation? In the self-image of the French, as in the rhetoric of nationalism, there are two components: an internal one, which can be called national identity or specificity, and an external one, the nation-state.[1]

The revolutionaries and the Republicans of the nineteenth century tried to define France's national identity in political terms. What constitutes the nation is the social contract that set up a national, democratic polity; it was around those principles, transmitted by the school and the army, that foreigners were not merely "naturalized" but "nationalized," assimilated. But the initial voluntarism was enriched and modified by an increasing emphasis on historical continuity, on *l'héritage*. The weight of the past, a Burkean notion, was providing roots and substance to the abstract and somewhat formalistic notions derived from Rousseau. It is the combination of historical identity and political specificity which provided the formula of the French melting pot. In France, as in the United States, the absorption of immigrants has been a constant. Germany, however, remains reluctant to conceive of itself as a "country of immigration."[2] In both the United States and France—in the former because of the liberal tradition, in the latter because this is one point on which liberalism and Rousseauism converge, yet without merging—the distinction between the public and the private spheres means that

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the foreigner who becomes a national, and thereby a citizen, is supposed, in receiving all the rights of citizenship, also to accept the principles of legitimacy and government as well as the laws of his or her adopted country (explicitly in the United States, where these principles are not in dispute, implicitly in France), but can, in his or her private life, remain faithful to his or her customs and religion. The public person must speak English or French; the private one can keep speaking his or her language of origin. In both countries, the naturalization of foreigners was made easy: in France, this was accomplished through the use of jus soli as well as through voluntarism, i.e., requests for French nationality after a few years of residence.

But the French melting pot has never been quite like the American one. The United States *is* "a nation of immigrants"; France is a nation that attracts and incorporates immigrants. This is a major difference. It accounts for the waves of xenophobia which French historians are beginning to study[3]—against Italians and Belgians in the 1880s and 1890s, against Poles and refugees from Germany and Central Europe in the 1930s. After all, there were comparable waves in the United States. This accounts also for two distinctive features. First, because French nationality is not merely contractual—the signing on to the principles of the Constitution, as in the United States—but has a heavy historical component, the public dimension is *both* political and cultural: it entails the assimilation of French culture, which the school system was supposed to produce. Moreover, the political principles were more pointed or militant, as the result of long struggles; thus, the notion of citizenship entailed not only the separation of church and state, but also *la laïcité,* an aggressive *rejection* of the Catholic Church, precisely because of its old connections with and public role in prerevolutionary France, and its determination to have a say in public affairs. Second, although the French idea that the Republic integrates only individuals, not "communities," and does not "recognize" communities as public actors is one which many Americans would share, the private sphere is regarded, in France, with far greater suspicion than in America. It is the combination of these two differences which explains why the idea of "multiculturalism" remains repugnant to the French. There is only *one* French culture, and "separate" subcultures are not welcome insofar as they impede assimilation to the French culture.

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To be sure, there are occasional similarities between American debates about, and resistance to, the demands of black militants who insist on group identity and groups rights and reject the model of individual integration, and French debates about the integration of Muslims. But America has a special and weighty problem with the blacks: they are Americans, and descendants of slaves forcibly brought to this country long ago. Claiming group rights is a way of obtaining at last the full range of individual civic and social rights that they were denied for so long. The Muslims are immigrants. And while the arguments about their "unassimilability," their ineradicable "difference," are no different from earlier anti-Italian or anti-Polish arguments, there is a novelty: Islam, as duly noted by Fernand Braudel, the eminent historian of the Annales School.[4] Islam is not only an "alien" religion (unlike Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism); it is a powerful culture (which, unlike Catholicism, has not been a major part of French culture), indeed "a way of life," and (like Catholicism in this respect) a code that includes the private *and* the public.

Hence the intensity of the debate about immigration. This time, French national identity is felt to be at stake by many more people than those who ranted about what the "invasion" from the East in the 1930s was doing to the French race (I am thinking of the French writer, Jean Giraudoux). There are two sources of worry. One is that many of the Muslims, particularly those who are deeply religious will be "unassimilable": either French identity will be deeply transformed if they become French, or they will be "a danger to the nation" if they are not assimilated.[5] The other worry is that the mechanisms which succeeded in assimilating men and women whose "cultural distance" from the French was often wide, are no longer as effective. The directives of the Ministry of Education about the civic and social values children must be taught may well be unchanged since Jules Ferry in the late nineteenth century.[6] It is the capacity of schools to transmit these directives which is questioned, partly because the content of French education has become less cultural and parochial, and more technical, that is to say mathematics and science count for more, history and the French classics for less, and partly because many primary schools are now predominantly frequented by the sons and daughters of immigrants in districts—urban and suburban—where they are most numerous, and from

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whose schools the French have fled. There are other aspects of the "weakening of the French melting pot," as an important report has pointed out:[7] spatial segregation, the loss of influence of the Catholic Church on the Muslims, the flabbiness of French voluntary associations such as unions and parties (remarks which acknowledge the role the Church and the Communists, two organizations seen as "antinational" by many French, had played in the process of assimilation), and the decline of the army as an integrative body because of both shorter military service and the preponderance of technical expertise over civic training. All these factors make the Republican model of individual assimilation far more dubious. So, many foreigners want to become French but without assimilating, and the process that turned foreigners into Frenchmen is faltering. The nature of the "demand" has changed: it is tougher. The supply, too, i.e., the melting pot, has changed: it has softened.

The paradox is that the most common reaction, among intellectuals and politicians, from the conservative Catholic historian Pierre Chaunu, to the socialist leader Michel Rocard, via the Jewish sociologist Dominique Schnapper, is an act of faith in the very process which, all agree, no longer performs as it once had. "Integration will be easiest if the consciousness of French identity is strongest"[8] and such a reinforcement of national consciousness cannot be left to "the free play of the spontaneous forces of social life"[9]; the old distrust of private forces left to themselves is obvious here. A deliberate policy is needed, and it sounds most familiar. On the one hand, the goal of full integration is preserved—hence the rejection of the suggestion, made by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing among others, to make the jus sanguinis the exclusive mode of acquisition of French nationality—as well as the "voluntaristic" approach to the acquisition of French citizenship. When there is a contradiction between the two, the former prevailed until recently: hence the maintenance of the laws that granted French nationality automatically to certain categories of foreigners living in France. The new conservative majority has now sharply limited such cases and demanded formal and material evidence of will. On the other hand, a reinvigoration of the school and the army, as vehicles of civic training, is being demanded; little is said about how this is to be done. Around the need for full assimilation, France's two nationalist traditions, the Republican one and that of the far Right, curiously

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converge. It is true that the former wants to facilitate integration, the latter, which fears it, wants to make it more arduous; one stresses the political component of the melting pot, the other the cultural one. But there is a common enemy: the pluralism of multiculturalism. Jews who have become fully and proudly assimilated are, occasionally, the strange bedfellows of Catholic *intégristes.*[10]

The episode of the *foulards islamiques* in 1988—the national debate about the insistence of three young Muslim girls on wearing a veil over their heads at school—showed both the French penchant for turning small incidents into grand symbolic issues, and the depth of the anxiety about Muslim distinctiveness. The defenders of the traditional mechanism of assimilation thought that such a demand was intolerable, because it challenged *la laïcité* in the very heart of the process of homogenization: the school system. American quarrels over multiculturalism, especially in schools and universities, have been followed with a certain amount of *Schadenfreude.*[11] What will happen to American national identity if the Hispanics, the blacks, and the Native Americans, among others, request a right to their separate cultures in the public realm (remember, it includes education for the French)? All these comments and warnings seem to suggest that whereas each wave of American immigrants contributes to and shapes American identity, French immigrants are asked to adopt a firmly preestablished French identity. Indeed, the social historian Gérard Noiriel boldly asserts that while the American melting pot began with the Revolution, the French one ended with it.[12]

And yet, there are genuine grounds for believing that France's capacity to assimilate immigrants has not been seriously impaired. Most of them speak French—part of the labor of integration is therefore unnecessary. Many of them, especially Algerians, appear to want integration, while preserving cultural and family links with their country of origin. This is neither an unreasonable demand nor an original one; it is not a fatal obstacle to assimilation. The power of the French culture, even in a "weaker" school system, remains enormous, and many elements of that culture are transmitted in the working place, and through the media and entertainment industries. Finally, for all the ideological resistance to the taboo of multiculturalism, all the Rousseauean suspicion of pluralism as a threat to *la volonté une,* a de facto pluralism has spread. It was always there in the private sphere, which is where people mostly

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live. But what is significant is the loosening of the Jacobin corset in the public sphere, and the lowering of the barrier between public and private. Regional government is gaining strength. The legislator's will can be declared unconstitutional by unelected judges. The French state encourages the building of mosques. The "private," i.e., Catholic, school system has, for many years now, been subsidized by the state and treated as part of the public service of education. When François Mitterrand tried to tighten state control over it, millions of Frenchmen marched, not in defense of the Church, but for the right of families to choose their children's schools. In the affair of the *foulards islamiques,* many Catholics and Jews—the former because the whole Republican model was built to *expel* the Church from the public domain, the latter because of their own new restlessness about a model of *inclusion* that required assimilation but did not, in the horrible crunch of 1940–1944, protect them from discrimination and death—often supported the girls' request.

There is, thus, an increasing distance between the old Jacobin model, or straitjacket, and the modern French society and polity, but this distance does not doom the French melting pot. A certain amount of friendly tolerance for diversity might turn out to be as good a force for integration as the old Republican indoctrination. What is needed to keep the melting pot busy and effective is, in the first place, the prevalence of values of decency, sympathy, and universality in French society. This is why the refusal of right-wing parties to make deals with Jean-Marie Le Pen on the far Right, even though much of its electorate comes from theirs, is essential: the values common to liberalism and to the French (i.e., Jacobin) version of democracy are more important than the narrow model produced by the latter. In the second place, the success of the melting pot may be helped by the strength of French cultural identity, which remains as well established, and despite an apparent lack of public confidence, as solid as ever. It may be that the doubts about its strength are nothing other than pure and simple xenophobia, a rejection of the others not because they cannot or do not want to become "like us," but because we do not want them. In this respect, it cannot be said that the champions of the old model

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have always done their duty by combating repugnance for the "invaders."

II

Fears about not the substance but the potency of French national identity are also fed by questions about the European enterprise. European integration was initiated by the Fourth Republic, both as the best way to defend French interests now that France had slipped in rank and power, *and* as a bold endeavor in reconciliation (with Germany) and cooperation worthy of French ideals. The sacrifices of sovereignty entailed by supranationality had been, after the debacle of the European Defense Community, both reduced—insofar as the Common Market's Commission, unlike that of the Coal and Steel Community, was not a decision-making body—and delayed, because of the postponement of the introduction of majority rule in the Council. De Gaulle's *Blitzkrieg* against the European Economic Community's (EEC) Commission of 1965, when the latter tried to increase its powers, led to the Luxembourg compromise which eliminated the "threat" of majority rule in matters deemed of essential importance by a member. Under those conditions, the preservation of French independence seemed quite compatible with the construction of a West European entity in economic and monetary matters: the Community helped French modernization, French civil servants dominated its bureaucracy, and France was prima inter pares, the only nuclear Power of the entity, and a fully sovereign state next to a divided Germany with restrictions on its sovereignty. Moreover, in a world dominated by the Cold War, French military autonomy was widely seen as a great asset, offsetting whatever constraints the Community's rules might impose on French economic and financial freedom of maneuver. France was, in the eyes of many French leaders, still a Great Power: through Europe, by its presence outside Europe, especially in Africa, and by virtue of its nuclear nuisance power.[13]

A certain complacent pride began to evaporate in the 1980s. The socialist government's attempt to pursue a *dirigiste* policy of nationalizations and massive public spending disrupted France's balance of payments and trade and jeopardized France's ability to remain within the limits of the European Monetary System (EMS) estab-

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lished in 1978. The sudden awareness of the costs that would have been imposed by the pursuit of such a policy in the midst of a recession, when most of her European partners were tightening belts and fighting inflation, a huge loss of competitiveness and the need to insulate France from the EMS and the EEC's rules, revealed to the French both how much modernization and the abandonment of traditional industrial protectionism had made France dependent on the world market and especially the West European one, and the impossibility of pursuing an economic and financial policy that would be both independent and beneficial. Having finally chosen Europe and austerity—the latter because of the former—Mitterrand needed a new political initiative, and turned to a *relance* of Europe. It was, once more, presented as essential for French power and welfare. The switch to majority vote entailed by the Single Act of 1987 was accepted by Parliament with little turmoil: it was presented as a logical and necessary effect of the decision, unanimously made by the governments of the twelve members, to establish a single market by 1992. But clouds formed soon enough. The inevitable clash between sovereignty and integration, avoided since 1965, when the latter had been set back, could not be postponed any longer.

First, there was the problem of agriculture. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) imposed by de Gaulle had been a tremendous engine of modernization and expansion for French agriculture, just as the size of the rural population was falling to a new low. But the cost to consumers was high, and the accumulation of surpluses was exorbitant. When "Brussels," partly because of this, and partly under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) pressure, began demanding a reform of the CAP, French farmers ceased seeing the Community as their savior and instrument, and turned their anger against its new policies. The "transfer of competence" that had made Brussels, not Paris, the locus of France's agricultural policy was now seen as a fatal giveaway.

Second, it became gradually clear that the European Court of Justice was quietly but relentlessly giving a "Federalist" interpretation of Community competences, and establishing the superiority of Community over national legislation. The French Conseil d'Etat was the last to accept this, but it finally did. Effectiveness within the Community clearly required the enforceability of its norms,

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regulations, and directives in the Courts of the members. But French sovereignty, again, was being eroded.

Third, the reunification of Germany transformed the political context. The economic and monetary giant of the European Community (EC)—however hampered, temporarily, by a hasty policy of absorption of former East Germany that was supposed to be painless—was now a full "sovereign" state with enormous political weight. In the absence of the Soviet threat, France's exclusive card, the *force de frappe,* was devalued, and France's nuclear preference meant that Paris lacked the military freedom of action where it mattered: in the conventional domain. It was no consolation that Germany had voluntarily shackled its own freedom in this realm, since the addition of two *impuissances* left Western Europe still utterly dependent on the United States.

Fourth, the Maastricht treaty on European Union, despite its "essential conservatism," seemed to assault French sovereignty sufficiently, on three points, to oblige the government to ask the Constitutional Council for a judgment on its compatibility with the French Constitution. The Union was receiving the power to regulate the entry of non-EC nationals into the Community, possibly by majority rule in the future. The Monetary Union meant that France would have to give up both the franc and the theoretical autonomy of its financial policy, symbolized by the existence of the Bank of France, in exchange for a dubious share in the control of a European Central Bank which would be fully independent of governments, and a carbon copy of the Bundesbank. Indeed, in order to reach the nirvana of Monetary Union, France would have to meet the highly constraining "convergence criteria" Germany had demanded concerning inflation, interest rates, deficits, and public debts. The treaty also gave to EC nationals the right to vote in local elections and for the European Parliament in whatever country of the Community they were living in. This represented a breach in the historic French association of nationality and citizenship, on behalf of foreigners, whereas the only past dissociation—in colonies—had been at the expense of foreigners.

The Constitutional Council and the French Parliament, which had to revise the Constitution so as to make it compatible with the treaty, focused on these points (the new Title XVI reduces the right of non-French EC nationals to vote and to be elected to a possibil-

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ity, and keeps them from becoming mayors or assistant mayors). The public debate, opened by Mitterrand's decision to submit the treaty itself to the public, and not merely to Parliament, went far beyond this. What emerged from the sound and fury were two central issues. The first was the need to choose between two radically different conceptions of sovereignty—the trickiest of all concepts. An "absolutist" one, which happened to be deeply engraved in French culture, from the days of the Old Regime *and* the proclamation of national sovereignty, logically led to a rejection of all the *abandons* and entrapments entailed by the infernal machine of the EC, with its treaties, its technocrats, and its judges. But the cost of keeping "free hands" risked being the lack of any hands at all: monetary sovereignty had already, de facto, been given up, and the champions of French independence were sufficiently lucid to realize that its recovery entailed jettisoning the EMS and weakening the single market altogether. However, the alternative economic policy they advocated, by imperiling French competitiveness and the franc through inflation and deficits, was no more attractive than in 1983, and no more likely to reduce unemployment than the official course.

A pragmatic and relative notion of sovereignty looked at it not as an indivisible substance but as a bundle of competences that could be gradually pooled or transferred to common bodies, so as to substitute the efficiency of the whole for the relative inefficiency of the members. But this raised as many questions as it answered. As Gaullist Senators put it in a request to the Constitutional Council,[14] which had adopted the pragmatic version in its ruling in April, "if sovereignty is no longer anything but an addition of competences, if one can successively remove them as one would the leaves of an artichoke, at what point, or at what degree, do we arrive at the heart?," a metaphor I had used many years ago![15] (The Council declined to answer.) Who was collecting these leaves? A classical "international organization. . . invested with powers of decision by virtue of transfers of competences consented to it by the member-states,"[16] as the Council put it, or, as many "European" jurists, contrary to the Council's opinion, see it, a supranational entity with a "distinct juridical order" of its own both superior to and part of the juridical order of the members? When the French Parliament, before the public debate on the treaty, amended the Constitution, it carefully avoided taking sides, and it just as carefully limited the

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"transfer of competences" to the establishment of economic and monetary union and to the setting of rules of entry into the Community.

The second issue which dominated the public debate was the famous democratic deficit. Here again, the Rousseauean, revolutionary, and Republican tradition weighed heavily. It attributes legitimacy only to decisions either taken by representatives of the nation, who have full legislative power, or controlled by these representatives. There is, so far, no European nation. The structure of the EC is such that decisions are taken either by "irresponsible" bureaucrats (the supranational Commission), or by ministers of the various member states who exert jointly the Community's legislative power. Even after Maastricht, which increases the European Parliament's powers, the Council will remain the main legislator, and the Parliament a body that can more easily plead and remonstrate than decide and control. Here, the defenders of the treaty were at a disadvantage. They could try to argue that a "transfer of competences" was a better choice for France than a jealous defense of sovereignty because a strong collective hand is better than a weak and empty national one. But there was no way they could argue that this transfer was to a fully democratic system. If the EC was just an international organization, the question of democracy was secondary, and the effectiveness of such an entity would continue to be impaired (the French government had to reassure Parliament that the Luxembourg compromise was still valid). If the new Union was going to become what its name implied, the absence of democratic institutions was a major handicap. The two countries most responsible for this were Britain and France—logically in the former case, since Britain is now the most ardent champion of national sovereignty, or rather, in Thatcherian words, the sovereignty of the British Parliament; but illogically in the French case, since it is the French government which wants the Union to have the broadest possible jurisdiction. The treaty's opponents were able to use the "democratic deficit" as a major part of their case. France, they said, was caught in an *engrenage* in which more and more decisions affecting her future were going to be taken by faceless figures operating on their own, and in which the representatives of the French people were being doubly dispossessed: by an Executive that defined the European policy of France all by itself (it is true

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that the French Parliament has debated European policy only rarely, but it is also true that these debates were remarkably ill-attended), and by European institutions that eat up, one by one, the leaves of the national artichoke.

III

The debate on Maastricht also raised two broader issues—one directly, the other indirectly. The first is the relation of the French nation-state to the European Community or Union. The Community, so far, is neither a classical Confederation, it goes way beyond, nor a Federal Union, it falls far short, nor an ordinary intergovernmental organization. The more it evolves, the more sui generis it becomes: its range expands, but its "supranationality" gets diluted (except insofar as the European Parliament's powers are grudgingly increased); its institutional structure becomes more Byzantine, its legal homogeneity more cracked. Pooled sovereignty means, in practice, that agents of the members behave both as guardians of national interests and as European trustees. To present the Community enterprise as a zero-sum game for the members is wrong. What the states "give up" is not necessarily lost, and much of what is "transferred" does not go to Brussels but to the private actors of the new European economy. Each of the members—by which I mean their governing elites—believes that, left to itself, the European small- or medium-size nation-state is doomed to being less prosperous at home and less effective abroad than if it pursues the complex course of European integration.

But this is not the whole answer. What is this course leading to? It has kept advancing, despite periods of stagnation and setbacks, partly for the reason just given, and partly because it has kept its ultimate configuration in the dark. Ambiguity, which preserves most alternatives, has been both the condition and the price of progress. But there is something about the French mind which resists ambiguity: the pragmatism and open-endedness of the "Monnet method" appeals more to businessmen, and often to bureaucrats, than to lawyers, political thinkers, and intellectual politicians. De Gaulle's insistence on setting goals, on eliminating alternatives, and on prescribing policies, while it always left room for pragmatic adaptation to "les circonstances," aimed at ruling out shackles on

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French hands. The formal anxiety about being governed from Brussels barely conceals a real anguish about being dictated by Bonn (or Berlin), entrapped in a Community that would be an extension of German might rather than, as was hoped originally, French power. Even though all the European nation-states are, in dozens of ways, dependent on each other, on the world economy, and on the country that still appears as having the greatest influence in shaping the world economy, namely the United States, some European states have greater means of affecting their milieu than others, and the new Germany is seen as potentially the most able to do so. There exists, at present, a gnawing fear of being caught in an enterprise that will either lead to a Federation in which the nation will lose its identity as a political unit, with its political powers going both upward, to the new central institutions of the Union, and downward, to the regions, or else result in a Baroque or Gaudiesque construction, multileveled and multispeed, manipulated above all by Germany. There is a fear that the Community begins to resemble much more the German model of Federalism and "social market economy" than the French model of the unitary and regulatory state.

The second large issue is that of the relation of the French nation-state to the new global system that is now emerging. The French conception of political rule is heavily territorial: the soil, the hexagon, are inseparable from French conceptions of authority. But in the new system, as many observers have noted, "nonterritorial functional space,"[17] as one of them inelegantly called it, is developing systems of regulation which are collective and apply to specific activities across geographical space. This "unbundling of territoriality" also takes the form of unregulated transnational economic and financial transactions. Both kinds affect all nations and states, but the hardest hit are, of course, those which participate the least or carry the least weight in the regulatory institutions or in the "transnationalized microeconomic links" and economic and financial flows, and those that find it hardest to conceptualize a system not based on sharp territorial demarcation. Nations such as the United States, Japan, potentially China, and perhaps Germany, although their capabilities are obviously uneven (among countries and among sectors), may be able to control the nonterritorial flows and institutions more than France. There is little solace to be found,

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for French men and women attached to the nation-state, in the emergence of so many new nation-states on the ruins of the former Soviet internal and external Empire, and of Yugoslavia. They are either eager to join the Community, or else are degenerating into an economic mess and violent conflict.

However, the French predicament is one that all nation-states will face (the worst is that of states that have not succeeded in becoming nations, either because, like Russia, they are still multinational, or because, like many African countries, they have failed to integrate their disparate and feuding elements). The nation-state has been a blend of cultural unity (often compatible, as in Britain, with the survival of regional cultures) and political unity; as Ernest Gellner has put it,[18] culture became the access card to citizenship and dignity. How far can these two elements be dissociated? What will happen to cultural identity if they are separated? And where should, or will, the political component of nationhood go in this divorce? To this last question, different countries may give different answers. Some, in Western Europe, for instance, may be quite ready for a leap into Federation; others (Switzerland, it appears) are not ready at all. If Auguste Comte's old principle still applies—that one can only destroy what one can replace—then the nation-state, including its political dimension, still has a bright future. There is, so far, no higher allegiance, nothing that replaces the nation as a legitimate source of social identity, even though, as the late Judith Shklar has pointed out,[19] the modern nation-state has so often been nothing but a war machine and a source of oppression for minorities and deviants. International institutions, although increasingly endowed with powers, remain utilitarian enterprises. They are not objects of loyalty. An entity such as the European Community is still, when it comes to allegiance, primarily a collection of cooperating national loyalties, with loyalty to "Europe" superposed on national loyalty (just as allegiance to Britain is over, say, loyalty to Scotland) only in the rare cases of devoted Eurocrats. It may well be that my judgment of 1965 still stands: the nation will survive, with diminished political powers, and those it will keep losing or has already lost will not go to a single, concentrated higher source. The model of modern state-building out of dispersed and overlapping earlier units may not tell us anything about the future. There may well be no European Federation, at least in the foreseeable

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future. Unless all the members of such a potential Federation are willing to begin by establishing both a genuine European electorate and an effective European Parliament, there will be no world state. But the surviving nation-state will bear little resemblance to the Rousseauean sovereign community, or even to the liberal Mazzinian-esque, Millian, or Wilsonian models of cooperating, homogeneous nation-states. It will no longer be possible to write a purely fierce and proud "hexagonal" history. A world of "pooled" and "unbundled" sovereignties, in which states collectively decide on the attribution and on the use of the powers which they put in common and which they are no longer strong enough to apply effectively all by themselves— even in the military realm—may well be the immediate future of the nation-state. It may be the natural result of an evolution marked both by increasing interpenetration and by the continuing elusiveness of that general society of humankind whose absence Rousseau had noted with, the cultural historian and theorist Tzvetan Todorov notwithstanding, more complacency than regret.[20]

As for French cultural identity, it has never been detachable from French political institutions and programs—it has always been tied to the state. The French state's abandonment of many of its powers over the French economy, the "Europeanization" or "globalization" of that economy, cannot therefore fail to affect French cultural identity. The French have in the past been proud of their unique economic "balance." This was a significant component of their sense of social distinctiveness, as well as a major component of Jules Michelet's nationalism, vis-à-vis England, and later of right-wing nationalism, especially in its anti-American incarnation. This singularity began to fade with post-World War II industrialization, urbanization, and the lowering of trade barriers. It is bound to vanish with the creation of a single European market open to the world. The very dispossession to which the state has thus consented will produce sharp reactions of national sentiment and resistance, as in the case of French farmers, and renewed demands for greater state management and control of whatever can still be managed and controlled from Paris. But insofar as the strategic, high-tech sectors of the industry are concerned, regulation will make sense only at the European level. It may be true that the more European and global economic integration intensify, the greater will be the temptation to defend and to mythologize all the remaining social and political

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components of French national identity (just as global economic integration feeds the tendency of the "Eurocrats" to insist on Europe's distinctiveness—not always obvious—vis-à-vis the United States and Japan). However, the nationalist reactions are more likely to be similar to recurrent bouts of fever than returns to the dominant ideologies, policies, and practices of the self-contained past.

French national consciousness will therefore have to concentrate increasingly on such components of identity as, in the public sphere, the virtues of France's constitutional system—which, despite the consensus around it, are far from uncontroversial—as well as those of France's system of social protection, and the many elements of cultural distinctiveness still provided by French education, by the French intellectual tradition, by whatever persists in the French style of authority, by the sometimes frivolous, but permanent belief in the importance of high culture (which state policies have strengthened since André Malraux) as well as a certain art of life and leisure, a certain rapport with nature, a unique "agreement of earth and foot" (to quote from a character in Albert Camus' *Caligula*) — i.e., what the French have done and will continue to do with the imprint of their history and geography. What may, therefore, occur, is something that would be most welcome: the end of the need that Rousseau had posited—to choose between being a human being and being a citizen. The French revolutionary and Republican nationalism had tried, heroically but falteringly, to bridge the gap by making France the universal carrier of the citizen model. If the operational content of citizenship and sovereignty continues to shrink, then the emotional charge of a national feeling all too ready to veer into chauvinistic nationalism may shrink as well, despite occasional surges, and cosmopolitanism would no longer have to be either a chosen nation's "mission" or a term of insult.

ENDNOTES

[1]This essay is an excerpt of the second of the Tanner lectures on "The Nation, Nationalism and After: The Case of France," delivered at Princeton University in March 1993, and to be published by the University of Utah Press.

[2]See Gérard Noiriel, "Difficulties in French historical research on immigration," in Daniel L. Horowitz and Gérard Noiriel, eds., *Immigrants in Two Democracies* (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 66–79.

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[3]See especially Gérard Noiriel, *Le creuset français* (Paris: Seuil, 1988), chap. 5, and Gérard Noiriel, *La tyrannie du national* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1991). See also Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[4]Fernand Braudel, *L'identité de la France,* vol. I (Paris: Arthaud-Flammarion, 1986), 195.

[5]Noiriel, "Difficulties in French historical research on immigration," 74.

[6]Quoted in Danielle Boyzon-Fradet, "The French education system: springboard or obstacle to integration," in Horowitz and Noiriel, eds., *Immigrants in Two Democracies,* 149.

[7]"Rapport de la Commission de la nationalité," *Etre français aujourd'hui et demain,* vol. II (Paris: Documentation française, 1988), 82ff. See also François Bourricaud, "1945–1992 La crise des référents," in J. F. Sirinelli, ed., *Histoire des droites en France,* vol. I (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 567–99.

[8]"Rapport de la Commission de la nationalité," 82.

[9]Ibid., 86.

[10]In a comparable vein, Paul Yonnet has written a book, *Voyage au Centre du malaise français* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), that requires particular attention. Rather than defending racism, he attacks antiracism. He charges foreign historians with having destroyed "le roman national français," along with French critics such as Bernard-Henri Levy, who has a "sick fear of French identity." He laments "the weakening of national sentiment," and the "decline of the representation of the nation's homogeneity." *Quotidien de Paris,* 2 February 1993.

[11]See *Le Débat* 69 (March-April 1992).

[12]In Horowitz and Noiriel, eds., *Immigrants in Two Democracies,* 73.

[13]See my chapter on "French dilemmas and strategies in the new Europe," in Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *After the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming, 1993).

[14]Quoted in Alec Stone, "Ratifying Maastricht," *French Politics and Society* II (1) (Winter 1993): 83.

[15]See "Obstinate or obsolete," in Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal: France since the Thirties* (New York: Viking, 1974), 379.

[16]Stone, "Ratifying Maastricht," 74.

[17]John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations," *International Organization* 47 (1) (Winter 1993): 171.

[18]In Ernest Gellner, *Culture, Identity and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 6–28.

[19]Unpublished remarks on nationalism.

[20]Cf. Tzvetan Todorov, *Nous et les autres* (Paris: Seuil, 1989), 206 ff.

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Methods of production appear in Marx as prime causes, and the reasons for which they change from time to time are left completely unexplained. As a matter of fact, methods of production change, in the main, owing to intellectual causes, owing, that is to say, to scientific discoveries and inventions. Marx thinks that discoveries and inventions are made when the economic situation calls for them. This, however, is a quite unhistorical view. Why was there practically no experimental science from the time of Archimedes to the time of Leonardo? For six centuries after Archimedes the economic conditions were such as should have made scientific work easy. It was the growth of science after the Renaissance that led to modern industry. This intellectual causation of economic processes is not adequately recognized by Marx.

Bertrand Russell

From *Freedom versus Organization, 1814 – 1914*
1949

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Douglas B. Klusmeyer

Aliens, Immigrants, and Citizens: The Politics of Inclusion in the Federal Republic of Germany

IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS of November 23, 1992, in Mölln, a town near Hamburg, two right-wing arsonists firebombed a house in which a ten-year-old Turkish girl, her fifty-one-year-old grandmother, and the grandmother's fourteen-year-old niece were sleeping. All three were killed. Nine others were injured. The youngest, Yeliz Arslan, burned to death in her bed. In a telephone warning to police, the arsonists ended their message with the words: "Heil Hitler!" The Arslan family had settled in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) twenty years before. The niece, Bahide Arslan, had come from Turkey three months earlier for a job-training program. Yeliz had been born in Germany, and would have been eligible to apply for citizenship under German law in six years.

That evening over six thousand Germans demonstrated against xenophobia in Mölln. Four days later, thousands more demonstrated in large cities such as Hamburg, Frankfurt, Dortmund, and Berlin as well as in smaller towns like Singen and Reinbek. As the year drew to a close, hundreds of thousands of Germans in cities and towns across the Federal Republic had participated in marches and in silent candlelight processions to protest against right-wing violence and intolerance toward minorities. One of the largest marches took place on December 6, 1992 in Munich, which attracted an estimated 350,000 people. These extraordinary displays of public outrage have been both impressive and moving.

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The Mölln firebombing was not an isolated incident of right-wing violence and xenophobic intolerance. Nor was the reaction to the tragedy unique. Germany has seen a surge in hate crimes since unification, and the government's difficulties in dealing stringently with those crimes has in turn prompted an increase in public protest against xenophobia. At stake are two distinct issues that have dogged Germany since the creation of the Federal Republic, and that indeed have their roots in the legacy of Weimar: how to treat alien residents on German soil, and how to police the Federal Republic against the threats of such internal enemies as right-wing hate groups. The first is tied to the general problem of defining rules governing civic membership, the second to the general problem of preserving political order. While these two problems seem to pose separate issues, they come together in tragic incidents like the Mölln firebombing.

The Federal Republic is hardly the only Western liberal democracy that must confront problems of xenophobia and political extremism, and the Federal Republic's record in dealing with these problems may not be notably worse than many of its Western counterparts. But the memory of 1933 means—fairly or not—that Germany's handling of these problems will remain in the spotlight for many years to come. And so we hear "Bonn is not Weimar" repeated over and over again like a mantra. The refrain is true, but many still seem to need the reassurance of hearing it.

Recent fears of the stability of the democratic order and the potential rise of a new militantly nationalistic right-wing movement in the Federal Republic go to the heart of a much older debate over the so-called "German Question." Did the German path of modernization diverge in some fundamental way from other Western liberal societies, or does the distinctiveness of the German past simply reflect the differences of any national history? Was the Third Reich the ultimate outcome of a historically flawed modernization process and, if so, has the Federal Republic truly surmounted these flaws? The upsurge in extremist violence since unification has given these issues a renewed urgency, but we should not allow this upsurge to obscure the remarkable political resilience that the Federal Republic has demonstrated throughout its history. Extreme nationalistic movements have never found secure footing in the Federal Republic. The fears that are now being stirred by the

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outbreak of right-wing extremism grow from concerns that this outbreak may be revealing something fundamental and enduring about German society and German national character. Attempts to define any national character can be illuminating, but are often frustratingly amorphous and highly conjectural. Rather than speculating about the nature of German national identity in the wake of unification and the political extremism that followed, I will approach this issue more practically by examining historically how the Federal Republic has defined the membership boundaries of its national community. Every community determines its own identity—morally, culturally, and politically—by whom it includes and by whom it excludes.

Throughout their history, Germans have had to face an especially difficult and painful problem in drawing the boundaries of their national community. For centuries, each generation has had to wrestle with the questions of defining what it means to be "German," who is and who is not "German," and what are the geographical and political borders of "Germany"? These remain the preeminent questions with which the Federal Republic has had to struggle since its inception, and all of which turn on the issue of defining the criteria for membership in the German national community. These criteria have particular importance for foreign minorities who have settled in the Federal Republic. This essay will examine the struggles that the Federal Republic has had in expanding its definition of civic membership to encompass the diversity of its society. It will focus on the development of the "foreigner problem" in the Federal Republic from the end of World War II to the present.

CITIZENSHIP

Central to the legal status of minorities in the Federal Republic is the issue of citizenship. The FRG constitution, the Basic Law, recognizes two categories of rights: general and reserved. General rights apply to all individuals in the Federal Republic and include freedom of expression, liberty of person, and freedom of conscience.[1] Reserved rights are restricted to German citizens, and include the right of peaceable assembly, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and freedom of occupation.[2] The Basic Law does not

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prescribe how citizenship is recognized or conferred, but the criteria are based first and foremost on ethnic nationality. The rules governing the acquisition of German citizenship derive from the *Reichs-* and *Staatsbürgergesetz* of July 23, 1913, and provide that citizenship is passed by descent from parent to child.[3] In a very real sense, citizenship is transmitted through bloodlines, which is known juristically as the principle of jus sanguinis. By contrast, the acquisition of French and British citizenship is grounded on the principle of jus soli, which makes the place of birth the determining factor. The Imperial Naturalization Law of 1913 had been designed to make the attainment of German citizenship difficult for aliens out of fear that the Reich was being inundated with immigrants from the East, especially Poles and Jews. At the same time, the law sharply reduced the barriers to the immigration of ethnic Germans from outside the Reich.[4]

In explaining the founders' treatment of citizenship issues, one recent study has emphasized how the postwar division of Germany, its loss of full sovereignty, and the massive influx of refugees shaped their conception of national identity. This conception derived from the nineteenth-century German romantic idealization of the nation as a holistic, ethnically-based, cultural community. "The collapse of the Third Reich," Rogers Brubaker observes,

> and the discrediting of *völkisch* ideology might have been expected to discredit German self-understanding as an ethnocultural nation as well. Instead, the peculiar circumstances of the immediate postwar period. . .reinforced and powerfully relegitimated that self-understanding.[5]

Consider, for example, the framers' motives for differentiating between general rights applicable to everyone and reserved rights applicable only to Germans. Seeing themselves "act[ing] on behalf of those Germans to whom participation [in establishing the constitutional order] was denied," the framers wanted to ensure that Germans outside the Western occupation zones would not, through the creation of this order, lose their claim to full rights of citizenship. To this end, they further guaranteed the right of repatriation to any person who had been "admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937 as refugee or expellee of German stock (*Volkszugehörigkeit*) or as the spouse

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or descendent of such person."[6] By singling out the shared racial inheritance of the German "stock" as a criterion for repatriation, the framers invoked a distinctly biological conception of Germanness.[7] Accordingly, the Federal Republic has applied this policy to all ethnic Germans living inside or outside the 1937 frontiers who could prove their German origins from ancestors as far back as four generations, regardless of whether they could speak German or had any familiarity with German culture in the Federal Republic.

The framers envisioned the Federal Republic to be only a "provisional" state until the "entire German people" could "achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany."[8] The framers could not, therefore, make an individual's citizenship — irrespective of ethnic nationality—in the Federal Republic the criterion for conferring reserved rights. At the same time, they believed that certain rights must be reserved in that they are connected exclusively with the exercise of citizenship. One of the fundamental, collective duties of citizenship was, in the framers' view, to achieve German unity, which would only be accomplished by a German citizenry. Accordingly, the rights of citizenship had to be reserved, in principle, to Germans to accomplish this purpose. Fearful that the Federal Republic could become overrun by non-German immigrants, the framers sought to protect the membership rights of Germans. The rump stature of the Federal Republic in comparison geographically with the old Reich made this fear very real. To provide, then, for the millions of Germans outside the Federal Republic, the framers recognized a certain class of rights that inhered in the quality of being German irrespective of formal state affiliation. And to facilitate the absorption of the millions of German refugees and expellees entering the Federal Republic, the framers sought to equalize the rights and duties of all German inhabitants regardless of their place of origin.[9]

IMMIGRATION

The question is how the founders' ethnocultural view of German national identity has shaped laws, policies, and public attitudes toward minorities. Its most obvious effect has been the absence of a general immigration policy. From its inception to the present, the Federal Republic's official policy has been that "Germany is not an

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immigration land." Individuals can obtain indefinite residence, and for some, citizenship, in the Federal Republic if they fall into one of three groups. The first are ethnic German refugees and expellees, who have fled primarily from Eastern Europe and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The second are so-called "guest workers," who have the legal status of resident aliens with, until recently, few prospects of gaining citizenship. The third are generally political asylum seekers who are admitted under ARTICLE 16(2) of the Basic Law. The framers adopted this provision to underscore the Federal Republic's commitment to universal human rights in response to the Nazi legacy of persecution and genocide.

Refugees and Expellees. From the end of World War II to the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, ethnic German refugees and expellees formed by far the largest group of "immigrants" that entered West Germany. During this period, millions flooded into the Federal Republic. In 1950, they composed 16.7 percent of the population, and this percentage rose steadily to 23.9 percent by 1960.[10] It is a testament to the remarkable recovery of the West German economy that the Federal Republic was able to integrate them successfully. In assessing the Federal Republic's experience with its first wave of large-scale immigration, two patterns that reemerged with subsequent waves can be detected. First, the refugees and expellees initially encountered a cool, and sometimes hostile, reception from native West Germans. Living in precarious circumstances themselves, many West Germans worried understandably that new arrivals would merely bring new burdens. Second, despite these fears, the new arrivals actually contributed much more to the economy than they took from it.[11]

In contrast to the assimilation of some future generations of immigrants, the new arrivals in this period had one distinct advantage: they were unquestionably "German" by blood and culture. This advantage also ensured them the right to organize themselves politically, to hold elective office, and to vote. In January of 1950, the expellee politician Waldemar Kraft established the German Fellowship Bloc of Expellees and Victims of Injustice (*Gesamtdeutscher Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten,* GB-BHE), which that year gained 23.4 percent of the vote in Schleswig-Holstein *Landtag* elections and 12.5 percent of the vote in Bavaria *Landtag*

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elections.[12] During the 1950s, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) assiduously wooed GB-BHE's supporters because the refugee and expellee population represented too large a pool of voters to be ignored. The emergence of the GB-BHE posed a real threat to the electoral coalition that the CDU/CSU hoped to build across the center-right spectrum. The CDU/CSU's efforts to win over GB-BHE voters proved highly successful, and the latter's electoral support declined markedly throughout the 1950s. The GB-BHE example vividly demonstrates the importance for immigrants to have the legal and institutional means to represent their own interests in the political process. Having these means did not solidify divisions between native West Germans and immigrant groups, but rather forced the ruling government parties to address the interests of these groups and thereby to integrate these groups into the political life of the Federal Republic.

Guest workers. The West German economic recovery proved so successful that by the mid-1950s regional labor shortages had developed. To address this problem, the federal government signed its first employment contract with Italy in December of 1955 to import workers for the agricultural and building sectors.[13] The contract became the model for all future ones with other countries. In response to demands from German labor unions, the agreement stipulated that foreign laborers have equal rights in the workplace and receive pay equal to their German counterparts within a job category. It further guaranteed terms of employment, promised provision of adequate housing, and permitted the return of earnings to the home country. Finally, the agreement left open the opportunity for foreign workers to bring their families with them subject to the approval of German authorities.[14]

Originally, the West German government envisioned the recruitment of foreign labor as a temporary, expedient measure necessary to sustain economic growth. In the next several years, the number of Italian workers recruited remained relatively small. By the early 1960s, however, the West German economy's demand for new labor had begun to explode. Labor shortages were compounded by the erection of the Berlin Wall which largely stopped the influx of refugees from the German Democratic Republic. During the early 1960s, the West German government concluded employment agree-

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ments with Greece, Spain, Turkey, and later with Portugal and Yugoslavia. As the number of foreign workers rose, they moved into new occupations from agriculture to manufacturing, construction, mining, and services.[15]

Beginning in 1968 the number of guest workers climbed steadily to reach a peak of 2,595,000 in 1973, accounting for 11.9 percent of the total work force. By 1972, Turkish workers comprised the largest share of this group. When the 1973 OPEC oil embargo plunged the West German economy into a recession, the federal government ordered an indefinite suspension in the recruitment of foreign workers. For the next several years, the number of foreign workers dropped sharply as the government had anticipated, but by the end of the decade it began to rise again. By 1980, there were one million more resident aliens than there had been in 1972. In short, many of the foreign workers and their families who had entered the Federal Republic as guests were now permanent inhabitants.[16]

If by the 1980s large numbers of resident aliens were permanent members of the Federal Republic, how had their legal status changed and how had government policies toward these groups been altered? From its enactment to the adoption of new legislation in 1990, the Aliens Law of 1965 regulated the basic terms under which foreigners were admitted, the conditions and duration of their stay, and the grounds for deportation. The overriding purpose of the 1965 law was to give the government a flexible policy instrument to meet the changing needs of the labor market, and so it maximized the discretionary authority of those who administered it. Fundamental guidelines were accordingly left vague, open to multiple, conflicting, and equally plausible interpretations. The most notorious example of this open-endedness was a key provision that directed: "Residence permits may be issued if the presence of the foreigner does not prejudice the important interests of the Federal Republic of Germany."[17] The law offered broad latitude in the eleven grounds it listed for deportation. Included among these were threats to "public morality" and to the "constitutional order," without specifying criteria by which these threats should be weighed. Such rules can only serve to impress upon foreign residents their second-class status and to increase the risks of challenging this status.

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With the growing numbers of second and third generation foreign residents, one major test of the Federal Republic's resolve to promote a pluralistic society will be the liberalization of naturalization rules. In general, naturalization has traditionally been treated as the exception. As a minimum standard that is required before foreign residents will be considered for citizenship, they must meet the following four criteria: *1)* unrestricted legal capacity; *2)* unblemished character; *3)* residence in one's own dwelling; and *4)* proven capability to support oneself and one's dependents.[18] In addition to these criteria, officials are bound in their discretionary authority to judge each case by several broad guidelines. First, the official must determine not only "whether the applicant in his or her personal standing is a valuable addition to the population, but also, whether the naturalization of the applicant from a general political, economic, and cultural viewpoint, is desirable. . . ."[19] According to this "viewpoint," an applicant must demonstrate a definite and enduring attachment to German society, a solid mastery of the German language, a professed commitment to the constitutional order, and a thorough knowledge of it. Membership in any foreign national group or association disqualifies an applicant. Second, a foreign national must have resided in the Federal Republic for at least ten years. This is reduced to five years if the national is married to a German citizen.[20]

Naturalization

Given this highly restrictive immigration policy, it should be no surprise that the Federal Republic has had the lowest naturalization rate of any major European country.[21] The annual naturalization rate of aliens in the Federal Republic fluctuated around 3 percent throughout the 1980s. Some try to defend this low rate by arguing that the guest workers do not want citizenship in the Federal Republic. There is some truth to this argument. In 1982, for example, a public effort was undertaken to encourage the thirty thousand Turkish residents of West Berlin who might qualify for citizenship to apply. This number represented less than one-third of more than 100,000 Turkish residents in West Berlin at that time. From this potential pool of thirty thousand, a mere fifty applied.[22] How can such a low figure be explained? Many have clung to the dream of returning to their homelands, despite the fact that the vast majority

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do not. Orthodox Muslims often fear that naturalization is a way station toward Christianization.[23] Others simply have no desire to become "German." A 1989 survey suggested that many foreign inhabitants would like to obtain citizenship, but have not done so out of specific concerns. It indicated that 44 percent of all foreign residents, and 49 percent of the Turkish minority, are interested in acquiring citizenship but are dissuaded by the rules governing naturalization. In explaining their reluctance, 41 percent expressed fear over losing significant rights in their home countries, such as inheritance rights. Thirty-one percent of the respondents were concerned that they would become cut off from their families and native lands. Another 26 percent voiced discouragement over the complexity of the naturalization procedures, and 16 percent cited the high costs of the process (80 percent of an average month's salary). Many of these concerns could be effectively addressed by, for example, offering dual citizenship, so that foreign residents did not have to renounce their current citizenship to obtain a German one. Such a provision would help to protect their access to their native lands and their rights in these lands. In addition, the government could ease the assimilation requirements of its naturalization rules, so that acquiring citizenship would seem less predicated on abandoning one's ethnic heritage and culture.[24]

In 1979, the former Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, Heinz Kühn (Social Democratic Party, SDP), issued a report that addressed this matter. He had been appointed to the newly created position of Federal Commissioner for Foreign Workers, a post designed to study the problem of minorities in the Federal Republic but with no power to implement policy and lacking even direct access to the Cabinet.[25] The office has a small budget and is attached to the Ministry of Labor. Kühn proposed that all youths born and raised in the Federal Republic should be offered the choice of citizenship. In addition, he recommended allowing foreign residents who had lived in the Federal Republic for a requisite number of years the right to vote in municipal elections.[26]

This last recommendation was an important one because the Federal Republic's experiments with local consultative bodies to represent the interests of foreign workers had generally been unsuccessful. With the support of the Federal Labor Ministry, local governments in 1971 had begun to form *Koordinierungskreise*

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(coordination groups). Within five years, six hundred to seven hundred of these groups had been formed. Since their inception, these bodies have differed widely from one another in structure, in the means by which representatives are selected, in the proportional composition of foreigners and Germans, and in their powers of influence. Whatever their differences, however, these bodies at best provide an institutionalized channel through which foreign residents can express their views, interests, and objections to local governments. While having this channel is better than having none at all, it stops short of giving foreign residents any real power to hold local officials accountable, to pass or to block legislation that directly affects their interests, or to have votes to trade with other political parties. The effectiveness of these groups, then, depends entirely on the willingness of local governments to cooperate with them. We may wonder too just whose "interests" these bodies represent, when in many cases Germans have comprised a majority of their members, and often an overwhelming majority.[27] One early study found that a third of these groups had no foreign residents as members.[28]

POLITICS AND POLICIES

The SDP-led federal government did not carry out most of Kühn's proposals. It rejected giving foreign workers the right to vote, and the CDU/CSU-dominated *Bundesrat* blocked an initiative to make citizenship easier for the youth of foreign residents to obtain. As Chancellor Helmut Schmidt acknowledged, such reforms to promote integration cut "against the instincts of our core voters."[29]

During these years, the far Right moved to exploit West German anxieties over the "foreigner problem." In 1980, the National Democratic Party (NDP) launched a "Stop the foreigners" campaign in the North Rhine-Westphalia elections. Similarly, the authors of the far-right Heidelberg Manifesto of 1982 developed this theme.[30] Ever sensitive to the issues that attract right-wing support, the CDU/CSU quickly followed suit, and strenuously opposed all SDP initiatives to improve the status of foreign residents. When the CDU/CSU, allied with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), assumed power in 1982, the new Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, made the problem of minorities one of the centerpoints of his "emergency program."[31]

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The federal government pushed through new legislation the next year to encourage the return of unemployed foreign residents to their homelands. Among other measures, the new law offered to pay qualifying aliens DM 10,500 plus an additional DM 1,500 for each child if they would leave the Federal Republic within a six month period. The law had only a marginal effect, but it exemplifies the unwillingness of the CDU/CSU leadership to adapt government policy to the fact that the foreign resident population is firmly established in the Federal Republic.[32] Of course, the issue of municipal voting rights for foreign residents was out of the question for the CDU/CSU. Kohl made the thrust of his policies unmistakably clear, declaring in 1983: "The number of foreign '*Mitbürger*' must be reduced."[33]

Resident Aliens

The federal government's reluctance to accept long-term foreign residents as full citizens was consistent with public opinion. One study in the early 1980s showed that 49 percent of West German citizens expressed negative attitudes toward the presence of foreign residents.[34] There was a strong correlation between the age of the respondent and the expression of negative views. The highest percentage of negative attitudes were held by respondents in the oldest cohort, while the youngest cohort expressed the most positive views. This finding offered some grounds for optimism in suggesting that the newer generations of Germans were becoming more tolerant of cultural diversity. Among voters generally, the highest percentage of negative views were expressed by CDU/CSU supporters. Kohl's policies in this era were clearly intended to speak to their concerns. Of the guest workers, West Germans in the early 1980s were most sympathetic to those from European Community (EC) countries and from Yugoslavia. They expressed their lowest opinion toward the Turks.[35]

From 1973 to 1983, West Germans expressing "unsympathetic" attitudes toward the Turks had risen from 14 to 46 percent, but the rise was not necessarily the harbinger of a long-term trend in popular attitudes. Rather, it was probably a response to several different developments that had thrust the "foreigner problem" into the forefront of public attention. First, as we have already discussed, the decline of guest workers and their families that had

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followed the 1973 recruitment ban had again reversed in 1978. Second, the massive oil price rises that occurred from 1973 to 1979 had undercut German economic growth and increased unemployment. Between 1981 and 1982, the number of unemployed climbed from one million to nearly two million. Third, the number of asylum seekers had also been steadily climbing from approximately ten thousand per year in 1975 to approximately fifty thousand per year in 1979. These totals soared passed the 100,000 mark in 1980. Fourth, in 1980 the Interior Ministry began to incorporate figures for foreign residents into its demographic projections. It predicted that their number would reach approximately seven million in the year 2000 and over twelve million in the year 2030, and told the West German public that the "foreigner problem" was not going to melt away. Finally, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the German school system encountered its worst problems in handling the influx of children of resident foreigners. German parents grew anxious that their own children's education would suffer by being in class with other students who had a poor command of German.[36]

Beside these immediate circumstances, an underlying cause promoting a climate that fosters negative attitudes toward foreigners is the way they have often been depicted in the press. Studies from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s have shown that media stories disproportionately focused on sensationalistic criminal acts that foreigners committed. The press reported crime statistics for foreign residents distinguished from the general population, giving the false impression that the crime rate among the former was considerably higher. This distinction not only deepened the link between crime and the "foreigner problem" in the public imagination, but also reinforced the perception that this part of the populace is separate and different. Too often, these studies argued, media coverage has been full of caricatures, biased reporting, and misinformation about foreigners. For example, the press has tended to emphasize two opposing stereotypes of "Germans" and "foreigners," contrasting the small family structures of the former with the large family structures of the latter, urban origins against rural origins, modern commercial economy against feudalism, a Western religious heritage against an Eastern religious heritage, civic equality against the oppression of women, and German culture against a foreign culture.[37]

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The rise of negative attitudes among West Germans toward foreign residents in the late 1970s and early 1980s was not the beginning of a trend. As we have seen, there were a number of specific factors in this period that help explain this rise. What proved more permanent was the stigmatization of foreign residents as separate and distinct within German society. Such stigmatization inevitably made them inviting targets for blame, suspicion, and hostility during periods of economic and social hardship.

Over the course of the 1980s, West German attitudes toward guest workers grew more positive.[38] This change was probably due in part to the ending of the recession, though unemployment remained relatively high. In addition, the number of asylum seekers dropped rapidly from its high in 1980 and did not soar again until later in the decade. Finally, the school system crisis caused by the influx of non-German children eased. Increasing numbers of these children had been born in the Federal Republic, and so entered school with much better language skills than their predecessors. This change may have lowered the anxieties of German parents about their own children's education.[39]

Growing public tolerance did not change the most visible symbol of the marginalized status that foreign residents occupy in West German society, namely that of housing discrimination. As one observer concluded, "[a]ll investigations establish unequivocally again and again that foreigners live under worse conditions but pay proportionately more rent than their German counterparts."[40] Conservatives have argued that minorities like to live together with their own kind in ghetto districts, which just happen to contain the poorest housing and amenities. The argument is specious because most foreign residents have little choice to live anywhere else. Their freedom is restricted in a variety of different ways. In many cases, German landlords simply refuse to rent to them, fearing that they will drive their German tenants away. In other cases, they are assigned housing by a government agency or by another body. For example, the Ruhrkohle AG, a large mining company, provides 200,000 units of housing for its workers. The workers' councils are responsible for allocating these units. A study in the early 1980s found that Turkish workers were most heavily concentrated together in the worst housing, where their Polish counterparts had lived during the 1920s and 1930s.[41] For some aliens a poor knowledge

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of the German language and the local housing market has also been a problem. The housing difficulties that minorities confront have been compounded by continuing housing shortages suffered by Germans and non-Germans alike.

Throughout the 1980s, minorities in the Federal Republic also faced serious disadvantages in the labor market. Foreign labor is concentrated in a few sectors of the economy, such as heavy industry and mining. According to a 1991 report, 50 percent are employed in nine of fifty-two sectors, and comprise 14 percent of the work force in nine other sectors.[42] They are more likely than Germans to be employed in unskilled or semiskilled jobs where they work in shifts, are paid by piecework or the bonus system, and face higher risks of accident.[43] Approximately 50 percent of foreign workers receive no job training or if they do, it is merely a short introduction.[44] The upward mobility of foreign workers is further restricted by their lower education qualifications when compared with the work force as a whole. In 1990, foreign students comprised 11.3 percent of the total student population, but they were underrepresented in the *Realschulen* (8 percent) and the *Gymnasien* (5 percent). They were even more heavily underrepresented in the trade and technical upper division schools.[45]

The effect of these disadvantages is reflected in the consistently higher unemployment rate that foreign workers experience, which has been as much as 5 percent higher than the average rate.[46] These government-published statistics for the unemployment rate of aliens may seriously underreport the actual incidence of joblessness. Some experts have estimated the rate to be ten times higher than the official data shows.[47] Foreign workers do have the right to join unions, and in some industries, such as mining, their level of membership is quite high. However, they have been elevated very slowly into leadership positions as shop stewards and as representatives on workers' councils.

As public acceptance of the foreign residents rose in the 1980s, the federal and the *Länder* governments had an unparalleled opportunity to promote the acceptance of these second and third generation residents into German society. In fact, the CDU/CSU-led federal government chose a different, more restrictive, course. It sought to develop a new aliens law based on the recommendations of a 1983 commission's report. In its stated goals for a foreigner policy,

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the commission did not diverge much from the prevailing practice. It specified three guiding objectives: promoting the return of aliens to their homelands; restricting further immigration; and facilitating the integration of those who remained. But the devil, as they say, is in the details. The commission's recommendations to assist integration consisted largely of means for "tightening up the conditions for granting and renewing residence permits."[48] The clear intent was to make remaining in the Federal Republic more difficult for foreign residents, and thereby to hasten the return of as many as possible to their homelands.

The CDU/CSU aliens policy met resistance, which delayed the formal presentation of a new aliens law. In the spring of 1988, a draft of the new law surfaced in the press, and the harshness of its provisions provoked a storm of protest. As a result, the government abandoned the draft and appointed a new Interior Minister. In September of 1989, the government issued a revised version. Though it contained much less of the "nationalistic flavor" of the original, the new draft encountered opposition from many churches, labor unions, and welfare groups.[49] The legislation was enacted in April of 1990 while the questions surrounding unification dominated public attention. The new law did liberalize some provisions from earlier legislation, such as allowing women and children to receive a separate resident permit. It also, for example, made it easier for young persons between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three from second and third generation-resident families to acquire citizenship.[50] In other areas, it imposed new restrictions on the upgrading of residence rights, such as requiring applicants to have made contributions into social insurance funds for sixty months in order to obtain the right to unlimited residence. In addition, the law extended the minimum period of residence from five to eight years to be eligible for this right. Finally, it failed to address the problem of dual citizenship.[51] Overall, the new law remains wedded to the notion that "integration" of foreigners is only possible through their adoption of the German way of life, which illustrates again how closely the idea of civic membership in the Federal Republic is linked with an ethnocultural concept of national identity. In a more pointed fashion, *Der Spiegel* attacked it as "proceeding from the assumption that '[all] foreigners are undesirable.'"[52]

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The Aliens Law does not apply equally to all foreigners in the Federal Republic. Minorities from EC countries have more rights than those from non-EC countries.[53] The former are not required to obtain work permits and have complete freedom of mobility throughout the Federal Republic. By contrast, minorities from non-EC countries must meet certain conditions before acquiring a work permit. They must have been continuously employed for five years within the last eight years or be married to a German citizen. The expulsion of EC minorities is governed by EC law, which makes it more difficult than under the Federal Republic's Aliens Law depending upon the affected individual's residence status. No aliens are presently allowed to vote in municipal elections. In October of 1991, the Federal Constitution Court struck down a law that Schleswig-Holstein had enacted in 1989 giving foreigners the right to vote and to stand in local elections. However, the Court left open the possibility that the Constitution could be amended to allow EC nationals this right. Since June 1988, the Commission of the European Community has been discussing draft legislation that would extend all EC nationals this right. If adopted, it would reinforce the distinction between EC nationals and non-EC nationals unless the Federal Republic extended the same right to all long-term foreign residents.

For non-EC nationals there are several different types of residence permits. Under the 1990 Aliens Law, the most secure residence authorization is a permit with the "right of unlimited residence" (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*), which in principle protects the holder from expulsion except on serious grounds of public order and security. By 1990, barely 20 percent of foreign residents requiring permits had achieved this status. The second most secure residence authorization is a permit granting unlimited residence (*unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*), which 40 percent of foreign residents needing permits hold. This authorization gives individuals a right of unlimited extension if certain conditions are met, such as possessing a special work permit and having adequate living space for themselves and their families. In principle, a foreigner can receive an *unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis* after five years of residence and an *Aufenthaltsberechtigung* after eight years. But if we compare the percentage of foreigners with these two classes of permits with the length of time the vast majority have lived in the Federal Republic,

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we see that the reality is somewhat different. Twenty-five percent of all foreigners have been residents of the Federal Republic for over twenty years, 44 percent for more than fifteen years, and 60 percent for more than ten years. Sixty-six percent of all Turks and 76 percent of residents from the former Yugoslavia have lived in the Federal Republic for more than ten years.[54] The rules introducing these two classes of permits were adopted in 1978.

Asylum Seekers

The problems that the Federal Republic has experienced in absorbing immigrants culminated in the 1980s and the 1990s over the issue of asylum seekers. The Basic Law's liberal guarantee of the right to political asylum is the Constitution's most concrete expression of the Federal Republic's commitment to human rights, because it rests on the recognition that certain basic rights are universal and are not simply reserved to the German people. ARTICLE 16(2) stipulates: "Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum."[55] Although the right to asylum applies universally, the criteria for determining eligibility for asylum are inevitably restrictive to particular categories of individuals. Refugees fleeing from famine, civil war, terrorism, or other threats of personal injury do not necessarily qualify for asylum status. Likewise, victims of human rights violations are not automatically entitled to this status. Applicants must demonstrate that they have a well-founded fear of persecution in their home states, and that the motivation for this persecution is based on the applicant's religion, political beliefs, or other personal attributes.[56]

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the number of total asylum seekers entering the Federal Republic each year grew rapidly from a low point of approximately twenty thousand in 1983 to 256,112 in 1991.[57] Of that number, those who received official asylum status remained small and shrank considerably after 1984 as a percentage of the total number. Thus, for example, 8.6 percent of the 103,076 applicants for asylum in 1988 received official asylum status, and only 6.9 percent of the 256,112 applicants in 1991 received official asylum status.[58] The application process for asylum can be lengthy and arduous. The determination of an applicant's eligibility for asylum may require several months. After this determination has been reached, both the applicant and state officials have the right to

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appeal.[59] Because the court system lacks adequate resources, this appeal process can last for years. The rejection of an asylum application, moreover, does not necessarily mean that the applicant must leave the Federal Republic. Of the 57,605 rejected applicants in 1989, for example, 6 percent were returned to their countries of origin, 15 percent departed voluntarily, and 18 percent dropped from official view, often remaining illegally in Germany.[60]

"Ethnic Germans"

During the 1980s, the number of "ethnic Germans" entering the Federal Republic has also soared. In contrast to asylum seekers, these groups have been entitled to the full rights of citizenship under ARTICLE 116 of the Basic Law. Before unification, ethnic Germans coming to the Federal Republic fell into two distinct groups. Refugees from the German Democratic Republic were known as "*Übersiedler.*" Their numbers fluctuated annually from 38,655 in 1984 to 18,961 in 1988, and then to 343,845 in 1989 and 238,384 in 1990. German immigrants from other countries are called "*Aussiedler.*" From 1983 through 1986, approximately forty thousand *Aussiedler* came on average to the Federal Republic per year. This number rose to 78,523 in 1987, 202,673 in 1988, and 397,075 in 1990. Of that last figure, 113,253 originated from Poland, 147,455 from the Soviet Union, 107,189 from Rumania, and 29,178 from other countries.[61]

The issue of the *Aussiedler* is emblematic of the ethnocultural character of the Federal Republic's citizenship policies, but also helps to illuminate the dilemma that the Federal Republic faces in framing these policies. There are roughly four million living ethnic Germans. From a strictly juristic standpoint, these ethnic Germans are "foreigners," legally defined citizens of foreign states, regardless of whatever common ties they may share by blood and culture with the citizens of the Federal Republic. From a historical point of view, however, they are German migrants or at least the descendants of German migrants and colonists. This heritage gives them a historical claim to membership in "Germany" that cannot be easily reconciled with their juristic status as foreigners, which should give them no privileged claim to citizenship in the Federal Republic. The practical problem of reconciling these two aspects comes to the fore over the question of formulating a general admissions policy that

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applies to both ethnic Germans and other ethnic groups. The Federal Republic has tried to evade this problem by rejecting on the one hand the principle of immigration as policy, while on the other hand classifying its admissions policy of the *Aussiedler* as "repatriation." By this sleight of hand, "immigrants," who are exchanging legal citizenship in one state for another, are depicted as "resettlers," who are simply returning to their ancestral home. In this way, the federal government has sought to preserve the fiction that the Federal Republic is not a land of immigration, and to justify thereby its restrictive naturalization rules with respect to other ethnic groups. But as we shall see, public opinion surveys in the late 1980s and early 1990s show that West Germans themselves increasingly tended to lump all newcomers together as "foreigners."

The *Aussiedler* have generally encountered greater difficulties than the *Übersiedler* in becoming integrated into the Federal Republic. Although West Germans might increasingly balk at the rising costs of integrating the *Übersiedler*, they at least accepted them without question to be "German."[62] Opinions about the *Aussiedler* were far more divided. In a 1988 survey, only 38 percent of West Germans expressed this view of the *Aussiedler*, while 36 percent of the respondents labeled them as "foreigners." The remainder were undecided. Not surprisingly, West Germans over the age of sixty were much more likely (53 percent) to look upon the *Aussiedler* as German than those under the age of thirty (29 percent).[63]

The German public's fears over absorbing more immigrants have been exacerbated by the social and economic dislocations that have accompanied unification and by the sheer number of *Aussiedler* and *Übersiedler* who have come to the western *Länder* in recent years. By 1990, the Federal Republic was suffering a severe housing shortage of one million units, which was especially acute in the large cities and industrial areas. Many *Aussiedler* and *Übersiedler,* unable to afford their own dwellings, were assigned to public housing. A shortage of public housing has meant in practice that many must live in emergency shelters, such as gymnasiums and barracks. At the same time, unemployment rates have been soaring. By the end of February of 1990, there were 2.15 million unemployed, including 138,000 *Aussiedler* and 140,000 *Übersiedler.* These latter numbers do not count the 100,000 enrolled in language

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courses and the twenty thousand in training programs. The unemployment rate for *Aussiedler* exceeded 30 percent.[64]

Any assessment of the Federal Republic's policies toward the *Aussiedler* must keep in mind the clear economic motives behind the acceptance of these immigrants. Like the guest workers, the *Aussiedler* were expected to perform jobs that native Germans did not want because of the low wages paid or the nature of the work. And studies have shown that over the long term the *Aussiedler* will put far more into the economy than they will take out in social benefits.[65] The key difference between the policies toward the *Aussiedler* and the guest workers has been rooted in the fact that one group has putatively correct bloodlines, and thereby a far stronger claim on citizenship.

Public Perceptions

Against the concrete realities of housing shortages and high unemployment, the theoretical models, predicting a decline in the Federal Republic's population over the next twenty years[66] and showing the indispensable long-term economic benefits that the immigrants bring to their new home, may seem too abstract to carry much persuasive force.[67] Yet, despite these long-term projections, these concrete realities have led many Germans to conclude that "the boat is full." However, there are two separate issues here that must not be conflated. The first concerns the treatment of aliens who have already been given residence in the Federal Republic. Regardless of whether the Federal Republic decides that the boat is overloaded or not, it must address the needs and interests of these groups much more effectively than it has in the past. The second issue involves the admission of new aliens. Every state has the right to determine its own admission policies, establish fixed limits, and define the criteria for admission that it deems best. Over the past several years, the Federal Republic has accepted more refugees than all of the other Western European countries combined. It is a record for which Germans can be proud, and it is entirely understandable that they may feel that the Federal Republic has done far more than its fair share in this area. But any general policy dealing with the "foreigner problem" that focuses solely on restricting admissions will constitute a serious retreat from the commitment to human rights made in the Basic Law.

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By 1991, the German public's attitudes had begun to harden against accepting more immigrants of any kind. In a September poll of that year, 76 percent of the people surveyed supported changing the asylum law to curb abuses by those who were not fleeing political persecution. An almost unanimous 96 percent opposed accepting foreigners coming for economic motives, and 69 percent advocated curtailing the granting of asylum altogether. Even more disturbing, however, is that 36 percent voiced sympathies for right-wing groups whose programs emphasized "action against foreigners."[68] Meanwhile, the federal government continued to dither. Instead of speaking out strongly against xenophobia and for a more inclusive conception of national identity, it focused on tightening asylum procedures and border controls as if these were the sole issues at stake. Another study found that less than 25 percent of Germans regard the distinct cultural contributions of foreigners positively.[69] During July of 1991, Lisolette Funcke resigned in frustration from her position as Federal Commissioner for Aliens, complaining of lack of support from the government. Finally, in a memorandum published in September of 1991, Eckart Schiffer, the director of the Constitution Department of the Interior Ministry and Interior Minister Wolfgang Schräuble's top advisor on aliens policy, expressed his alarm at the threat posed to the preservation of German national "identity" by unassimilated foreign cultural elements. While acknowledging that foreign minorities had made life in the Federal Republic "more colorful" through their introduction of exotic new cuisines and music, he warned advocates of multiculturalism that they were sowing the seeds for an antiforeigner backlash. The potential for such a backlash did not suggest to him the importance of promoting a more tolerant attitude toward cultural diversity, but rather the need for minorities to become more like "Germans."[70]

Unification compounded the problem of integrating minorities because of the immense financial cost borne by West Germans and the economic hardships that the East Germans suffered. Under these circumstances, the public perception of minorities as unwelcome competitors for jobs, housing, and social assistance naturally increased. The conditions in the new eastern *Länder* have provided a particularly fertile ground for the growth of right-wing extremism and xenophobia in the East. Since 1933, East Germans lived under

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authoritarian rule—the overwhelming majority had no direct experience with democracy, its institutions and parties. Their schools offered them a highly ideological and one-sided view of the Third Reich, which encouraged students to discount accounts of Nazi crimes as distorted. Soon after unification, East Germans encountered the unconcealed condescension of their fellow (West) Germans,[71] massive unemployment, and other severe social and economic upheavals. By the end of November 1992, unemployment in the eastern *Länder* had reached 13.4 percent, which was more than 7 percent higher than in the western *Länder*. In some eastern regions, unemployment approached 50 percent. Youth centers were closed, rents increased, and social support payments decreased. Small wonder that some, especially the young seeing only bleak economic futures ahead, might turn to extremist parties that denounce the entire existing order as rotten and call for putting the interests of "Germans" before the interests of foreigners.

Because of the rising antiforeigner sentiment in both the eastern and western *Länder* of the Federal Republic, extremist right-wing parties have profited by running on "foreigners out" platforms. In September 1991, for example, the German People's Union (*Deutsche Volksunion,* DVU) showed new strength in Bremen municipal elections, gaining over 6 percent of the vote.[72] The Republikaner Party won 10.9 percent of the vote in Baden-Württemberg state elections in April of 1992 and 8.3 percent in Hessian municipal elections a year later. In April 1992, the DVU attracted 6.2 percent of the vote in Schleswig-Holstein state elections. As the extreme Right has grown, the number of criminal acts committed by right-wing radicals has also risen rapidly from 270 in 1990 to 1,483 in 1991. From January to mid-December of 1992, this number increased to 2,084, and involved seventeen incidents of murder or attempted murder, 563 incidents of arson and bombing attacks, 502 incidents of bodily injury, and 902 incidents of damage to property. The problem of right-wing extremist violence in the Federal Republic began to attract worldwide attention after a firebomb was thrown into a foreigners' dormitory on September 17, 1991, in Hoyerswerde, Saxony. In October, a firebomb attack killed two Lebanese girls in the village of Hünxe near Düsseldorf. This cycle of violence continued into the next year. On August 22, 1992, right-wing extremists attacked a building housing asylum seekers in the Baltic port of

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Rostock. As crowds of cheering residents watched, gangs of young assailants carried swastikas and shouted Nazi slogans. The attacks occurred over several days, leaving many to wonder why it took the police so long to restore order. A week later extremists attacked refugee hotels in Cottbus and in two other Brandenburg towns. The most shocking attack took place on November 23 in Mölln.

INTEGRATION, SEGREGATION?

Since the Mölln tragedy, the federal government has taken some steps to crack down on right-wing radicalism, and the reported incidence of hate crimes has been dropping steadily. "Those who believe," Kohl declared on December 10, 1992, "that our country can be changed by creating a climate of intimidation, of terror and of fear are mistaken. The Federal Republic is a democracy that knows how to defend itself and we will prove it."[73] If these last words have a menacing ring, they are meant to set Bonn apart from Weimar, and to emphasize the government's resolve that Bonn will not go down Weimar's road to dictatorship. The ghosts of that epoch can be seen hovering throughout the speech, though no explicit references are made to that era. Like Weimar, Kohl describes the Federal Republic as facing serious challenges from both right-wing and left-wing extremists bent on undermining the constitutional order. But where the Weimar political leadership had flinched before these violent challenges, he insists that today "[a]ll democratic parties in Germany and all the country's leading representatives have categorically denounced the use of violence." Again and again, he returns to the theme that the state will not tolerate any violation of its laws and democratic principles. We can welcome his declared determination to stop the violence, but can still ask whether the fears of repeating the Weimar experience pose an unwitting danger of leaving the present a prisoner of the past. If we look too closely at Bonn through the lens of Weimar, we risk making Weimar the sole measure of Bonn as if the latter does not have a history and future of its own. Through this lens, all the internal problems facing the Federal Republic become viewed as mainly tests of its ability and resolve to preserve order at the expense of other dimensions to these problems.

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The CDU/CSU leadership have certainly approached the "foreigner problem" as primarily an issue of order, seeing it as threat to the Federal Republic's democratic system. In early November of 1992, for example, Kohl declared that Germany was facing a "state of emergency" over the influx of asylum seekers. If the SDP did not agree to amend the Basic Law's asylum provision to his satisfaction, he announced that his government would set aside constitutional requirements of a two-thirds majority vote in the Bundestag and pass the amendment with a simple majority.[74] And in staking this "state of emergency" to the influx of asylum seekers, Kohl shifted the problem of right-wing violence from its perpetrators to its victims. In case anyone mistook this message, Kohl's coalition partners, the CSU leader, Federal Finance Minister, Theo Waigel, and Bavarian Minister-President, Max Streibl, helped to drive it home several days later.[75] They pointedly declined to participate in the first mass public demonstration against xenophobia in Berlin on November 8, 1992, dismissing the event as "window dressing."[76] Focusing this emergency on the asylum question also gave Kohl an emotionally charged issue by which to distract attention from his broken campaign promises that unification could be accomplished with little economic cost to West German voters and to the immediate satisfaction of their East German counterparts. To a public angry at the government and disappointed by the fruits of unification, he as much as said: blame the outsider. In this way, his rhetoric has helped to feed the perception that asylum seekers are a serious threat to the German way of life, and, since these distinctions are easily blurred, that foreigners generally are an unwelcome burden.

The problem of integrating minorities stands out as one of the most pressing social and political challenges that the Federal Republic must address in the coming years, but this challenge cannot be limited to combating right-wing extremism and hate crimes. The task ahead is not simply to protect the political order (and with it the rights and lives of all FRG inhabitants), but equally important to expand opportunities for full membership in German society. These two aspects are inextricably bound together. The presence of a permanent caste of outsiders affords right-wing radicals a conspicuously visible target for their demagoguery as well as a readily available scapegoat for grievances during times of social and eco-

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nomic distress. Nevertheless, the problem of membership must be understood as distinct from the problem of order, because each poses different kinds of issues and each requires different kinds of responses.

The 1980s have been described by one of the foremost authorities on the "foreigner problem" in the Federal Republic as the "lost decade," because a golden opportunity to reduce these barriers was missed.[77] The rise of antiforeigner sentiment among West Germans in the late 1970s and the early 1980s should have alerted political leaders to the danger of leaving the status of non-EC minority residents unresolved. As these sentiments turned more favorable in the mid-1980s, the federal government had its best chance to promote vigorously the integration of its foreign residents. By this time, moreover, the evidence that the settlement of foreign residents in the Federal Republic had become a permanent reality was clear-cut. A considerable body of scholarly literature had by then also been published that documented the barriers that minorities encountered in the Federal Republic.[78]

Instead of seizing the opportunity in the 1980s, the federal government temporized, vacillating between a policy of integration and a policy of assisted return to the countries of origin. These two policies are not different sides of a common coin, but rather presuppose wholly different views of the "foreigner problem." The first proceeds from the premise that minorities have a permanent place in German society, so the choice is between integration and segregation. The second seeks to avoid this choice in the vain hope that these minorities can be encouraged to leave on their own volition. By treating the status of foreign residents as an open question, the federal government gave its license to the far Right to campaign for their expulsion. By clinging to the fiction that the "Federal Republic is not a country of immigration" as official policy, the government lent its imprimatur to the view that foreign residents have no legitimate home in Germany as full citizens.[79] In fact, approximately 25 percent of the Federal Republic's population today are immigrants of various sorts. This count deliberately ignores the invidious distinction between "foreigners" and ethnic Germans—be they classified as expellees, refugees, *Aussiedler* or *Übersiedler*.

The window of opportunity began to close with the climbing numbers of *Aussiedler* and asylum seekers entering the Federal

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Republic in the late 1980s. As their numbers soared, public fears of becoming oversaturated with foreigners also rose, and these fears shaded gradually into open animosity. The influx of these groups also sharpened the debate over what it means to be "German" and who qualifies as "German." Are the *Aussiedler* truly "German"? By what criteria is this determined? If they are "German" only in some distant sense, are they entitled to a claim on public resources and to a home in the Federal Republic? If the claim of the *Aussiedler* is suspect, what about the other groups of foreigners? The issue of the *Aussiedler* in particular betrays a disturbing pattern in the laws and policies of the Federal Republic to conflate the concept of ethnicity, which is a cultural construct, with the concept of race, which is biological. "Germanness" is not a matter of blood, but of culture. In this sense, Germanness cannot be inherited, but it can be adopted.

The Kohl government has treated the problem of membership as largely a matter of raising barriers to outsiders trying to enter the Federal Republic. His coalition has apparently negotiated a compromise with the SDP over restricting the Basic Law's asylum provision. Under the agreement, a new provision will be adopted that denies the right of asylum to persons coming to Germany from a member state of the European Community, or from another "third state" which adheres to the Geneva Convention or to the European Human Rights Convention. As part of this compromise, the government will restrict the number of ethnic Germans accepted to no more than 10 percent above the number who entered legally in 1991 and 1992.

As the price for this agreement, the SDP forced the Kohl government to accept some liberalization of the Federal Republic's naturalization rules, but this reform is at best a modest step toward expanding the definition of membership in Germany. In approaching this issue, we can begin by disposing of the notion that the choice is between two extremes: sacrificing German national identity to multiculturalism and preserving the purity of this identity in its authentic form. National communities are "invented," and not given in nature.[80] Their invention is a dynamic process that spans the entire life of the community. In this process, definitions of national identity are continually subject to challenge, reevaluation, and change. To see how historically contingent these definitions

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are, consider the example of modern Austria. Austrians and Germans share a common religion, a common language, and common cultural traditions. These shared properties are all typical defining characteristics of a common ethnicity, but the Austrian people's understanding of their own national identity has changed considerably over time.[81] From the 1920s to the *Anschluss* in 1938, the Austrians increasingly came to think of themselves as first and foremost German, and as such members of a "Greater Germany." After World War II, the Allies reestablished Austria as an independent state, but would the Second Austrian Republic see itself as a third German state or as an autonomous nation of its own? The answer was by no means foreordained. In contrast to the interwar years, the Austrians by the 1970s did develop a firm sense of their own identity as separate and distinct from the German national community. As the Austrian example suggests, national identities have no single, fixed form, but rather are constantly being changed and adapted.

Expanding the inclusiveness of the Federal Republic will require altering one definition of German national identity, but opens the way to creating a new and more open one in the larger European community. The German people have a long history that is extraordinarily rich in its religious, cultural, and regional diversity upon which to build a more pluralistic national identity. The Federal Republic will need to draw upon this heritage to integrate not only its ethnic minorities, but also the sixteen million East Germans with their own distinct historical memories. The Federal Republic has already committed itself to building this new identity through, most recently, its signing of the Maastricht and Schengen Agreements. These agreements also reflect a growing understanding among EC member states that they must coordinate their approaches on issues of migration, asylum policy, and the regulation of non-EC nationals.

One important step that the Federal Republic could take would be to enact an immigration law. The point of such laws is not to throw open the doors to everyone who seeks to enter, but to restrict admission to those whom the society is prepared to accept (in due course) as equal members. A more liberal naturalization policy is no substitute for an immigration law, because only the latter links the admission of aliens to the conferral of citizenship. From its inception, German naturalization law has been used to preserve a clear distinction between citizen and alien, so that foreign intrusions

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do not infect the host. By contrast, the purpose of an immigration law is to promote the integration of aliens into civic life in recognition of their positive contributions to this life. Such a law should be applied to both ethnic German and non-German ethnic groups, which would eliminate the increasingly artificial distinction between "immigration" and "repatriation." On a practical level, adopting an immigration law means simply acknowledging the reality of migration pressures in the modern world. Immigrants from poorer countries are going to be drawn to advanced industrialized states and these states need the contributions that immigrants make to their economies.[82]

As a second step, the federal and *Länder* governments urgently need to introduce broad-based antidiscrimination legislation in the areas of housing, employment, and education. They may also have to create new agencies to enforce this legislation and to give minorities better institutional channels to express their concerns. The long absence of such legislation is a telling testimony of the Federal Republic's slow recognition of the permanent place of minorities and of the corresponding need to protect their rights as distinct from the majority.

The rise of right-wing extremism in the last few years has brought the "foreigner problem" in the Federal Republic back to the forefront of public attention. In exposing the dangers of leaving this problem unattended, this extremism (and the popular revulsion that it has produced) may open a new window of opportunity for German political leaders to make membership in German society more inclusive. Some, like Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, the Federal Commissioner for Aliens, have called for bold reforms.[83] These reform efforts will surely fail, however, if the government treats the problem of minorities as primarily a question of restoring order and punishing criminals. As the German economy struggles with recession, the temptation to blame foreigners for hard times may grow, but this prospect merely underscores the need for reform. Judging from the sheer number and scope of the mass rallies that have been held across Germany to condemn xenophobia and extremist violence, large segments of the German public are well ahead of their government in seeking to build a more inclusive and just society.

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POSTSCRIPT

In May 1993, the German Bundestag passed legislation amending the FRG's asylum law along the lines discussed in this essay. The legislation took effect on July 1, 1993.

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ENDNOTES

[1]ARTICLE 2, 3, 4, and 5. Reprinted and translated in Elmar Hucko, ed., *The Democratic Tradition: Four German Constitutions* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1989), 194–95.

[2]ARTICLE 8, 9, 11, 12. Ibid. 196–97.

[3]*Reichs-Gesetzblatt* (1913): 583–93. Until 1974, the father determined a child's nationality, but now either parent is sufficient.

[4]Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 114–19, 134–37; Lutz Hoffmann, *Die unvollendete Republik: Einwanderungsland oder deutscher Nationalstaat* (Cologne: Papy Rossa Verlag, 1990), 91–98.

[5]Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood,* 168.

[6]ARTICLE 116 (1); Hucko, *The Democratic Tradition,* 255.

[7]Here it must be noted that this same ARTICLE also makes provision for the repatriation of "(f)ormer German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendents. . . ."

[8]Quotations are from the Basic Law's preamble; Hucko, *The Democratic Tradition,* 193.

[9]Kay Hailbronner, "Ausländerrecht und Verfassung," *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift* 38 (21 September 1983): 2112.

[10]Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880–1980,* trans. W. Templar (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 196.

[11]Henry C. Wallich, *Mainsprings of the German Revival* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955), 281–87.

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[12]Gerhard A. Ritter and Merith Niehuss, *Wahlen in Deutschland, 1949–1991* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1991), 158, 174.

[13]Ray Rist, *Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 61.

[14]This account is based on Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany,* 205–206.

[15]Ibid., 218–20.

[16]Ibid., 231–35.

[17]Werner Kanein, *Ausländergesetz,* 2d ed. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1974), 3.

[18]Kay Hailbronner, *Ausländerrecht: Ein Handbuch* (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1984), 691.

[19]Cited and quoted in Ibid., 695.

[20]Ibid., 695–97.

[21]Gerhard de Rham, "Naturalisation: The Politics of Citizenship Acquisition," in Zig Henry Layton, ed., *The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe* (London: Sage Publishers, 1990), 182.

[22]Vivano Frank and Browning Frank, "Immigration: The American Problem comes to Europe," *TransAtlantic Perspectives* 9 (August 1983): 3–7. Cited in Peter Katzenstein, *Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1987), 223.

[23]John Bendix, "Rights of Foreign Workers," in I. Basgöz, ed., *Turkish Workers in Europe* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1985): 45–46.

[24]Hoffmann, *Die unvollendete Republik,* 87–90; Barbara Marshall, "German Migration Policies," in Gordon Smith et al., eds., *Developments in German Politics,* 2d ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992), 251.

[25]The office's responsibilities were later expanded beyond workers to include all foreigners except asylum seekers.

[26]Heinz Kühn, "Stand und Weiterentwicklung der Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Memorandum des Beauftragten der Bundesregierung," in K. H. Meier-Braun, ed., *"Gastarbeiter" oder Einwanderer?* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1980).

[27]Mark J. Miller, *Foreign Workers in Western Europe* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 124–36. As Peter Katzenstein has observed, these councils "have been largely ineffective and count for little at least in the eyes of most foreign workers." Katzenstein, *Policy and Politics in West Germany,* 224.

[28]Paul Kevenhörster, *Ausländische Arbeitnehmer im politischen System der Bundesrepublik* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1974), 18. Cited in Miller, *Foreign Workers in Western Europe,* 132.

[29]Cited in Dietrich Thränhardt, "Ausländer als Objekt deutscher Interessen und Ideologien," in Harmut M. Griese, ed., *Der gläserne Fremde* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1984), 124.

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[30]C. Burgkart, "Das Heidelberg Manifest—Grundlage staatlicher Aüslanderpolitik?" in R. Meinhardt, ed., *Türken raus? oder Verteidigt den sozialen Freiden. Beiträge gegen die Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1984), 141–61.

[31]Thränhardt, "Ausländer als Objekt," 125.

[32]The CDU/CSU is singled out here from the FDP because these coalition partners had strong disagreements over foreign resident policy in these years.

[33]Thränhardt, "Ausländer als Objekt," 125. Among the West European states that have extended municipal voting rights to resident aliens are Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland.

[34]*Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft, Meinungen und Einstellungen zum Ausländerproblem. Endbericht einer Untersuchung für das Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, vervielfältigtes Manuskript*, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, April 1982. Cited in Richard Stöss, *Die extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989), 49.

[35]Wolf R. Leenen, "Ausländerfeindlichkeit in Deutschland: Politischer Rechtsruck oder Politikversagen," *Deutschland Archiv* 10 (October 1992): 1047.

[36]Ibid., 1047; Günther Gugel, *Ausländer, Aussiedler, Übersiedler: Fremdenfeindlichkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Tübingen: Verein für Friedenpädagogik, 1990), 90.

[37]Manuel Delgado, *Die Gastarbeiter in der Presse* (Opladen: Leske, 1972); Herbert Leuninger, "Medien und Ausländer," and Thränhardt, "Ausländer als Objekt," both in Harmut M. Griese, ed., *Der gläserne Fremde* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1984), 103–32; Horst Reimann, "Gastarbeiter und Massenmedien," in Helga Reimann and Horst Reimann, eds., *Gastarbeiter: Analyse und Perspectiven eines sozialen Problems*, 2d ed. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), 141–71. In a recent study, Hamburg law professor Bernhard Villmow has discussed how the crime rates among foreigners have been distorted and inflated. *The Week in Germany*, 20 November 1992.

[38]Leenen, "Ausländerfeindlichkeit in Deutschland," 1049.

[39]Hermann Korte, "Guestworker Question or Immigration Issue? Social Sciences and Public Debate in the Federal Republic of Germany," in Klaus J. Bade, ed., *Population, Labour and Migration in 19th- and 20th-Century Germany* (New York: Berg Publishers, 1987), 170–71.

[40]Ibid., 175. For an overview of housing policies in the 1970s, see Rist, *Guestworkers in Germany*, 149–78.

[41]Korte, "Guestworker Question or Immigration Issue?," 175–76.

[42]Federal Ministry of the Interior, *Survey of the Policy and Law regarding Aliens in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Interior, 1991), 10.

[43]Korte, "Guestworker Question or Immigration Issue?," 167.

[44]Uschi Backes-Gellner and Bernd Frick, "Discrimination in Employment in the Federal Republic," *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law* 20 (1990): 116.

[45]Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, *Daten und Fakten zur Ausländersituation* (Bonn: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer, July 1992), 10.

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[46]Backes-Gellner and Frick, "Discrimination in Employment in the Federal Republic," 108.

[47]Knut Dohse, *Arbeitsplatzentwicklung und staatliche Regelungsmechanismen*, (Berlin: Science Center, 1985), 14a. Cited in Katzenstein, *Policy and Politics in West Germany*, 229.

[48]Stephen Castles, "The Guests Who Stayed—The Debate on 'Foreigners Policy' in the German Federal Republic," *International Migration Review* 19 (Fall 1985): 529.

[49]Marshall,"German Migration Policies," 251.

[50]Critics have pointed out that twenty-three is still a rather young age to set a deadline for such a potentially momentus decision.

[51]Peter Knösel and Werner Teubner, *Ausländerrecht in Deutschland* (Münster: 1991), 26–28, 59–60. Marshall, "German Migration Policies," 250–52.

[52]Quoted in Marshall, "German Migration Policies," 251.

[53]Foreigners comprised 5,880,000 inhabitants or 8 percent of the total population in 1991. Of this number, 25.2 percent were EC nationals in 1991, which was down from 28.4 percent in 1988. Foreigners made up 8 percent of the work force in 1991, which had risen from 7.7 percent two years earlier. Schmalz-Jacobsen, *Daten und Fakten zur Ausländersituation*, 7–8.

[54]Ibid., 9, 20; Federal Ministry of the Interior, *Survey of the Policy and Law regarding Aliens in the Federal Republic of Germany*, 23–27.

[55]Hucko, *The Democratic Tradition*, 200.

[56]Hailbronner, *Ausländerrecht: Ein Handbuch*, 551–61.

[57]After reaching its highest number in 1980, the number of asylum seekers dropped rapidly to approximately 50,000 in 1981 and to under 40,000 in 1982. Gugel, *Ausländer, Aussiedler, Übersiedler*, 90.

[58]Marshall, "German Migration Policies," 255; Schmalz-Jacobsen, *Daten und Fakten zur Ausländersituation*, 35; Statistisches Bundesamt, ed., *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1991 für das vereinte Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Metzler-Poeschel, 1992), 73.

[59]The applicant's right is guaranteed under ARTICLE 19 of the Basic Law. Hucko, *The Democratic Tradition*, 201.

[60]Marshall, "German Migration Policies," 255–56.

[61]Bundesamt, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1991 für das vereinte Deutschland*, 94.

[62]On the assimilation of the *Übersiedler* into the Federal Republic, see Kristina Pratech and Volker Ronge, "Ganz normale Bundesbürger? Zur Integration von DDR-Übersiedlern nach fünf Jahren im Westen," *Deutschland Archiv* 8 (August 1989): 904–12; Volker Ronge, "Die soziale Integration von DDR-Übersiedlern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 1–2 (90): 39–47; and Anne Köhler, "Ist die Übersiedlerwelle noch zu stoppen? Ursachen—Erfahrungen—Perspektiven," *Deutschland Archiv* 3 (March 1990): 425–31.

[63]Gerhard Herdegen, "Aussiedler in der Bundesrepublik," *Deutschland Archiv* 8 (August 1989): 913, 920.

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[64]Gugel, *Ausländer, Aussiedler, Übersiedler*, 113–14.

[65]Marshall, "German Migration Policies," 257.

[66]See Wolfgang Klauder, "Deutschland im Jahr 2030: Modellrechnungen und Visionen," in Klaus J. Bade, ed., *Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1992), 455–64.

[67]Schmalz-Jacobsen, *Daten und Fakten zur Ausländersituation,* 7–8.

[68]Marshall, "German Migration Policies," 262.

[69]K. H. Meier-Braun, "Auf dem Weg zur multikulturellen Gesellschaft?," *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch* 41 (1991): 9–26.

[70]*Der Spiegel* 40 (30 September 1991): 53–59; Marshall, "German Migration Policies," 262.

[71]*Der Spiegel* 22 (July 1991): 24–29.

[72]Bundesministerium des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1991* (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1992), 109.

[73]Helmut Kohl, "Extremism and the Rising Propensity for Violence in Germany," *Statements and Speeches* XV (20) (New York: The German Information Center, 1992).

[74]*Der Spiegel* 45 (2 November 1992): 18.

[75]*The Week in Germany,* 13 November 1992.

[76]Approximately 350,000 people took part in this demonstration, which took its theme from ARTICLE 1 of the Basic Law: "the dignity of man shall be invoilable."

[77]Klaus J. Bade, "Politik in der Einwanderungssituation: Migration—Integration—Minderheiten," in Bade, ed., *Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde in Deutschland,* 449.

[78]See, for example, the compilation of bibliographical sources in Alois Wiedacher, *Ausländische Arbeiterfamilien, Kinder und Jugendliche: Situationsanalysen und Massnahmen* (Munich: DJI Verlag Deutschen Jugendinstitut, 1981).

[79]The government has sought to depict this issue as an either/or question between two extremes. Either the state throws open its doors to massive waves of immigrants or it rules out immigration in principle. Federal Ministry of the Interior, *Survey of the Policy and Law regarding Aliens in the Federal Republic of Germany,* 49.

[80]My views on this issue have been shaped by Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism,* 3d ed. (London: Verso, 1986); and Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[81]See Peter Katzenstein, *Disjoined Partners* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976), 132–62, 177–98.

[82]On this issue, see James Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[83]*Die Zeit,* 4 December 1992.

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Michael Mann

Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying

MANY BELIEVE WE HAVE NOW REACHED the old age of the nation-state. Since 1945, they say, its sovereignty has been outreached by transnational power networks, especially those of global capitalism and postmodern culture.[1] Some postmodernists take the argument further, asserting that this jeopardizes the certainty and rationality of modern civilization, one of whose main props is a secure, unidimensional notion of absolute political sovereignty lodged in the nation-state. In the historic heartland of modern society, the supranational European Community (EC) seems to lend especial credence to the argument that national-political sovereignty is fragmenting. Here, the actual death of the nation-state has sometimes been announced—though perhaps a graceful retirement would be the more apt life-cycle metaphor for such a view. The political scientist Philippe Schmitter has argued that, though the European situation is unique, its progress beyond the nation-state has more general relevance, since "the contemporary context systematically favors the transformation of states into either confederatii, condominii or federatii in a variety of settings."[2] Most current writers probably do not have such decided views as these. Nonetheless, most—and almost all of those whom I later cite—believe that the nation-state is declining in Europe and that this signals a more general retirement.

It is true that the EC, to which I devote most attention, is developing new political forms, somewhat reminiscent of much older political forms, as Schmitter's Latin tags imply. These force us to revise our notions of what contemporary states and their

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interrelations must be. But I will also briefly examine the other two major regions of advanced capitalism and the less developed world. I will conclude that Western European weakenings of the nation-state are slight, ad hoc, uneven, and unique. In parts of the less developed world, would-be nation-states are also faltering, but for different, essentially "premodern" reasons. Across most of the globe, nation-states are still maturing, or they are at least trying to do so. Europe is not the world's future. The states of the world are many and they remain varied, both in their present structures and in terms of their life-cycle trajectories. The few that are near death are not old but are still in their cots.

THE EUROPEAN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The sovereign, territorial nation-state is very young. Most political theorists and international relations specialists date the birth of "unidimensional" territorial state sovereignty to the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries.[3] This is because the theorists pay too much attention to the claims of monarchical ideologists and because international relations specialists are interested only in sovereign powers over foreign policy, which arrived earlier than most other aspects of modern sovereignty. But in real sociological terms, territorial state sovereignty was born more recently and matured even more recently.

There has been an enormous growth in state size and scope over the last three centuries. Before the eighteenth century, entities we call "states" had shared political functions with other agencies—local lords, churches, and other corporate bodies. Whole swathes of social life were not penetrated by states or indeed by any political agency. States prior to the eighteenth century did very little. They conducted diplomacy and small foreign wars; they erratically administered only the highest level of internal justice and repression. Monarchs might have proclaimed ambitious projects but they achieved very little. It was only when entwined with churches that they penetrated much of social life outside of their "Home Counties."

Nonetheless, between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries, European states gradually came to monopolize the single function of military violence. In the eighteenth century, however, this military function exploded. Around 1700, states absorbed perhaps 5 percent

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of the GNP in peacetime, 10 percent in wartime.[4] By 1760, this had risen to between 15 and 25 percent; by 1810, to between 25 and 35 percent. At this point, the armies were comprised of about 5 percent of the total population. These 1810 extraction rates are *identical* to those of the two world wars of the twentieth century and to the highest rates in the world today, those of Israel and Iraq.

Such figures and comparisons enable us to appreciate the scale of the eighteenth-century transformation. From being fairly insignificant, states suddenly loomed large in the lives of their subjects, taxing them, conscripting them, attempting to mobilize their enthusiasm for its goals. States were becoming cages, trapping subjects within their bars. Masses were thus aroused out of their historic political indifference. They were empowered by the contemporary development of a capitalist civil society, which in Europe, North America, and Japan always accompanied the rise of the modern state. They demanded changes in the conditions of their cages. They demanded political citizenship and exhibited new nationalist ideologies—first males, the bourgeoisie, and dominant religious and ethnic groups, then females, the peasantry, the working class, and minorities.

Foreign wars eased in the nineteenth century, but citizenship then combined with industrial capitalism to produce demands for a whole range of new state services for burgeoning civil societies. States first sponsored major communication systems, then mass education systems. Both contributed to the consolidation of a series of civil societies partly bounded by the territories of states. Next, states organized health systems, followed by the first stirrings of modern welfare systems. The national integration of the United States lagged behind that of most European countries, since it went through a Civil War, was a large continent, and had a rather weak Federal government during this period. Massive twentieth-century wars then expanded nationalism further and encouraged a deepening of economic planning and a widening of national welfare systems. Through the compromise of class struggle, citizenship became social as well as political, to use T. H. Marshall's famous terms. Citizens—often led by labor movements—became true zoo animals, dependent on and emotionally attached to their national cages. The widening of political citizenship and the emergence of social citizenship occupied a period centered on the early twentieth century. This is when the first true nation-states, mostly in Europe, were born. Others emerged

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more recently, especially in a sudden great wave affecting all continents after 1945. To date, even the oldest have enjoyed only a normal human life span; most are much younger, and many are still struggling to be born.

In the last twenty-five years, we have seen neoliberal and transnational reversals of some nation-state powers. Yet some of its other powers are still growing. Over this same recent period, states have increasingly regulated the intimate private spheres of the life cycle and the family. State regulation of relations between men and women, family violence, the care of children, abortion, and personal habits that used to be considered private, such as smoking, is still growing. State policies for consumer protection and the environment continue to proliferate, and feminists and "green" activists demand still more state intervention. Through the twentieth century, central government has also been increasing far more than local government. Apart from a few "subnations"—the Catalonias and Quebecs—local and regional barriers have declined inside the nation-state. National education systems, mass media, and consumer markets are still subverting localism and homogenizing social and cultural life into units which are, at their smallest extent, national. When watching the Olympic Games or other events transformed into displays of emotional nationalist pageantry, it is difficult to believe that the nation-state is finished.

The nation-state is thus not in any *general* decline, *anywhere*. In some ways, it is still maturing. However, even if it were declining in the face of the supranational forces that I will shortly analyze, it is still gaining at the expense of the local, the regional, and especially the private forces. The modern nation-state remains a uniquely intense conception of sovereignty. Militarism, communications infrastructures, economic, social, and familial regulation, and intense feelings of national community attachment have been fused into a single caging institution. There is a reality lying behind the facile assumption made by so many social scientists in the recent past that the "society" that they were studying was the nation-state.

But our "society" has *never* been merely national. It has also been transnational—involving relations that freely cross national boundaries. And it has also been geopolitical—involving the relations between national units. Transnational relations are not merely "postmodern": they have always undercut the sovereignty of all states. Geopolitical

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relations restrict the sovereignty of states which are parties to binding agreements, and they more persistently undercut the sovereignty of weaker states.

Neither the capitalist economy nor modern culture has ever been greatly constrained by national boundaries. Capitalism was especially transnational in its early industrial phase, with virtually free mobility of capital and labor and with most of its growth zones located in border or crossborder areas, like the Low Countries, Bohemia, and Catalonia. Though industry went through a more national phase between about 1880 and 1945, finance capital usually remained highly transnational. The cultural identity of this "civil society" was not just— or even primarily—"Britain," "France," or "Spain." It was also "Christendom," "Europe," "the West," and "the white race." Cultural artifacts also diffused transnationally as "the Romantic Movement," "the realist novel," the "Victorian" furniture style, the symphony orchestra, opera and ballet, "modernism" in art and design, and now soap operas, jeans, rock music, and postmodern architecture. National sovereignty was always undercut by both capitalist and cultural transnationalism.

But since 1945 both economic and cultural transnationalism have undeniably increased. Capitalism has become, in Susan Strange's words, "casino capitalism," its funds slushing rapidly through the world in a complex web of institutions which partially elude the economic planning capacities of states and partially "internationalize" them.[5] Mass transportation and electronic media have almost confirmed Marshall McLuhan's prophecy of a "global village"—at least Coca-Cola, Benetton, and Charles and Di are momentarily universal. Capitalism and culture merge into what the Marxist cultural critic Frederic Jameson has termed "postmodern hyperspace,"[6] diffused without regard to nationality or territory, fragmented, but united by the logic of capitalist profit taking. As we shall see, Europe, a small densely settled area of essentially similar countries, has been especially penetrated and homogenized.

The postwar geopolitical transformation has also been momentous, coming in two sudden spurts at the beginning and end of the Cold War. It was knife-edged: the Cold War might have destroyed us all, but did not. But war exhaustion in 1945, followed by the Cold War, made the West extraordinarily pacific in its internal relations, while the collapse of the enemy in 1989–1991 has resulted in a

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unique absence of any threat from outside. War between the Great Powers, and especially between the major European Powers, seems a long way off. This has reduced that aggressive mass-mobilized nationalism so destructive of the twentieth century, though it remains around the fringes of the West and in a more symbolic aggression, requiring few commitments from citizens, directed against hate figures in the less developed world. The absence of a threat is also reducing the military size of Western and some former communist regimes, an important and hopeful reduction in the strength of the nation-state.

But this geopolitical transformation has gone to quite unique lengths in Europe. Europe may show us the future of a more pacific world, should that indeed transpire. Eurocentric events, such as two "world" wars and the Cold War, finished off the region's traditional Great Power aspirations. Since 1945, West European sovereignties have been undercut geopolitically by their voluntary dependence upon the United States, and Eastern European sovereignties were undercut by their involuntary dependence on the Soviet Union. Since 1945, Europe has not defended itself. West Germany, its major economic power, has had 350,000 foreign troops occupying great swathes of its territory for forty-five years. Few Germans have minded; they complain only when the troops get drunk. But other European NATO members do not have much representation in its High Command. All depend on an American defense of Europe over which they lack ultimate control. Thus, Western Europeans could run military expenditures averaging approximately 3 percent of the GNP—half of both the United States' and the whole world's levels and very small in historical terms. Their states hunkered down together in pacific harmony, living without what was historically the main state function and the main source of aggressive nationalism—a military power adequate to defend themselves. This regional peculiarity greatly assisted their drive toward cooperation.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The EC occupies a much smaller area than the United States, but with a substantially bigger population. Its numerous countries (twelve at present, soon to increase to perhaps twenty) are essentially similar, being advanced capitalist, Christian, and liberal democratic,

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virtually all ranging center-left social democratic parties against center-right conservative or Christian parties. The transnational and geopolitical forces noted above ripped unhindered through them, enabling much closer cooperation than has occurred in any other part of the globe.

Cooperation began in the new geopolitical core of Europe, France, West Germany, and the Benelux countries. Their Iron and Steel Community widened to become the European Economic Community (EEC), gradually expanding its membership and scope. Its task remained economic: to liberalize trade and permit more integrated industrial production. It was successful in this endeavor, though partly through bribing the protectionist, unintegrated agricultural sector every step of the way.

Until the 1980s, the EC was almost entirely compatible with the nation-state. It was merely an extreme example of the peaceful geopolitical negotiations that have characterized the capitalist world order after 1945. Under such arrangements, the representatives of constituent governments sit in committees and work out agreements which are taken back to be ratified or rejected by the sovereign national governments. In fact, EC history has been something of a two-Power initiative. As the English writer Perry Anderson emphasizes, bilateral agreements between Germany and France essentially provided all its forward surges.[7] Since France and especially Germany were offering resources, most countries willingly accepted their leadership. Nation-states were still following sovereign interests, sacrificing nothing. But, through the 1980s, EC political regulation began to cut more directly into member state sovereignties. What were these subverting political functions?

The Political Functions of the European Community

The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in December 1991, gives a simple answer: it declares EC control over virtually all policy areas. A cursory reading might give the impression that the EC is indeed a superstate. This text was aired before the Danish and French voters in 1992, and they did not like it. Most of its clauses are mere rhetoric. It is an oddity of the EC that most of its staff become committed Federalist Europeans. They write Federalist-sounding documents which are then signed by national politicians, many of whom do not share their values. To assess real EC functions, we

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must look at those Maastricht clauses which are actually implemented by sizable institutions. These reveal three main undercuttings of national sovereignties.[8]

Law. Most EC law is known as "secondary law," since originally it largely supplemented national legislation. But, in the 1980s, member governments passed beyond merely recognizing each other's laws and administrative regulations and began to "standardize" them—a process involving considerable revisions of the national laws. Governments now routinely announce to their parliaments that a particular national law contravenes Community law and needs revision. The EC also denounces violations by member states, though this does not always lead to changed behavior. Secondary law has somewhat undercut state sovereignty, though almost always through its technical details rather than through sweeping legal declarations.

More general Community law rests in the rulings of the European Court of Justice. These have expanded in scope, again largely through detail, and they will probably continue to expand since social life and culture in the member countries are gradually becoming more similar. But these rulings are binding only because of the voluntary commitment of the states, and they are administered, rather variably, by the individual states.

The content of European law, especially of the secondary law, overwhelmingly concerns the EEC's two original purposes: trade liberalization and production integration and standardization. It regulates in great detail the nature of commodities bought and sold in the Community, gradually extending this to include labor as a commodity, especially regulating occupational qualifications. Its core thus remains economic policy, expanding as initially limited economic activities spilled over more broadly into economic life. This resulted as capitalism expanded into more differentiated consumer markets with a more occupationally differentiated labor force. The advanced capitalist economy turns more of life into commodities, and the EC became this region's way to regulate them.

The Single Market.[9] The Single European Act of 1986 laid out a timetable for the removal of all impediments to the flow of persons, goods, and services throughout the EC. It was to be fully implemented by December 31, 1992. Although implementation has lagged a

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little, it is largely complete—though the free flow of persons and animals has been delayed by the British, Irish, and Danish governments (the new French government is currently also advising delay). The Act virtually eliminates internal borders. Reinforced by Maastricht clauses, it supposedly confers a common European citizenship. It may also lead to a new European Police Authority. When a state no longer has arbitrary power over its own borders, its sovereignty has indeed eroded. Again, the core of the erosion was economic policy, expanding across the lives of Europeans as producers and consumers.

The European Monetary System (EMS). The drive toward a single monetary system, culminating in a single currency, represents an important loss of the key traditional state sovereignty over coinage. It also undercuts the kind of macroeconomic planning which states claimed to have exercised during most of the twentieth century, though this is also being undercut by transnational capitalism. Its rules for the convergence of currencies have also implied a deflationary economic strategy contrary to the social Keynesianism and/or competitive devaluations espoused by many twentieth-century governments. This drive resulted partially from near unanimity between the member states and partially from geopolitical relations of influence between them. Wayne Sandholtz notes that its path was paved by the earlier separate decisions of virtually all the states to abandon traditional Keynesianism.[10] Indeed, in countries like Italy and Spain, currency union allows governments to blame unpopular monetarist policies on the exigencies of membership in a desired "modern" Europe. Geopolitically, Germany has also led the monetary system, believing it to be in its own national interests.

Now, however, some states are wavering in their commitment to monetary union. Many Germans have come to predict a loss of national sovereignty if the EMS goes further, and this significantly lessens their commitment. Britain and Italy have been permitted to bolt out of the EMS, Denmark has been allowed that privilege in the future, and Spain and Ireland have stretched its rules by decisions that resemble old-style competitive devaluations. The European Monetary Union's (EMU) single currency was to be reached in the period from 1997 to 1999. This is not now possible, and many believe it will never be reached. Before it can happen without disaster, there probably must be a general economic recovery plus

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far more standardization of economies and economic policies than yet exists—though there are also substantial disagreements between "economists" and "monetarists" over this issue. Of course, the core of the progress actually made is again economic.

Overall, these three activities have undoubtedly eroded the sovereignty of the individual member state. This has been reinforced by Maastricht's major constitutional change. The Treaty greatly extended the scope of "the qualified majority" voting system at the expense of unanimity. Fifty-four of the seventy-six member votes are required to make a new ruling, with no country having more than ten votes. A ruling now needs three big countries and more smaller ones to block legislation. Of course, a country's votes are always cast as a single national bloc, leading toward stable geopolitical power relations between states, not toward a single "transnational" superstate.

The EC thus remains fundamentally an economic planning agency. It has expanded with the broadening of Europe's product-market range, its complex web of consumer regulations, its diversified occupational structure, and its intricate set of financial instruments. All of this regulation is highly technical and capitalistic. Euro-institutions are arcane, and they are dominated by the lobbying of business enterprises and trade associations. Union and professional organizations are much weaker, and lobbying by churches and other secondary institutions is virtually nonexistent. The direct impact of EC policies on everyday politics in the member countries is rather limited. Regulations about markets and products rarely reach a mass audience, except for the rampaging of French farmers and for the EC's jokes over who can sell products labeled with words like sherry, champagne, or ice cream. The most important Acts, about free movement and currencies, have great implications. When these become apparent, they cause dissension. While the European economy was booming, the states found near unanimity relatively easy. They rarely defined erosions as "loss"— economic growth was the whole point of the EEC, and is still the central policy objective of the EC. Yet, in recessions, their negotiations tend to stall. Future progress seems dependent on growth, the trade-off for the erosion of sovereignty.

The state as a whole is not, as Marx asserted, an organization for managing the collective affairs of the bourgeoisie; the state does far

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more than this. The EC, however, is. Throughout the twentieth century, political parties and national states, aided by the result of two world wars, have managed to institutionalize relations between the social classes. What remained more problematic as capitalism continued to expand across the world were the relations between the national and the transnational. Since 1945, a group of institutions emerged to regulate these relations. The EC is a stronger regional equivalent of these institutions—the global corporation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Europe is the biggest market in the smallest area of the three main capitalist regions. It is divided into many similar, pacific states. The EC became more sovereignty-constraining-by-consent than its comparable global institutions. But it has largely extended the same types of functions.

There are several areas, however, where the EC shows little interest. It provides few communications infrastructures, one traditional (and usually a relatively uncontentious) mainstay of state activity. If Europe comes out of recession, these might be expanded. It interferes in nationalized industries only when they are subsidized monopolies offering goods in competition with other countries' enterprises, i.e., a few state enterprises in southern Europe. The bulk of the state sector (whose size varies greatly between countries) is unaffected. EC expenditure is important only for the agricultural sector and is dwarfed by national state expenditure. The EC has not moved into class or other group relations, such as the regulation of labor relations, public order, religion, or the welfare state, though where welfare and the labor market meet in national educational policy, it is active. It does not regulate moral issues, the family, or gender relations—this would be impossibly divisive if attempted. Regional policies began to be scaled down when they appeared to be redistributive. There has otherwise been no attempt at social redistribution. True, there is the fairly vacuous "Social" Chapter 8 of the Treaty of Maastricht, but the Thatcher government refused to sign even this and the EC did not compel it. Britain is not bound by it, a sign of the low priority social issues have for the EC. Indeed, the deflationary rigor of the EC's requirements for fiscal convergence are overwhelming any real social objectives.

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The EC can hardly point to Britain alone as the home of "social dumping."

The EC does not really cultivate a real sense of European identity or citizenship. The Strasbourg Parliament has few powers, an attendance rate of less than 50 percent, and little salience for Europeans. Polls show that Brussels, the seat of executive power, is seen as a bureaucratic Leviathan. This is unfair in one sense, since the administration is small, only 17,000—less than Madrid's municipal government, and one-quarter are translators. But it is accurate in another sense: it is a technicist apparatus uninterested in commanding sentiments or affections from Europeans. There is a diffuse cultural sense of being "European" which is widespread across the member countries and which is reinforced in everyday life by myriad "town-twinnings," student exchanges, professional and scientific conferences, and vacationing arrangements. This cultural identity exists alongside strong and enduring national loyalties, whose only major "weakening" appears to be a substantial reduction in aggressive xenophobia. To be "European" today means to be nice, gentle, and civilized. Such a European identity could be mobilizable for "pan-European" politics and social purposes. But these are absent. Most national politics concern taxes, income policy, welfare policies, moral issues, and foreign crises. These are not perceived to be, and are not, the province of the EC. Thus the political parties are still entirely national in organization and almost entirely national in orientation. Even referenda supposedly about Europe have tended to turn into confidence votes on the national performance of governments.

Moreover, there are two functions, central to the modern state and to almost all other states today, which the EC has not acquired. As a Belgian minister remarked during the Gulf War, the EC is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm. There is no collective defense and not much foreign policy-making. Under Maastricht rules, there is intergovernmental policy-making and it is decided by unanimity, not by a qualified majority. The French and German governments are developing a small joint defense force, but in bilateral negotiations. The American creature, NATO, has different, though overlapping, members to the EC. The Western European Union might house a European defense agency, but its members differ yet again—Denmark, Greece, and Ireland are not members. Some Europeans favor broader defense commitments, but the two

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nuclear Powers, France and Britain, refuse to share control of these weapons and jealously preserve their individual UN Security Council seats. The individual states largely maintain their own military and foreign policies. Yet fiscal pressures and the lack of an external threat continue to reduce European militarism. The English sociologist Martin Shaw predicts the end of popular militarism, institutionalized in conscription. Militaries, he argues, will become smaller, high tech, professional, somewhat removed from civil society.[11] Yet the only geopolitical agency capable of coordinating a defense remains the United States. At little cost to themselves, most European states tagged along in the Gulf War. But where is their response when the United States has (so far) been less interested, to the convulsions on their own border, in Yugoslavia? Things have certainly changed since the assassination in 1914 of a single Archduke! Defense arrangements are not only outside of EC scope, they are also a bit of a mess.

Thus Europe is not moving toward a single state or even toward a federal state. Different political arrangements for three main types of state function may be distinguished. First, for most economic policy, sovereignty is divided between the EC and the nation-states, though not according to clear, "federal" or "confederal" constitutional principles. Second, in other civilian policy areas, sovereignty remains largely, though not entirely, in the hands of the nation-state. Third, in defense and foreign policy, very little effective sovereignty is located anywhere. Overall sovereignty is now divided and messy. The EC is diplomatically recognized by many states and is an accredited observer at the United Nations, but so is the Vatican. The EC itself has no single seat or place of sovereignty for what it does control. In democracies, this resides in an elected executive and in a sovereign parliament. Europe is far short of either. Europe does not in effect possess a constitution, clearly regulating these complex institutional relations. The major encroachments on national sovereignty are not really constitutional—the replacement of one sovereignty by another. Instead, they are the practical, surreptitious, and delayed implementations of decisions taken by the Council of Ministers, whose decision-making processes reflect partly consensus and partly the geopolitical influence of the various member Powers. The encroachments are routinized, constraining practices like the dense web of product regulations or the narrow band of currency

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fluctuations permitted by the EMU. These Powers do not add up to a single, organized state-like whole. In controversial areas, the EC works not according to supranational principles, but according to geopolitical ones—agreements and alliances between Powers.

Recently, Britain, Denmark, and France have claimed a damaging right. They have identified a major EC policy as "of vital interest" to themselves and so claim the right not to conform. The British government declares that it is in principle opposed to monetary union; the French government is at odds over agricultural tariff policy. We do not know where these disputes will end. But in December of 1992, the Danish government was allowed disassociation from monetary policy and formal citizenship. There is a formidable sanction available to the majority against the dissident state: expulsion. It has not yet been wielded. If it is, we will know that the EC is a powerful new political entity, over its admittedly narrow sovereign range of policy. Largely toothless, the EC regulates only the capitalist activity of a region. It provides a genuinely "European" regulation—but only for areas agreed on by traditional geopolitics. It is not yet a state, nor is it replacing states.

The Future of the European Community

What will happen in the future? The EC might weaken or it might strengthen. Contraction, or worse collapse, seems unlikely, as the economic consequences for all would be disastrous. No present member can sensibly withdraw and the momentum now is toward gaining more members. At the other extreme, the nation-states and the EC *could* eventually form a single federal whole. But where are the pressures for this? The EC was developed for economic harmonization. Its "spillovers" into other state functions have been limited. Even in the economic sphere, the existence of core and periphery regions and the difficulty in reaching monetary union is producing a Europe of "different speeds." Europe has been led since the 1950s by the core Franco-German alliance, loyally backed by Benelux countries whose economies are inseparable from theirs. But the British are still puzzled when they examine the map. Are we in Europe, they ask, or are we in the Atlantic? Italy remains a dual entity, North and South, with a quite distinctive system of government (to put it mildly). The other Southerners are poorer and bring future problems of integration with the North; the Scandinavian neighbors

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with Austria are as rich as Germany, and they will soon enter the EC. Yet many favor more progressive domestic and foreign policies than most of its present members. Europe has a problematic Eastern periphery. It has no clear Eastern boundary, and the EC has no clear vision or policy for this area. Its activities in the countries of Eastern Europe are insignificant when compared with those of a single member state, Germany. And, finally, Germany, recently united, with an economy nearing the size of the former Soviet Union's, with massive influence in Eastern Europe, now has another option: to play the Great Power. It seems unlikely that German governments would choose this rather than the EC. But present indications imply that Germany might resist further erosion of its national sovereignty. Without German leadership, there would have been no EC; without German leadership, the EC will not deepen. As Felipe González, the President of the Spanish government, has stated, "if Germany fails we will all fail as well."[12]

Thus, it is more likely that for the members, arrangements will either stall or there will be a Europe of differential convergencies and speeds, encouraged by the entry of new members and ad hoc associations with other neighbors creating a widening but not a deepening. Ad hoc cooperative agencies may proliferate within and across its new borders. A pan-European Environmental Agency will hopefully appear stretching at least to the Urals (Chernobyl taught a very broad geography lesson). Less territorially and functionally unified political alternatives seem more likely than federalism.

Europe is not headed toward singular political arrangements. Indeed, it may be headed back to political arrangements resembling, though in far denser forms, those of earlier feudal times. Like then, Europe has no single locus of sovereignty. It has different political institutions regulating different functions in its EC core, and it contains Powers of greatly differing strengths. Europe has ad hoc institutional solutions to particular problems, such as defense and the environment, devising stronger agencies according to present combinations of functional and geographical need. There are committed Federalists. But dilemmas of defense, currency, and Eastern Europe are slowing these Federalists down and increasing pragmatism and ad hoc solutions.

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Proliferating pragmatism may seem sensible, but it has raised the issue of a "democratic deficit" in EC institutions. These tend to be bureaucratic rather than democratic. Can democracy control them? Clearly not, since democracy itself arose as the sovereign nation-state. Democracy was the achievement of the state as a single, representative place. The Federal version of democracy requires a clear division of sovereignty between plural institutions—as in the US Constitution, between the states and the federal government, and between the President, the two houses, and the Supreme Court. Making the EC democratic without transferring some specialized formal sovereignties to it is impossible. Such an act of transference is unlikely.

Do we need to bother? We only need bother if states remain the cages they became in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, and if they threaten their own citizens or their neighbors, as many of those states did.

The European nation-state has lost some economic functions to the EC and some defense functions altogether, while gaining functions in what had previously been more private and local spheres. Overall, the bars of the cage may not have changed very much. Citizens still need to deploy most of their vigilance at the national level and most accountable sovereignty should remain there.

But Euro-institutions do exploit. They are only responsible in a rather indirect, cumbersome way. And since the EC is essentially a capitalist club, it is part of the growing postwar ability of the capitalist class to outflank other classes organized overwhelmingly at the level of the nation-state. Twentieth-century, not nineteenth-century, socialists have concentrated virtually all their activities on the nation-state, greatly strengthening it in the process. Now their social Keynesian achievements are threatened, and their social democratic governments and union federations are simply unable to resist the economic logic imposed by a more globally organized capitalism. Clearly, socialists and other dissidents should organize more in Euro-institutions. But, as long as they can only mobilize their forces on policy issues which remain overwhelmingly the province of the nation-state, it is also a reason for them to be wary of more sovereign powers transferred to the EC. European socialists have been feeble in response to the fiscal conservatism of the Bundesbank-led EC. But their humbling by fiscal conservatism

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occurred first within their individual nation-states. European leftists need to renew their sense of purpose, and this can only occur through international cooperation. European institutions provide one locus of cooperation, of which they must take full advantage. But it is not the only locus, since they have been outflanked by global, not European capitalism.

European states no longer threaten each other. Europeans had been long nurtured on negative evaluations of each other. I, for example, was brought up in postwar Britain as deeply anti-German, resenting the French, mildly despising Italians, Greeks, and Spaniards, and making malicious Irish jokes. The Swiss, I was led to believe, were tidy and repressed, the Belgians messy and fat, and the Scandinavians and Dutch were nice because they were totally harmless. I hope they reciprocated with anti-British sentiments. But the polls show that negative national stereotypes have almost vanished. National rivalries now largely consist of Eurovision Song Contests, Football Cups, and contests in servility to attract global corporations. Western Europe has no military governments and virtually no authoritarian Right. The greatest political transformation of twentieth-century Europe is not the decline of socialism but the defeat of authoritarianism of both the Right and the Left. Center-right conservatives, Christian Democrats, and Centrist Social Democrats dominate European politics. And what some carelessly call resurgent fascism is nothing of the sort: it is racism focused on immigration, appealing (as fascism rarely did) almost exclusively to the working class on the material issues of jobs, housing, and schools.

The new Europe is harmless. It is also unthreatened. Europe has the geopolitical security it has always wanted, as well as client states and even supplicant states, between itself and any threat coming out of the East. And the Americans remain to defend it. Europe has little need for efficient geopolitical decision-making. Pacific muddling can do little harm. Its sins are the lesser ones of omission. If this is postmodernity, it is closer to being a utopia than a crisis.

The EC also enjoys fairly amiable relations with the other two trilateralists: the United States and Japan. It is true that they have unending trade disputes about protectionism regarding automobile spare parts, semiconductors, and rice, but they also show a capacity for finally compromising on these. Capitalism is not so transnational that it can dispense with political regulation, and trilateralism fits

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the bill. Cultural solidarities across the Atlantic are also strong, reinforced by a capitalism and a consumerism that blurs both national and continental identity. Americans may know that Jaguar cars are now American. But do they know that Burger King or Winchells Donuts are British? Spaniards may know Seat cars are German and Pryca supermarkets French, but not that Texas Homecare stores are British and not American, that half their clothes are Dutch, and that Massimo Duti fashion clothes are not Italian but Spanish, more precisely Catalan.[13] Perhaps one-half of the television programs shown in mainland European countries originate from America, but they are dubbed. Do Clint Eastwood, Sylvester Stallone, and the "Dallas" and "Beverly Hills 90210" casts remain American when speaking Portuguese or German slang? Do the cartoon characters of "Dragonball" remain Japanese? Europeans seem capable of ingesting American and even Japanese identities.

The EC must also be viewed favorably by its neighbors since—from Iceland to the entire Baltic and Mediterranean littorals—they want in. The EC has had a benign effect on some of its neighbors by making democracy a condition of membership. Greeks and Spaniards have cause to be grateful for this, and East Europeans and Turks might in the future.

But there is a potential European threat to its neighbors: the immigration issue, with a potential for strengthening Euro-racism. This is linked to the broader issue of "fortress Europe," especially whether Europeans will show much interest in the less developed countries to their east and south. The fortress would revive Europe's identity as Christendom and "white." Whether Slavs would be members or aliens remains unclear, and this would affect the exact nature of the European racial and religious identity. The fact that some Slav groups have their own ethnic conflicts adds to the potentially heady brew. In fact, all three of the trilateral regional hegemonies, Europe, the United States, and Japan, now have relations with the developing world on their doorsteps and within their thresholds which have ethnic implications. Racism may no longer be "the American dilemma" since America has experience and achievements in this area. Racial geopolitical conflict may be more the European and the Japanese dilemma. Who knows what riots, terrorism, and even war this might bring to global geopolitics in the twenty-first century? If it brought much violence, then there would surely be a resurgence of

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European state sovereignty. Would this be a move back to the nation-state or forward to the United States of Europe? The nation-state, reinforced by European-wide immigration and counterterrorism policies, seems the more likely outcome, in line with the pragmatic political developments I charted earlier. European nation-states are neither dying nor retiring; they have merely shifted functions, and they may continue to do so in the future.

THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE STATES

What of the other two trilateralists? In contrast to Europe, they are still dominated by single nation-states, who have given no hint of retirement, let alone of death. The Americas are dominated by the United States. The continent's other states are varied and most live with threats to their security from neighbors and dissidents from within. They are in this respect typical emerging nation-states, with fairly secure territorial scope, fairly stable, large state administrations but contested and volatile political regimes. However, as dependent economies, they also lack the degree of economic sovereignty possessed by most European states of the nineteenth century. Now the US hegemony helps to police the continent.

The United States is itself a nation-state, though never such a right little, tight little nation-state as the European type. The United States has had more ethnic diversity and a weaker, more federal government, reducing national homogenization and centralization. Yet, it is a virtual continent. Its size, ecological variety, and historic isolation have ensured that its economy has remained more self-sufficient than its rivals. The value of national trade has always greatly exceeded that of international trade in the United States, and that is not true of its major competitors. Its capitalism is more nationally owned than is the capitalism of any European country. Despite the growth of Japanese investment, the largest single foreign investor remains, as it has always been, Europe's offshore island, Britain. We can find a faint echo of the European Common Market in the free-trade agreements between the United States, Mexico, and Canada, but none of the parties are under any illusions as to who is the dominant partner.

Indeed, the life cycle of the American nation-state has differed, maturing more recently. In the 1930s, the federal government took

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major welfare functions away from the individual state and municipal governments. Its military might dates only from World War II; this finally enabled the federal government to exceed the size of the state and local governments. Unlike most civilian state functions, military power is wielded by the federal government and by the President as Commander in Chief. Thus, its militarism resonates amid symbols and institutions of the nation-state. The phrase "the American people" is constantly used to legitimate foreign and military policies. Across mid-century there was also social homogenization as immigration slowed and the South ended its isolation. Regional homogenization has been laggard but it is still continuing in areas such as mass media or banking. Immigration is now going through another great burst and this may bring a distinctive role within the United States for Latino and Asian cultures. But overall the United States seems still to be maturing as a nation-state, and not declining. Of course, it is declining as an economic power relative to Europe and Japan, and I suspect that the consequent loss of national confidence accounts for much of the popularity of postmodern relativism in American intellectual circles.

The second region, East Asia and much of the Pacific, is also a varied region dominated economically, though not yet politically, by a single Power, Japan. Japan is the least economically self-sufficient of the three regional Superpowers and is the most isolated from the others. Its state, though formally small, tightly coordinates its national capitalism, especially through the patron-client relations of its single ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and through its dominant economic Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The ownership of its capitalism remains overwhelmingly Japanese. Foreign raiders have found takeovers and subsequent management extremely difficult to accomplish. All of this is reinforced by dense and cohesive social and familial relations of a type unique in the advanced capitalist world.

Like Europe, Japan has not been a "full state" since 1945, lacking control of its defense and foreign policy. But the size of the American army stationed in Japan, just over 50,000, is small. Though the Constitution restricts military spending to 2 percent of the GNP, the size of that GNP has become so large that Japan now has the fourth largest armed forces in the world. Though the Japanese remain divided and cautious about their rising power, and though

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Japanese foreign policy remains weak, Japan is objectively a Great Power once again. Most Japanese are quite nationalistic and share a racial myth of common descent—though their actually varied physiognomies derive from many East Asian stocks. Abroad, Japanese "internationalism" is tinged with economic imperialism, with a tendency to impose particularly exploitative labor relations in the less developed countries of its own Asian-Pacific region.[14]

Japan remains a cohesive nation-state, despite playing a very large role as both a transmitter and receiver of capitalist and cultural transnationalism. As a nation-state, Japan was an unruly and militaristic adolescent. Its maturation has now resumed—though with very recent intimations of relative economic decline.

So European talk of the death of the nation-state should sound odd in the other two main capitalist regions. The new Euro-institutions are probably not a pattern for the future. It is difficult to see why the United States or Japan should enter into major sovereignty-pooling or sovereignty-shedding with other states or political agencies. They will continue to negotiate with their neighbors and with Europe as single Great Powers.

STATES IN THE LESS DEVELOPED WORLD

The less developed world presents different and more varied state problems. Most states date their birth or rebirth from after 1945, when decolonization imposed an ostensibly similar nation-state form on all countries, despite massive differences in the real infrastructural capacities of states and civil societies. The UN Charter and the Cold War tended to freeze these often artificial political arrangements. But this short era is now over. States must depend on their own, sometimes limited, power capacities. Few possess the infrastructures and mobilization capacities of true nation-states. In this "outer rim," many states confront an essentially "Hobbesian" problem of order, unlike states in the "Lockeian heartland."[15] Along with the former communist states, many face severe internal dissidence, sometimes combined with threats from their neighbors to their national security. Nowhere else is there a region enjoying the tranquillity of Western Europe. As the sociologist Charles Tilly notes, for several decades most states in less developed countries have not been following the European path of military development.[16]

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Their militaries did not decline in size once they reached a certain level of economic development—as happened in Europe. They have remained large, expensive, and modern, and are likely to remain so for some time. Such countries may spend another century struggling over political and social citizenship, regional and ethnic autonomies, and boundary disputes with neighbors. These are very different political agendas to those of Europe, North America, or Japan, and they may strengthen nation-states rather than weaken them.

But state scenarios in the less developed world are also very varied. At one extreme, mostly in Africa, we find collapsing Hobbesian states whose regimes are unable to penetrate their territories to provide even minimal social order—let alone to pursue the development goals required by the new global culture of instant gratification. In their ineffectual violence, the warlords of Somalia, Liberia or Zaire resemble the vast majority of political regimes throughout premodern history. They are not monsters but reflections of our own past—though armed with automatic weapons and Swiss safe deposits. Their problem is not postmodernism, but the absence of a genuinely diffused modernism in their civil societies. This problem lessens as we proceed through the rest of Africa and the less developed South Asian countries, then to Latin American, the former Soviet and the more advanced South Asian countries, and finally to the most successful East European and East Asian countries. By the time we reach Hungary, the Czech lands, South Korea, Singapore, or Taiwan, we encounter civil societies with solid economic and cultural infrastructures, effective state penetration of territories, and political battles over political and social citizenship that are undeniably "modern," in the sense that they resemble the recent history of Western Europe, North America, and Japan (though East European countries also have their own distinctive political battles). In between the Somalian and South Korean poles, a multitude of semieffective states are coping with uneven modernity—unevenly developed or enclave capitalisms, religious or ethnic identities sometimes dividing, sometimes strengthening them, bulging militaries keeping order and oppressing, bulging state administrations sponsoring development and dispensing corruption. Some of the problems of such regimes are indeed distinctively postmodern—they are subverted by the global reach of capitalism and the global culture of instant consumer gratification. But their basic political problem is that

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formally modern political institutions cannot compensate for the weakness of the other modernizing prerequisite: an evenly diffused civil society. They confront a crisis of modernity, not of postmodernity. This is their own crisis, and their diverse solutions will not reproduce the histories of Western Europe, North America, or Japan. But like these histories, they will center on the struggle to create civil societies and nation-states.

CONCLUSION

States became important in the modern world for providing five services of varying utility to humanity: *1)* they became capable of waging massive, routinized war; *2)* they provided communications infrastructures for both militarism and capitalism; *3)* they became the site of political democracy; *4)* they guaranteed social citizenship rights encroaching into the private sphere; and *5)* they invented macroeconomic planning. All five functions were connected and entwined with the rise of modern civil society. In the twentieth century, they have fused tremendous powers on the sovereign nation-state. Some of these powers are now declining, but others are still growing.

There is no necessary reason why all these functions should be located within the same political agency. For most of history, they were not. States shared some political functions with lords, with churches, and with private corporate associations. Other functions were not pursued collectively at all, but were considered essentially private activities. In one part of the world, in Western Europe, such functions have again partially separated. This is undoubtedly a world historical change, since it stemmed an apparently unstoppable growth of the nation-state. Europe has created new political institutions of divided, confused sovereignty, and this may spread to some adjacent countries. But since this development was largely a response to a particular regional situation, it may not be a blueprint for the world. Twentieth-century states seem highly varied.

The more global sources of contemporary change, from which some have also predicted the death of the nation-state, actually bring more mixed and varied political implications. Military changes, especially the advent of nuclear and biological weapons, have made major war between the Great Powers irrational, and this logic may

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also spread downward to lesser Powers. Since the modern state, and much of the nation-state, was conceived in war, this might be interpreted as signaling its eventual death. Yet, after its birth, the modern nation-state found other things to do and is still finding them. In any case, societies are not governed by rationality. Modern wars have been intensified by ferocious ideologies purporting to solve social conflicts. Ethnicity and religion entwined with "First World" versus "Third World" social conflict might be a fertile new source of ideologies capable of keeping states violent. It is thus particularly important that Europe, the United States, and Japan cope humanely with their immigration, border, and regional problems. If, instead, they invoke racist-religious identities, they too will suffer the consequences, in violence and in expenditures, of terrorism and counterterrorism. As far as war and violence are concerned, it is easier to see what should be done than what will be done.

Capitalist and cultural transnationalism do not merely undermine states. The increasing density of global society gives states new geopolitical roles. Tariffs, communications, and environmental issues are already notable generators of geopolitical negotiations between states and these may be expected to grow and be joined by many other issue areas. We might see, for example, more global "Social Chapters" (hopefully, unlike the Maastricht one, with teeth) regulating labor relations or setting common standards of public health or educational and professional qualifications. In the recent past, such negotiations, in or out of agencies like the United Nations or GATT, have been typically led by two great nation-states, the United States and Japan, by more ad hoc arrangements for representing "Europe," (sometimes all the above are replaced by the Group of Twelve states), and by ad hoc representation of "the Third World" by one or more states, with a more erratic Soviet/Russian and an occasional Chinese presence.

And so we reach a curious paradox. Transnationalism and the EC have so far been largely capitalist. Yet capitalism seems to be near its state-subverting limits. Capitalist profit-taking has resulted in not quite Frederic Jameson's "postmodern hyperspace." Though capitalism has reduced the social citizenship powers of the nation-state, and in association with military and geopolitical trends it has also reduced the military sovereignty of most states, it still depends on continuous negotiations between sovereign states in a variety of

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ad hoc agencies. Capitalism will not further reduce the nation-state. Yet, if socialism, of the democratic Western variety, is to survive, it has to take up this very task. When even Swedish Social Democracy is being undermined by transnational fiscal conservatism, the message should become totally transparent: unless socialists lift their gaze from inside their own nation-states to exercise power at the international level, they will have precious little to offer the voters. Throughout its life cycle, the nation-state has been entwined with class conflict. But the class movement which historically most strengthened the nation-state should now begin to subvert it. Whether it will recognize this destiny and whether it has the capacity to achieve it are open questions.

For now and for the foreseeable future, ad hoc associations of capitalism and nation-states stride dominant across most of the world, especially the most advanced ones. In the less developed world, states are varied. Some are in crisis, and a few are near death. Their crisis is not of postmodernity but of insufficient modernity. Where countries lack an effective nation-state, they would dearly like to have one. The nation-state is not hegemonic, nor is it obsolete, either as a reality or as an ideal.

ENDNOTES

[1]Earlier versions of this essay were given as lectures under the titles: "The End of the Nation-State?" in *Instituto Juan March,* Madrid, 11 December 1992, and "The End of the Nation-State? Prospects for Europe and for the World," in the Wendy and Emery Reves Lecture Series, "Beyond the Nation-State," at The College of William and Mary, 15 February 1993.

[2]Philippe Schmitter, "The European Community as an emergent and novel form of political domination," *Instituto Juan March,* Working Paper No. 26, 1991, 15.

[3]For example, John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations," *International Organization* 47 (1) (1993).

[4]All figures on state finances and manpower, and all generalizations about state activities prior to 1914, are drawn from the research I have conducted on the history of five states—Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Prussia/Germany, and the United States—reported in Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power. Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chaps. 11–14.

[5]Robert Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

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[6]Frederic Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism," *New Left Review* 146 (1984) and Frederic Jameson, "Marxism and postmodernism," *New Left Review* 176 (1989).

[7]Perry Anderson, "The development of the European Community," unpublished paper, Center for Social Theory and Comparative History, University of California at Los Angeles, 1992.

[8]Two of the major EC activities—agriculture and regional policy—do not undercut national sovereignties. The labyrinthine agricultural policies (still absorbing 65 percent of the EC budget) have resulted from intergovernmental agreements, especially between France and West Germany. In the 1970s, regional policy seemed to be moving toward undercutting sovereignties, but the entry of poorer southern European states as members reversed this. Most regional conflicts now pit northern against southern states rather than richer against poorer regions regardless of state boundaries (though German unification has provided an exception to this, since the regions of the former GDR qualify for regional funds). And the geopolitically dominant northerners were successful in late 1992 in keeping development funds down to 1.25 percent of the European Community's GNP rather than the 5 percent earlier envisaged for them.

[9]The literature on the single market and the European Monetary System is vast. Informative, provocative discussions of recent developments are available in articles in Otto Holman, ed., *European Unification in the 1990s: Myths and Reality,* special issue of the *International Journal of Political Economy* 22 (1) (Spring 1992).

[10]Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht," *International Organization* 47 (1) (1993).

[11]Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

[12]Interview with Felipe González, *El Pais,* 23 February 1992.

[13]Nor can I guarantee that this information will remain accurate even to the time of the publication of this article—since global corporations buy and sell individual enterprises with great zeal and rapidity.

[14]Anthony Woodiwiss, "Human rights, labour law and transnational sociality around the Pacific Rim (with special reference to Japan and Malaysia)," unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of Essex, 1992.

[15]K. van der Pijl, "Ruling classes, hegemony and the state system: theoretical and historical considerations," *International Journal of Political Economy* 19 (1989).

[16]Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

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Ernest Gellner

Homeland of the Unrevolution

THE TOTAL, ASTONISHING, AND ALMOST completely unforeseen collapse of the Soviet Union leaves us all with a practical as well as a theoretical problem. It is both difficult and dangerous, and we would much rather be without it. It is a kind of personal and emotional problem, a sense of acute embarrassment. If one had become accustomed to seeing a large number of people, and indeed an entire social system, live out and seemingly adhere to a certain set of ideas and principles, if one had internalized the obligation to treat those principles and values with a certain respect (as one generally does with regard to the religion of others, a recognized obligation violated only by boors), and then suddenly, overnight, they disavow it all, abuse it with an abandon which one would never have dared to indulge in oneself—from sheer respect for the deep convictions of others, or for their social pieties—well, one feels ill at ease.

I always knew that those beliefs were rubbish, but I did not like saying so, in so many words, to people who either chose or were obliged to organize their lives as if they believed it all. If they too knew it was rubbish, why did they not say so sooner? The polarization of the debate concerning the social order between liberalism and socialism had engendered certain conventions and expectations, and we had become habituated to them. The total collapse of one participant in the Great Debate or the Great Contest, or of its institutional incarnation, has transformed the intellectual-political landscape. It has been deeply disorienting. It is as if one had become so used to a certain constant and powerful wind that one unthinkingly

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leaned into it, and it suddenly disappeared. Old expectations persist; one still leans in a certain direction, but the counterwind is no longer there. One stumbles if indeed one does not fall over altogether.

When it still existed, the Soviet Union was a moral order, in fact a most marvelous specimen of it, exemplifying many of the things sociologists believe about human societies, and exemplifying them with a stark extremism which should perhaps have made us more skeptical about its prospects of survival than we were. It was a society based on a vision, in the keeping of a competent and occasionally brilliant corps of clerics, well trained to attend to the ideological needs of society. The system of ideas was coherent, rich, and supple. It had an answer for everything, but usually it had more than one answer for important questions, and so could accommodate changes in policy. The answers formed a system which was endowed with coherence and mystery; it could both inspire by linking itself to the most generous impulses of the human heart, yet also intimidate by incomprehensibility. In fact, it combined these elements in ideal proportions. It could invoke the values of equality, cooperativeness, prosperity, liberty, and fulfillment, and it also claimed that it could, and it alone could, render these values compatible and mutually supportive. This system was very richly endowed with devices for explaining and devaluing external critics and criticisms, and the self-maintaining circle of ideas it engendered was held firm until it was willfully broken from within by Krushchev at the Twentieth Congress. Even then it looked as if the damage could still be contained.

But, of course, it was not simply the system of ideas which constituted a well-rounded whole. There are many circular, self-maintaining systems of ideas, but they will never rival the place of Marxism in world history. Marxism was a system of ideas that captured and effectively dominated a society, indeed a whole cluster of societies, and this is a much rarer achievement. Marxism was not just an *idea* of a moral order; it was an actual moral order, incarnated in the real world on an enormous scale. To all appearances it was endowed with tremendous stability, which almost everyone credited to it—its enemies most of all—until we were all shown to be wrong.

The ideas of Marxism constituted a charter for a complex social organization, which in turn sustained and vindicated it. Formerly communist societies possessed an intricate hierarchy such that those

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privileged within it had a great interest in maintaining it, while those less privileged were nonetheless both provided with some incentives and deprived of opportunities for either conceptualizing alternatives or organizing or agitating for their implementation. The actual organization and its practices were sanctioned by the ideas of the belief system, and these ideas in turn were sustained by the permitted possibilities of expression, communication, and association. The social-ideal circle was complete, and there were neither social nor logical exit points from it. One of the early heroic dissidents, Valentin Turchin, left behind a moving account of his struggle to think himself out of this situation in *The Inertia of Fear.*[1] Turchin's inner development is reminiscent of Descartes', who found that in order to free himself from unwarranted prejudice, he had to doubt *everything,* or at least everything that could possibly be subjected to doubt. The Soviet system was so complete that a similar Cartesian attempt at universal skepticism seemed necessary if one was to escape from its hold. Of course, not everyone who in the end became a free man intellectually was obliged to tread this path of cosmic/social exile, of inner emigration. Andrey Sakharov, the most influential critic of the system from within the society (perhaps jointly with Solzhenitsyn), had accepted the system as a whole even while despising its individual theses. He freed himself not by general but by specific, and, as it were, gradual and cumulative doubt. Concern with the genetic effects of applied physics led to a concern for the dreadful state of Soviet biology; concern with the effects of unfreedom on the quality of Soviet physics converged with a concern for civil rights as such.

The Soviet world was a moral order in which the background belief system was highly elaborated, and respect for it was socially enforced, and within which the social hierarchy and styles of production and comportment were all intimately intertwined with each other. Here, for once, one could truly say that the dominant ideas were the ideas of the dominant class, or at any rate, the ideas which helped ensure that the class in question remained dominant, whether or not its members were deeply committed to them in the intimacy of their private thoughts. Many, probably the overwhelming majority, were not greatly given to intellectual intimacy and private thoughts, and might have had some difficulty in even grasping the problem. But they could and did live their lives in terms of these

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notions, and this is even true of that large inwardly skeptical part of the intelligentsia which did understand the question and did not grant the official belief system its inward endorsement. Even they could live by their rules which the system of ideas had spawned, and lean on its pervasive meanings. And suddenly, it is all gone. Has ever a Bastille of an ancien régime fallen quite so easily and with so little resistance? Even those of us who never loved this Bastille nevertheless miss it in a way: we are now obliged to rethink everything, and this is neither easy nor comfortable. It is greatly preferable that intellectual worlds emerge slowly, but this time, the speed, ease, and completeness of the collapse of the old order makes it impossible to wait.

A number of related questions arise. How did this moral order emerge? How does it differ from others? Why did it collapse so remarkably, contrary to all expert expectations and predictions? How unique is the situation presented by this collapse?

There is a widely held sociological theory which, simplified and freed of jargon, and with an accentuated outline, goes: once upon a time, *all* societies lived within meaningful worlds, linking nature and the social order, endowing the external world with human significance, and the society with a cosmic warrant. Morality then had a natural authority, and nature spoke with a human voice. The price of this fusion was both low productivity and feeble technology: economic activities, deeply embedded in social relations, might indeed be pleasingly human, but they consequently also lacked the freedom to follow the imperatives of instrumental efficiency. A science enmeshed with an anthropocentric cosmology would not progress nor provide the basis for a really powerful technology. Since those idyllic days, we have become richer and less happy, paying for rational production and cognition with a "disenchanted world."

In the liberal world, the coming of a disenchanted society and vision was a long, complex, protracted, and occasionally turbulent process. All kinds of compromises, ambiguities, and half measures came to be negotiated or accepted and even hallowed. It turned out not to be a simple black-or-white business of stark, pure, uncompromising alternatives. Western liberal society is not just a callous market in which individuals pursue private advantages within certain rules, and then purchase their position with the proceeds.

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All kinds of institutional rigidities survive or even emerge. Nor is the vision of nature simply an echo of scientific inquiry. The process anticipated by social thinkers given to think in terms of extreme oppositions was never completed. The world remains muddled, messy, qualitatively plural. This seems to be the lesson of the dramatic ending of the Great Contest, of the unambiguous victory of one side in the Cold War: it was the intellectually messy compromise which prevailed. It was not merely the organizational but also the *ideological* monolith which failed.

Marxism was, of course, born of the yearning for such moral/social unity, and it is tempting to suspect that it was the promise to satisfy such a longing which made it so attractive to the Russian soul. The Enlightenment had taught that just as a tyrannical and exploitative social order had been based on false religion, so a free, fraternal, and egalitarian order would be based on truth. When the French Revolution failed to deliver the promised result, Marxism provided a tempting answer for why it had gone wrong, and for why it would succeed the next time around. The fusion of truth and justice was possible, indeed in the end mandatory, but the laws of history had to be respected. The Second Coming was to be governed by a timetable which had to be observed; it could not be brought about willfully. But the underlying promise of the reunification of the social/moral order with absolute truth was retained, and it was this which endowed Marxism with the moral authority which it unquestionably possessed for many people.

Why did Bolshevism collapse in a uniquely ignominious way? It has often and correctly been compared to a religion, but in the end when faced with a crisis, its utter failure to emulate the achievement of other religions was precisely most conspicuous. Religious faiths strike roots deep in the hearts of men, and when a religion goes into decline, it seldom does so without a struggle. Some, at least among those who found their identity and orientation with it, find the break too painful, and fight to retain the vision and the self which the faith had given them. Not only old women, but men and people of all ages continued to come to pray in Orthodox churches even in the days when it was perilous to do so. But who today comes to show reverence and fidelity (in both senses) at the Marxist shrines? Virtually no one. That faith, once so strong and vibrant, has gone

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like the snows of winter when the strong Russian sun shines in late spring.

The world's first secular religion has failed to emulate the old faiths (in the literal sense) in at least one respect: it has no staying power. It has precious few determined loyalists; there is virtually no one eager or willing to make a last stand. There are now, on my count, twenty-nine sovereign states in the Eurasian zone between Western Europe and China. In many of them, there is conflict, sometimes violent. In many, the old apparat is fighting to retain its position, often successfully. The wars of succession and inheritance are on, but *no one* is doing it in the name of the old faith. Some may say that the old regime had given us strength, international respect, stability, and thus had been, instrumentally, a good thing. We might profitably have continued to use it. But no one has a good word to say for the old faith itself! Has there ever been such a complete desertion of a banner? There is now only a void under the banner of Marxism from which men flee as if from a pest. There must be an explanation for this remarkable incapacity of this faith to retain any loyalty.

I have some tentative suggestions. It may be the pantheistic inheritance of Marxism, bequeathed by Spinoza through Hegel, which is to blame. Spinoza was pervaded by the intuition that everything is equally sacred, and Hegel and Marx historicized this idea. Marxian "materialism" in particular ensured the inclusion of productive activities into the sphere of the sacred: if the new reverence for the real life of men and for human activity, instead of an imaginary fantastic projection of it, was to have any sacraments, then they were to be found in *work*. It is this apotheosis of work and the work ethic, and the turning of the process of production into the motor and arbiter of history, which makes Marx the supreme expression of the bourgeois spirit. But this means that a Marxist society is left with no humdrum sphere of the profane into which to escape during periods of diminished zeal and enthusiasm. Other faiths, even if they circumscribe the economic zone with religious rules, nevertheless do not elevate and sacralize it. Marxism did, and perhaps this constituted its undoing. Faith survived random and massive terror, and indeed found a confirmation in it: the final, total transformation of the human condition was confirmed in blood. But faith did not survive the squalor in the economic sphere.

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The vision of the *nomenklatura* murdering each other was acceptable, but that of its bribing each other was not. The squalid, gray, sleazy inefficiency of the productive process in the Brezhnev era really eroded faith.

The monolithic nature of the Soviet order, its Caesaro-Papism-Mamonism, and its fusion of the social, economic, political, and ideological hierarchies perhaps also contributed to the unexpected totality of the collapse when it eventually came. There may have been hidden pluralisms within the system, in the sense of competition of rival mafias, but there can be no doubt about the melding of the various aspects of social life—the failure to allow polity, economy, and faith their autonomous organizations. The entire structure was so rigid that when a large part of it went, *everything went*. The collapse of the Soviet Union seems to illustrate a generalization made long ago by Machiavelli concerning oriental empires: they are so centralized that they disintegrate under the impact of a single effective blow. This one collapsed through weakness at a single center, without even an outside blow.

Marxism was not the only politically powerful attempt to recover the real or imagined ancient unity of social fact and value. The faith eliminated in 1945 by military defeat had offered something similar, and had even been closer to using such language for characterizing its own program. Nazism was a blend of romantic communalism and biologism: fulfillment through a deeply affective membership of the community was combined with a view that the community was and had to be a genetic one, and with the view that ruthlessness was linked to both excellence and fulfillment. Though in fact very much adapted to an industrial society and its abstract impersonal organization, Nazism turned its back on the values of production and commerce and reaffirmed the old values of aggressiveness and territoriality. War was to be the judge. Significantly, the verdict was confirmed by the immediate postwar history: territorial amputation and an imposed abstention from military aspiration led to more power and prosperity than, perhaps, would have followed the success of the earlier option.

Marxism like Nazism was eliminated by a judge of its own choosing. It believed in economic growth; it held the augmentation of productive forces to be *the* secret of history (of which it alone possessed the key), and Marxism expected this principle to vindicate

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it and to damn its rivals. It turned out, quite unambiguously, to be the other way around. Incidentally, the Cold War was the first very major historic conflict to be decided entirely by economic means. One hopes it will not be the last. Opponents less committed than the Russians to the doctrine of the ultimate authority of the economic sphere may be less fastidious about turning to straight military blackmail when outdistanced in other spheres. Perhaps the West has some cause to be grateful for the fact that the Russians were habituated to think in Marxist terms, and were not immediately drawn to the thought that economic imbalance may be corrected by military means. When their way of handling the plow failed, they turned (not very cleverly) to the possibility of finding another way of handling it, rather than abandoning it altogether for the sword. Of course, their thoughts may have been guided not only by the intuitions of Marxism, but also by the fact that their sword had not done so very well in Afghanistan either.

There was, of course, a kind of vacuum and moral crisis which followed on the collapse of Nazism. In Austria, for instance, a complicity in Nazism and a reluctance to seek alternatives led to a curious persistent amnesia and an almost institutionalized moral/intellectual vacuum, but this is not true elsewhere. In many ways, the problem was easier. Nazism had promised to last a millennium, but in fact it lasted a mere twelve years. In other words, the memory of an alternative remained vivid and well-informed, and the proportion of those who had clearly not endorsed the ideology was probably much higher than under communism. Nazism had not radically transformed the economy, and this side of society did not need a fundamental reorganization. And, although Nazism was a faith, it was not a well codified one. The fact that it had only offered salvation to some, and not to all mankind, made the return to another world easier. There was a pluralist and (restricted) tolerant aspect to Nazism: during the war, Göring, a bon vivant if ever there was one, boasted that after the war, the victorious Germans would live and let live and were free of the narrow puritanism of some of their enemies. The sheer fact that the final conflict had been military and had left the victorious allies in firm and exclusive possession of power at the end of the war made the imposition of a new order incomparably easier. There was an unambiguous center of authority and the means to implement its decisions. American colonists could

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forge their social contract on the basis of the moral institutions they brought along, firm and complete, from England. Those who drew up the particular contract on achieving independence did so on the basis of a stable, well established civil society. The Russians are expected to draw up a social contract when the entire civil and economic society is to be remade, is *na remont,* and the moral institutions have been disoriented first by too much certainty and then by too much doubt. When watching the struggle between the various arms of government and when seeing dubious reconstructed former Communists appealing to democracy against the center, one should remember all of this.

The problem inherent in the vacuum left behind by the sudden and total collapse of the Marxist faith and its institutional incarnations is far bigger and graver. Seventy years is a long time, and there is no institutional memory or continuity. No one concretely *remembers* what it had been like and what it could be like. The welcome fact that the conflict had not been a military one also means that no external victor is present to act as peacemaker and arbitrator.

In certain ways, the postcommunist situation in Russia resembles the Weimar period more than post-Nazi Germany. There can be little doubt that if there were some man who could convincingly promise an end to inflation and unemployment, restoration of law and order, an end to criminalization, a corporatist social contract instead of political strife and economic chaos, and a restoration of national pride, then such a man would sweep the board. In other words, an appropriate version of the Hitlerian formula would win, even without the inclusion of ultranationalism and racism. But there is a difference. The turbulence and chaos of Weimar took place in an age when both the Left and the Right were full of confident dogmatism. "The worst are full of passionate intensity. . . ."[2] The worst are still with us but they are proportionately less numerous and, thank God, devoid of much conviction. Resentment is all they can muster. For better or worse, Russia is facing its Weimar in an age genuinely devoid of faith. There is a noisy Right, indeed nationalists and those imbued with nostalgia for the stable past Bolshevik order fuse in the notorious red-brown alliance, but they share an attitude and regret rather than either real conviction or a very wide appeal. Perhaps one ought not to underestimate the danger they represent, especially if conditions continue to worsen. But it is important that

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they represent an attitude and a reaction, and not, as was once the case, a vibrant faith.

In a curious way, the Russians are expected to set up a decent liberal social order under the worst possible conditions. Human societies maintain themselves by inertia, fear, hope, or faith. In different ways and to a differing extent, the present state-builders are deprived of all of these pillars, and yet are expected to erect a stable edifice. Fear has gone: there is a genuine revulsion against the methods that had been used by the state which has now happily withered away, and there is very little political (as opposed to privatized) violence, at any rate near the center. Faith too has gone; it is precisely the monopoly of truth and its linkage to power that is being abjured, but there is neither a clear successor (and it is doubtful whether he would or should be welcome), nor, as in the West, a custom-hollowed compromise, an ambiguous social concordat between belief and agnosticism. Society cannot carry on by sheer inertia along established lines, insofar as the one thing which is recognized is that the old order did not work and must be replaced. Hope? So far, there is little to encourage it. As the Moscow joke has it, there is only one thing worse than socialism, and that is the condition which follows it. There is no clear scenario of recovery.

As an alternative to the theory of ultraliberal, stateless Russia, there is also the theory of industrial feudalism. A common formulation of it runs as follows: the command-administrative monolith had never really existed; it had always been a myth. What had really existed was a set of negotiated relationships between the barons in an informal and flexible hierarchy, which in the end expressed its agreements and reflected an ever changing balance of power, in the idiom of the execution of commands emanating from an absolute center. But there was not really any such center, other than a locus of haggling and eventually an emergent consensus between power groups. So all that really happened when the center collapsed and the state withered away was that a game which had previously been covert and hidden, came out into the open.

This theory has a number of attractions. For one thing, it is inherently far more plausible than the old official story. Could it really ever have been the case that the conclusions of all those numerous, anonymous, gray planners of the Gosplan had then been inexorably translated into reality by an all-powerful executive, in

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total disregard of the wishes of the occupants of the more specific and regional power centers? A picture which accords more real power to desk-bound technicians than to occupants of nerve centers of the power network has little plausibility. For another thing, this theory explains why the system is still working at all (even if not well), as opposed to collapsing totally, which is what one could reasonably expect if the system had really possessed the rigidity and exclusively centralized authority with which it was credited. At the same time, it must have made a great difference to the system, loosely feudal though it may have been, that authoritarian appearances and decencies had to be respected, that brawls could not be public, and that the appearance of party discipline and order had to be revered. It imposed limits on the stubbornness with which participants in interboss poker games could indulge in bluff or intransigence. Excessive rigidity would penalize the perpetrator, a consideration which would inhibit temptations to play a hand too ruthlessly. The Party provided an outward form within which groups could play out their games with decency. The faith provided both an idiom in which to express the outcome and a set of rules which helped to give the struggle a determinate and hence seemingly a more or less nonarbitrary, acceptable outcome. A feudal system in which the overlord is known to be weak and *fainéant* is different from one in which he is known to be strong enough to enforce his prerogatives and touchy about their open violation. The overlord has gone, and there is no one to enforce cooperation in a system which is completely interdependent. A real feudalism could manage without the overlord and fall back on local autarchy. Can an *industrial* feudalism, with a highly developed division of labor, do so?

So, the fashionable, half-serious theories of the real functioning of contemporary Russia fluctuate between ultraliberalism—the state *has* now really withered away, and everything, including functions which sane liberalism does not leave to the market, is for sale—and the theory of a new, centrifugal rather than centripetal industrial feudalism.

The unprecedented vacuum is not simply ideological; it is also acutely present in other spheres of life. In Western Europe, the transition from an aristocratic honor ethos to a bourgeois work ethic was slow enough to allow, precisely, the emergence of a new spirit, with its symbols, rationale, and pride. The abrupt transition

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from messianic and total productive centralism has not really allowed anything of the kind. The only ideology available is the ultraliberalism of a totally free market as a supposed means towards affluence. It is eminently doubtful whether this crude economic liberalism is compatible *either* with late industrialism—a massive shared infrastructure, a need for a social framework, security and education, powerful technology calling for cooperation between the economic and political bureaucracies—*or* with the bank of custom left behind by the Russian past, whether Marxist or pre-Marxist. The image of an opportunist lumpen-bourgeoisie emerging from the wreckage of socialism, half old apparat, half old illegal mafia, may or may not be the whole of the truth: it has been challenged, and the facts of the case are less than clear. But it has a certain plausibility and is given credence widely enough to weaken the appeal and legitimacy of the emerging order.

Communism had destroyed much of civil society, and the monopolistic organization and faith which replaced it have gone down leaving something which must be as close to a social and moral vacuum as is conceivable in a complex, relatively advanced industrial society. Nationalism is the most plausible and most easily available candidate for filling this emptiness. Under these circumstances, the striking thing is not its presence, but rather its relative weakness or moderation. If the moral-ideological situation recalls Weimar (but, happily, without the passionate conviction and certainty of the extremists), than the ethnic situation recalls that of the end of the Habsburg empire—except that, once again, the Communists did not even need military defeat to induce them to collapse. Once again, a polyethnic empire, with an appallingly complex ethnic map and a large amount of ethnic division of labor and social specialism, crumbles. Declarations of independence or sovereignty become easy and virtually irresistible. But given the complexity of the ethnic map, the successor units are as riddled with minorities as had been the previous ideocratic state. The most important new minority belongs to the previously dominant ethnic group, more likely to be in a position to resent and resist discriminations which are now likely to strike it and which in some places are already conspicuously in operation. The successor units are small, inexperienced, and on occasion greedy and opportunistic. Last time around, this combination of elements led to the eventual

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collapse of the successor states and their domination by determined ideological dictators.

The year 1945 and its sequel seem to show that industrial society cannot successfully be run on a restoration of the preindustrial values of aggression and territoriality. However, 1989 and its sequels suggest that it cannot be run on a total faith or on the political imposition of righteousness either. Neither of these events may be absolutely conclusive theoretically, but they seem decisive in practice. The compromise which does work, however, seems to need *time,* a commodity in short supply in the former Soviet Union. The outcome of the experiment—*instant* pluralism and compromise—is unpredictable and constitutes *the* issue of the time.

History does not repeat itself with precision. But the similarity of dangers is unmistakable. The vacuum left behind by the first formally secular messianism is unique, and not properly understood. If we can, we must strive to understand and perhaps, if lucky, to mitigate it.

ENDNOTES

[1]Valentin Fedorovich Turchin, *The Inertia of Fear and The Scientific Worldview,* trans. Guy Daniels (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

[2]William Butler Yeats, *The Second Coming* (1921).

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The Industrial Revolution is not necessarily an intellectual revolution. Of itself it is neither nationalist nor internationalist. It is essentially mechanical and material. It has merely provided improved means and greater opportunities for the dissemination of any ideas which influential individuals entertain. Now it so happened that when the Industrial Revolution began, nationalism was becoming a significant intellectual movement, even more significant than internationalism.

Carlton J. H. Hayes

From *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*
1950

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Tom Nairn

Internationalism and the Second Coming

NAVIGATION OF THE SEAS BEYOND THE END of history requires new bearings. "Internationalism" is one of the most important of these. It is important that it not be taken for granted, yet it often is. The concept we have inherited was the reverse of the medal of first-wave (nineteenth- and earlier twentieth-century) nationalism. Even then it was more wielded than analyzed, and not often considered in its own right. It tended to be the background music which helped to form attitudes rather than the foreground story. Now we badly need a change of tune.

Much of this was borne upon me recently at an event I attended in Glasgow.[1] I was presenting the case for national self-determination in a suitably broad sense—nationalism as the least bad answer, or in any case inevitable—and opposing the new international pessimism, what I guess we have come to call the theory of the Ethnic Abyss. Afterward a well-known theorist of the (old) New Left said to me:

> *Merci, mon cher Nairn, merci, très intéressant, mais. . .*allow me to observe, without giving undue offense. . . .It seems to me that you are arguing the way you do because, being a nationalist, you have to.

What I believe he meant is that I distorted everything to suit my parochial bias. He was, of course, far too kind to employ phrases like "dressing up your personal prejudices" or "special pleading." But the point was that history, whether ended or reborn, had to be rewritten to make it fit the inescapable necessity that Scotland be free and have her own government.

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I, in turn, was too polite to make the obvious reply: he also might have prejudices to enrobe and interests to defend. His own contribution, an austerely revised version of an internationalist credo focusing on racism, could equally be viewed as a belief system of a particular group—a group speaking (or implicitly claiming to speak) for science and civilization as such.

The bias of nationalism (even generalized nationalism) is indeed easy to detect. However, that of internationalism is less so. A nationalist (even a pan-nationalist) by definition speaks from somewhere; the internationalist speaks (or claims to speak) from nowhere in particular.

Of course, it is ridiculous that the truth on such matters should be seen as merely a clash of such interests. I am not arguing for any kind of half-witted relativism here. The dialogue is what counts, and the question is how to continue it more fruitfully, or less one-sidedly. I believe that may be an important part of the post-1989 change. Nationalism and hence internationalism are now beginning to appear in a different light: one kinder to both sides, but which makes it clearer that the truth belonged exclusively to neither.

INTERNATIONALITY

The key distinction is between internationalism and what I am afraid must be referred to as "internationality." This is an uncomfortable term, at least in the English language, and is not in common use. However it does exist and, more importantly, it does mean something.[2]

"Of course, a French race-course is not like an English one. Internationality is not yet so perfect." This was the *Oxford English Dictionary*'s authority from the 1864 *Daily Telegraph*. It also expressed the scarcely veiled great nation chauvinism which, as the years went by, was destined to be a notable part of the internationalist orchestra. Racecourses were growing more alike over the world as civilization advanced. So were factories, shops, high streets, farms, and even people. Given enough time, would they not become indistinguishable?

Such would be the fulfillment of "internationality." A recent high note of the same chorus was struck by Alexander Cockburn. When the communists gave up in Russia, he predicted with a certain sourness that Pizza Hut would soon be setting up in Red Square,

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quite possibly in Lenin's mausoleum if only they could remove "the old stiff." Though a fully subscribed internationalist of the old school, Cockburn was definitely unhappy about this—maybe because he detected the hand of the American empire in such a triumph of internationality. Internationalism has always suffered from such problems.

There is, of course, nothing remotely left wing about internationality. It denotes all the things which were so conspicuously hymned in *The Communist Manifesto*: the majestic revolutionary tide of capitalist expansion dissolving all traditions and effacing every frontier; the lineaments of that right-wing world which would very soon be taken over and purified by the Left. I do not need to elaborate on the stages of tidal progress that are in review here, from Manchester Free Trade via the "international trusts" to their more powerful successors, the multinational corporations. The message has always been much the same, whether delivered as a hymn or as a curse.

One hundred twenty-six years later, we hear essentially the same tune from Jacques G. Maisonrouge, a former executive of the multinationalist International Business Machines:

> For business purposes the boundaries that separate one nation from another are no more real than the equator. They are merely convenient demarcations of ethnic, linguistic and cultural entities. . . .Once management accepts this world economy, its view of the marketplace—and its planning—necessarily expand. . . .[3]

The views of many representatives of convenient entities (not invariably delighted to see their boundaries treated like the equator, whether by computer salesmen, revolutionaries, or cocaine vendors) have expanded as well. Since then IBM has discovered that it does not rule the globe.[4] Small is not only beautiful but has teeth too (speaking both technically and politically).

The dignified point is, however, that internationality has never in any case implied internationalism, or at least not in any straightforward sense. Marx and Maisonrouge were equally mistaken. There have been, and there still are, constant, recurrent, and simplistic arguments to the effect that the one leads inevitably to the other. As protagonists of medieval particularism (as Lenin loved to call it), we nationalists find ourselves from time to time belabored by those in love with the communication and information revolutions or overawed by

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economic scale. Technological determinism is as inescapable as the weather. "How (they say) can you small-time extras and understudies go on pretending you have a starring future, when your own kids come home every day to stuff themselves with Big Macs while they watch programs like *Neighbours* or *L. A. Law* beamed down from a satellite?"

In fact, the overwhelmingly dominant political by-product of modern internationality so far has been nationalism. Not the implacably prescribed common sense of internationalism, but the nonlogical, untidy, refractory, disintegrative, particularistic truth of nation-states. Not swelling or supine unity but "Balkanization," a world of spiky exceptions to what ought to have been the rule but clearly is not. Even before 1989 it was clear that medieval particularism still had a future. Only after that year could it be more convincingly argued that it had *the* future too.

I fail to see how one can avoid suspecting that there is some connection here. It cannot simply be a chain of accidents, as internationalists pretend. Political Marxism may be in the grave, but in my book historical materialism lives on. All those Big Macs and IBM salesmen must have actually (materially) fostered or created this result, no doubt unintentionally. "Balkanization" must not be a doomed and mindless resistance to the advance of progress, but that progress itself. It must be what actually happens, as distinct from the ideological virtual reality offered up by the determinists, the multinational salesmen, and the internationalists. Ah yes, we always thought we knew that the poor Macedonians would have to resign themselves to progress—to the erosion of their antique and colorful ways, to becoming more like everybody else. Now, we also know that progress must resign itself to being Macedonian.

ETHIC AND DOCTRINE

An analogy may be in order here. It is now a commonplace of the theory of nationalism that it bears no simple relationship to nationality. The *"ism"* does not spring out from the brute facts of difference or singularity. There are nationalities without nationalism. I happen to come from one. In Scotland in the 1950s, everyone knew that they were Scottish, but almost no one believed that they would later require the troublesome *"ism"* as well. Actually, we thought our

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ethnos had been in some blessed and British way sublimated, carried over into a postpolitical state as a reward for being so good. Around 1970, however, the truth began to catch up with us.

The general belief here is that nationalism arose from the specific developmental conjuncture described by Ernest Gellner and his school of thought.[5] It was industrialization which did the trick. The ragged, uneven march into modernity, where certain peoples led or dominated others and transformed them (instead of merely sitting on them), squeezed nationalism out of nationality, and made it into the general political climate of world development. Nationalism is not a reflection, a mirror of ethnic variety. It is a set of levers (which are sometimes weapons) through which ethnos is driven into a new salience in human affairs.

But, in a very broad sense, the same could be said of internationalism. It is not a mirror of internationality, but a complex range of reactions to nationalism: part defense, part disguise, and part staged adaptation. It is a constituent of the same nationalist universe. Since the fall of Napoleon's empire, these two world views have existed in a permanent, uneasy tension with one another, the Siamese twin brothers of a single world-historical process.

This is, incidentally, why internationalism bears only a somewhat tortured and distant relationship to universalistic beliefs of the past. It is easy to see resemblances between these spiritual doctrines of man's nature and the kind of preaching internationalists admire. But I doubt if this will take us far. The religious verities are counterposed to sin and evil, in the framework of a mainly unchanging universe. Internationalism has arisen against the convulsions of the post-1776 or 1789 world: the endemic betrayals wrought by industrial and democratic development. The latter's devils are more powerful: contingency, particularism (medieval or otherwise), and a nativist darkness which has been triumphant. Priestly evil, on the other hand, was installed by a deity, who could be envisaged as an ultimate arbiter. Internationalists have no such consolation.

There is not a strong rapport between internationalists and cosmopolitans either. The latter were a preindustrial elite, convinced they had a vanguard role for civilized internationality. This was to be disseminated from the more elevated centers. Edmund Burke noted that there existed in his day "a system of manners and education that was very nearly similar to all in this quarter of the

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globe," such that by the 1780s, "no citizen of Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it" and no one "felt himself quite abroad."[6]

Now internationalists often fancy themselves as cosmopolitans. Sometimes a city, a region, or a person may be described as "cosmopolitan," meaning it or he is agreeably open to outside cultural influences and that foreigners (most often intellectuals) easily feel at home with it or him. There are also actual cosmopolitans, in the sense of individuals or families from culturally mixed or transplanted backgrounds who genuinely feel that they could choose to settle anywhere.[7] The same description, of course, leaves them open to attack by nativist spokesmen for vices such as rootlessness, lack of allegiance, etc.

However, I think such categories are really marginal. The more important point is that the whole thrust of nationalist-governed development has been against civilization being disseminated out and downwards from the appropriate centers, by those equipped with the right manners and education. Do-it-yourself replaced the metropolitan schoolteacher. But one can only do it oneself—in one's own language, via one's own resources and mistakes—by vigorously rejecting what the citizens of Europe are saying. This happened in 1776, and then again after the 1790s. "Never trust a citizen of Europe" became the prevalent slogan. In other words: "Join on our own terms, not theirs."

Cosmopolitanism slid into troubling confusion in the post-1789 world. It became more difficult to distinguish from imperialism, as waves of metropolitan civilization imparters began to work, each one convinced of his innate right to uplift and lead the way. Great Powers make internationalism their own by a sleight of hand which seems perfectly natural when one happens to be holding most of the good cards. Paris, London, Vienna, New York, or Moscow are out in front with the aces and jokers; the peasants, therefore, have the rubbish. For the latter not to let themselves be civilized by the former is rash, presumptuous, crass, vulgar, hopelessly ill-advised, and self-defeating. It is quite nationalist in fact.

Very fortunately, as Gellner noted in *Thought and Change*,[8] there have been enough nativist fools around consistently to thwart imperialism. Otherwise, one form or another of the Empire would have to get its boots permanently on humanity's

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windpipe—a fate uncomfortably close in the years from 1939 to 1942.

In this era of imperialist and nationalist struggles, internationalism was kept going as an ethic mainly by a single doctrine: the belief in an alternative vehicle of civilized development, neither imperial nor national. It was the idea that class could become a developmental vector in its own right. The proletariat, by opposing the Empire and transcending nationality, might step forward and itself assume the Enlightenment mantle. By uniting, the workers of all lands could escape from the vicious contradictions of capitalist progress. They could make themselves into citizens of the world, not just of Europe. Though for the moment confined to national stages, the working class should conduct its battles there in the appropriate spirit—the internationalist spirit looking to a wider horizon of emancipation, to the freeing of national enemies as well as friends.

Although lacking a social basis in the sense of Burke's educated cross-border caste, this secular faith did have a composite and shifting foundation. Part of it came from what George Steiner, in a 1987 television lecture on Vienna, called the "Judaic intelligentsia" (especially after the end of the Habsburg Empire); part from the working-class movement of different countries, as self-educated cadres adopted internationalism in opposition to what they felt as the oppressive cultures of their own schools; and part from metropolitan or Atlantic-left cliques whose influence was (or seemed) big enough to make them feel for a time like the center of the world.

THE SMALL BATTALIONS

Internationalists knew defeat was coming well before 1989. In 1977, Eric Hobsbawm morosely concluded that "The United Nations Organization. . .is soon likely to consist of the late 20th century equivalents of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Schwarzburg-Sondershausen."[9] He was trying to defend two things at once: Leninist Internationalism and Great Britain—the latter as a remaining exemplar of sane multinational values (if only Scottish and Welsh separatism could be exorcised). The big battalions, with all their faults, were already giving way to ever smaller ones (whose faults would be worse). He felt even then that internationalism was not going to reverse this trend. However, it could still be cautioned and contained. As long

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as some functioning multinational states like the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia survived, all was not lost.

From that point of view, all *was* lost in 1989. The last shards of the doctrine dropped through the grating, as the Eastern working class opted decisively for a mixture of "bourgeois democracy" and nationalism. The key overarching states fell apart. The United Kingdom is still there, true, though much worse afflicted than in the 1970s. So are China and India. Yet one need only cite this short list to see how hopeless the position may soon be. The internationalist ethic had survived only by being preserved in the Cold War aspic along with so much else.

Its great day had been the previous one—that of the struggles against pathological variants of nationalism in the interwar years. This too followed on the great defeat represented by the explosion of World War I in 1914. Nonetheless, Leninism, the Third and Fourth Internationals, and the anti-Fascist battles restored a certain salience and impact to the credo, for which, incidentally, one may perfectly well be grateful today, even while doubting most of what it stood for. After all, it stiffened resistance to the most deadly kind of imperialism. But we should not forget either that it did so (and won) only by allying itself to nationalism—that is, to those nonpathological forms of the creed which counterattacked fascism and brought about its destruction.

In that period, internationalism found justification as a heroic defensive morale. Yet, even at that time it remained simultaneously a way of adapting to the nationalist world. It often accomplished this by minimizing and deprecating nationality, on the assumption that *ethnos* was tolerable only because it was near history's exit door.

At its worst, the assumption could become a rigid sectarian conviction that the world is quite other than it was, that the exit door was standing wide open, as it were, with the masses already straining to get out. All they had to do was understand the patent map for getting there. This was the late, millenarian form of the internationalist belief structure. It remained a force until the 1970s, particularly in Italy and Germany. As it lost political ground it tried for a time to make up for it with a mixture of intellectual terrorism and armed force.

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By 1989 this too was already a memory. The relatively small battalions were taking over for good. The longer-term process mentioned earlier, by which globalization seems to engender fragmentation, attained a climax, namely, the liberal end of history. The Saxe-Coburgs and Sondershausens began queuing up at the UN's door. Slovenia was free; Andorra voted for full self-government; Denmark briefly wrecked the European Community, then changed its mind in May of 1993 and (even more revealingly) saved it. At least in the old sense, internationalism was no more: the wellborn ghost was homeless, doctrineless, and reduced to pious moralizing of the kind that Christian and other religions do far better. Since so many in the UN queue were and are still trying to kill one another, people feel a certain nostalgia for order and stability. But what intellectual content can that possibly have?

ALL NATIONALISTS NOW

Socialism has to find new, post-1989 bearings, although some may find this a charitable description of its plight. Its new bearings will take it through capitalism, not against it, even if socialists still want, eventually, to alter everything. The alternative lies within what used to be the enemy, not outside it or in alienated global contraposition to it. If market-governed development is the only kind that there is, then this implies that there will be—or perhaps, more *obviously* will be—different kinds of capitalism. Once unfrozen and uncongealed from permanent contraposition to a supposed alternative, it is the immense variety, the contradictions, and the unevenness of industrialization that will be both intellectually evident and more practically important.

But the same is true of nationalism and internationalism. Here also the alternative lies through (not against) a finally nationalized world. Any new bearings lie beyond the Ethnic Abyss (except that there is no abyss, in the hysterical-liberal sense). Are the fragmentation and anarchy really so bad? Some parts may be, but here we are inevitably talking on the whole—trying to hold the whole spectrum in view and to judge it accordingly. And, as I have argued elsewhere, in that general sense the new disorder is much better than the standoff of imperiums which came before.[10] The first has brought a murderous

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threat to certain border populations; had it endured, the second would have ended by murdering everybody.

On both counts—capitalism and nationalism—the other interpretation is to say we are now merely facing the real, longer-term trajectory of development "with sober senses," as Marx liked to say. If this is all for the best and not just a spasmodic response to communism's collapse, then socialists will have to decide what type of capitalists they will become, and internationalists will have to decide what sort of nationalists they will become.

Some may regard this choice as the hangman's noose, but I believe they are wrong. It is wrong if we attend to the generous, imaginative side of the old internationalist credo, rather than to its rigid, elitist, quasi-metropolitan side. The post-Yugoslav war has given a momentary boost to old-style Atlantic leftism, but I doubt it will last long. For the former, by contrast, new navigation lights are perfectly possible and some of them are becoming visible. Internationalism can only be built upon a certain style of nationalism whose construction rests more upon democracy than upon ethnos. A durable and bearable disorder will rely more upon chosen identities and less upon the classical motifs of language, folk custom, and "blood."

Some of the bearings are intellectual. They rest upon a rereading of nationalism and its doctrines. Recently, in Prague, I heard Roman Szporluk of Harvard University give an address on the history of nationalist ideas. He described how, often under the sway of internationalism, scholars tended to misinterpret the story of uneven development and even its principal theorists, like Herder and Friedrich List. Nationalism was in fact the first genuinely secular "world view" outside the natural sciences: its "*ism*" denoted the universal factor, the aspiration at its heart.

In the disturbed metropolitan perspective, ethnos has always figured as the spoilsport, the eruption in what would otherwise be a neat garden. But what they want is their own garden, a figurative place within the grander landscape of modernity. Szporluk also shows how List compares quite favorably as an analyst with, for example, Marx and Engels, and how he has fared incomparably better as a prophet. In one sense, it was clearly the Listian world which reemerged after 1989.[11]

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BEYOND DYSTOPIA

We need a new sense of the future as well as a revised history. As is so often said in the United Kingdom these days, one clings to nurse because of the fear of something worse—in this case, "the Abyss." But what is this black hole which we are supposedly being pulled into? Its profile is familiar enough; it has been frequently described in theory. The most up-to-the-minute example that I have is an unpublished paper written by Ernest Gellner.[12]

Gellner has always had a sociologist's weakness for incomprehensible diagrams. This new work contains two superb displays of agrarian (prenationalist) and industrial (or nationalist) society, respectively—civilization reconfigured for modernity. For Gellner, history tends to be the mildly annoying stuff which happens between one sociological model and another. Composed in 1991, the second has what feels like a post-1989 addendum:

> Society must be homogenized, *gleichgeschaltet*; and the only agency capable of carrying out, supervising or protecting this operation is the central state. Given the competition of various states for overlapping catchment areas, the only way a given culture can protect itself against another one. . .is to acquire one of its own. Just as every girl should have a husband, preferably her own, so every culture should have a state, preferably its own. The state-cultures live in competition with one another. So this is the end-product: a mobile, atomized, egalitarian society with a standard culture where the culture is a literate, "high" one, and where its dissemination, maintenance and boundaries are protected by a state. . . .One culture, one state. One state, one culture.[13]

So here is the Abyss indeed: a universe of armed Leibnizian monads drunk both with their own cultures and with a dislike of neighbors, as well as rootless cosmopolitans. Progress across a future Europe or even over the North American Free Trade Area might soon, on this reckoning, become like crossing Bosnia today. Every few miles a band of ruffians, uniformed or otherwise, would be waiting to dispose of enemies and to inflict their miserably depreciated currency upon hapless travelers.[14]

Civilization is certainly incompatible with this. But, of course, Gellner is typically half tongue-in-cheek about the vision of dread. He concludes that, while it looks "virtually Euclidean in its cogency,"

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not everyone agrees. "As a matter of regrettable fact an astonishing number of people fail to accept this theory even when presented with it." I am one of that number. It may fit Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Bosnia-Herzegovina does not (fortunately) fit very closely anywhere else. The general dystopia is false. There are no monads, nor is there any likelihood that a small-battalion, nationalized universe will look much like that.

By way of a suggestive counterexample, let us look briefly at another small zone within the same general area of post-Cold War Europe: Trieste. Here is a classical specimen of an "overlapping catchment area" of incorrigibly mixed populations: Italian, Slovene, Friulian, Croat, Austro-German, and Jewish. This artificial city-state would be doomed if the isomorphic state-culture norm were enforced (more or less what the Italian Fascists tried to do between 1926 and 1945).

Having nearly been strangled by "homogenization," most Triestines do not want a repeat performance. Nor is there any pressure for it from the side of the new Slovenia. The latter shows no signs whatever of wishing to redeem its catchment area, in spite of the fact that most people in this great city have either a Slovene grandparent or (often unconfessed) Slovene skeletons in either the backyard or the nearest cemetery.

At the same time, the live political forces in Trieste know that there is no escape from nationalism in a political sense. There can only be independence—a city-state independence or autonomy, through which sovereignty can be established inside the advancing new disorder. Since the place is inherently multiethnic, this implies that such self-government will have to have a democratic rather than a natural foundation. It will have to be a chosen identity, and in a sense a synthetic one which embraces elements of everything from the Habsburgs to the *Lega Nord*, currently in the ascendant.

But that too would be part of the new nationalist system—every bit as much as a cleansed Greater Serbia or a purified Schwarzburg-Sondershausen. The new order will and should be an order of bastards, mongrels, odd interstices, and breathing spaces, as well as 100 percent isomorphs like Slovenia and Poland. What is disorderly about it may be what is best, as well as what is worst. In fact, I suspect any such system will need its buffers, zones of confluence, no-man's-lands, and enclaves in order to function tolerably at all.

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Andorra, the Isle of Man, Sarajevo, Singapore, and Gibraltar may be as important in it as the more neatly theorizable ethnic building blocks.

The old internationalism was often uncomfortably close to "all-the-same-ism." I feel confident that this will never be said of post-1989 nationalism. Internationalism will find a far more natural foothold there as a moderating tendency of the system, rather than as a futile holding operation against its realization. Democracy has been the midwife of the post-1989 order, and remains its general interest. The anarchy in that is, in part, merely admitting that metropolitan grandeur and pretensions have shrunk out of sight and are unlikely ever to return. However, anarchy ought also to have a more positive function, which the new style of internationalism should take to heart.

ANARCHIST INTERNATIONALISM

In the post-1989 world, an odd thing has happened. While the Atlantic-left gloom traders see mainly atavism and warfare, utopia is advancing on other fronts. Earlier I mentioned some work relevant to the general revision of ideas about nationalism. But it may also be worthwhile recalling some other notions which, when they first appeared in print, were dismissed as roseate ruminations, visions of an almost inconceivably remote future.

For example, let us consider the theory put forward by Professor Jane Jacobs in *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*.[15] It is not true, as so often is said, that nobody foresaw the collapse of the Soviet Union. Jacobs did, and she lucidly described the "transactions of decline" which were then destroying it, as well as other "profoundly stagnated and pitiable fragments of empires, both old and recent." She concluded that the world would be better if it were smaller, economically and in every other way. But the problem was the existing frozen character of the international nation-state system which did not easily permit "the multiplication of sovereignties."

Existing national states (especially the bigger ones) were based on "the gruesome glamour of human sacrifice" so that betraying their unity meant rendering "the most glorious pages of national history mere sound and fury."[16] This sounds (incidentally) very similar to the speeches that London government ministers delivered in Scotland

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during the British general election campaign of 1992. They were, basically, "How dare you?" As well as that, an international order has been maintained on the principle of inviolability—the sacredness of every existing frontier, as lodged in the protocols of the United Nations and the European Community. Although this may sometimes protect the weak from the strong and hungry, it also defends the strong from the weak and hungry, in the sense of secessionists, new sovereignties, and the new patterns created by population movements.

An internationalism founded on these ideas alone is therefore profoundly disabled, and out of touch with what Jacobs saw as the living trends and possibilities of any new order. These will, she argued, depend primarily on the multiplication of political sovereignties by democratic means. They involve a radical freeing of international relations from the winding sheets of the Cold War and its pitiable assorted imperial fragments. How is this to be attained? Jacobs somewhat hesitantly suggests the following formula: for former empires or large national states, the alternative to "transactions of decline" would simply be to countenance breakup:

> . . .for a political unit not to try to hold itself together. The radical discontinuity would thus be division of the single sovereignty into a family of smaller sovereignties, not after things had reached a stage of breakdown and disintegration, but long before while things were still going reasonably well. In a national society behaving like this, multiplication of sovereignties by division would be a normal, untraumatic accompaniment of economic development itself, and of the increasing complexity of economic and social life. Some of the sovereignties in the family would in their turn divide as evidence of the need to do so appeared. . . .In this utopian fantasy, young sovereignties splitting off from the parent nation would be told, in effect, "Good luck to you in your independence!"[17]

Lugubrious economists from both the Left and the Right see this as a calamitous course with chaos, a multiplication of currencies, and a breaking of all the rules to follow. In 1984, Jacobs pointed out that if there was any truth at all in matching theories of the information revolution and the computerization of the globe, then the multiplication of both sovereignties and currencies ought in fact to become for the first time quite easy. Such new tools could allow smaller economic units to cease deranging international trade and affairs. Again, globalization would bring about and actually encourage

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the proliferation of smaller, competing entities, rather than wipe them off the map.

I should perhaps add that anarchist internationalism and urbanology in Jacobs' sense has little to do with the well-remembered slogan "Small is Beautiful." She knows that small is not necessarily or invariably beautiful. It can be suffocating, hopeless, and a nuisance. Her point was not to praise gnomic worlds as such, but to envisage a general order within which small could cease to be perceived as a nuisance and start to deliver: an internationality more favorable to mini- and microunits, where these in turn could be open, functioning parts of the greater world.

It seems that only nine years later Jacobs' utopian prospect is less improbable: utopia has rushed towards us in the sense that what then looked like an eccentric fantasy is at least conceivable in practical terms.

But here I am once again blatantly arguing for a breakup, for new nations, and a general international disorder only because, as a representative of the United Kingdom, I must. Let me stop with some closing words from *Cities and the Wealth of Nations*. In the past, imitative and would-be states "have ignored the Icelandic and Isle of Man parliaments, but heeded Britain's parliamentary system" at a cost. What if things were different?

> Since it does seem that sooner or later human beings get around to trying everything within their capacities, no doubt somewhere, sometime, in some culture or civilization this alternative form of discontinuity will be tried—if it really is within human capacities to divide large sovereignties before they have reached a dead end of disarray. . . .[18]

Five years after Jacobs wrote this, the great discontinuity appeared, unplanned and mostly unforeseen. We are still learning about life and the principles of anarchy. One of them will be a new kind of internationalism.

ENDNOTES

[1]The occasion was a conference on nationalism organized in March of 1993 at the Caledonian University of Glasgow (formerly Glasgow Polytechnic). I would like to thank the organizers of that event, as well as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and

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the organizers of a subsequent conference at Cornell University in New York where I delivered the paper upon which this essay is based.

[2]"Internationality" first appeared in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1864—conveniently enough the year when Marx founded his First International and modern left-wing internationalism along with it.

[3]As quoted in Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: the Power of the Multinational Corporations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 14–15.

[4]The *Economist* (22 May 1993) carries a probing piece about the proposed breakup of IBM to make it more efficient, and recoup its record losses of 1991–1992.

[5]The *opus classicus* is of course Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); a less well-known but still very important *locus ultra-classicus* is Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism" in Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[6]Thomas J. Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 2.

[7]The ones I happen to know have all been Russian, or partly Russian. I know one who is happy only living in hotels, and justifies this with a complex philosophy of exile as the natural, if often unrecognized, human condition. Buying a house and "settling down" merely makes him feel in exile from everywhere else.

[8]Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

[9]Eric J. Hobsbawm, "Some Reflections on The Break-up of Britain," *New Left Review* 105 (September-October 1977).

[10]See my article in the *London Review of Books,* February 1993.

[11]Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[12]Ernest Gellner, "L'avvento del nazionalismo e la sua interpretazione. I miti della nazione e della classe," in Perry Anderson, ed., *Storia d'Europa* (forthcoming). Quotations from a transcript kindly provided by the author.

[13]Ibid.

[14]A few weeks ago, a friend on his way from Zagreb to Belgrade was halted and, after the usual hassles and warnings, "invited" to pin on a lapel badge. It read, "I Love Serbs." He declined the honor, pointing out that he had not had the time to discover whether he loved them or not. This reply was met with gales of laughter: "Just what a Serb would say!" roared one of the banditti.

[15]Jane Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life* (New York: Random House, 1984), 212–14.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., 214–20 passim.

[18]Ibid., 212–14.

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Martin Kramer

Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity

THREE LINES OF POETRY PLOT THE TRAJECTORY of Arab national consciousness. "Awake, O Arabs, and arise!" begins the famous ode of Ibrahim al-Yaziji, penned in 1868 in Lebanon.[1] George Antonius deployed the line as the epigraph of his influential book, *The Arab Awakening*,[2] as the first utterance of a nascent Arab desire for independence from Ottoman rule. "Write down, I am an Arab!" begins the poem of resistance by the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, written in 1963 to assert an Arab identity denied by Israel and the West.[3] The poem immediately entered the Arab nationalist canon, to be recited from memory by a generation of schoolchildren. In the century that separated these two lines, millions of people gradually awakened and arose, insisting before the world and one another that they should be written down as Arabs.

"Are we Arabs one big lie?" This line ends a poem of anguish written in the midst of the latest Gulf crisis by Nizar Qabbani, the most widely read contemporary Arab poet and critic.[4] Too much had gone wrong to sustain exclamation points of awakening and defiance; they were replaced by a question mark of doubt. Once half of Europe and a Superpower had admitted to living a lie for most of this century, the Arabs could not suppress their own doubt any longer. Their god had also failed, spectacularly so. It had been called Arabism, or Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism, and by the time Qabbani posed his question, it had been in full retreat for a generation.

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At present, many Arabs have suspended their belief in the Arab nation, and now openly doubt whether there is a collective Arab mission. Those recently swept up by Islamic activism prefer to think of themselves first and foremost as Muslims, and do so without apology. At times, their lexicon has turned "the Arabs" into a derogatory label, implying wastefulness, incompetence, and subservience. Other Arabs plainly prefer to be known as Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians, Moroccans— citizens of over twenty independent states, each with its own flag and own interests. Some have even taken to referring to themselves as Middle Easterners, in anticipation of an Arab-Israeli peace and a new regional order of cooperation modeled on Europe. A few intellectuals keep the Arab flame alive. Yet they are most often abroad, in London or Paris, where they command dwindling audiences of Third Worldists and "pro-Arabs." For a decade they have quarreled over whether pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism are simply in remission or beyond all resuscitation.

A sense of "Arabness" still persists. It has existed for as long as the Arabs have walked the stage of history, and it has been subject to negotiation by every generation for nearly a millennium and a half. In this generation, this sense of "Arabness" must come to terms with the growth of loyalty to separate Arab states, a burgeoning Islam, the global triumph of liberal democracy, the ascendancy of market capitalism, and the prospect of peace with Israel. All were anathema to Arab nationalism as it evolved over most of this century. "Arabness" can doubtless accommodate the new challenges, as it has always done. Arab nationalism, a modern creation of this century, may well disappear altogether under their impact.

But whatever the prospects of Arab nationalism, its history to this point represents one of the most remarkable instances of the rapid birth, rise, and decline of any modern nationalism. That history deserves a new telling, for it has not been invoked in the broader debate over the growing instability of identity that marks the end of this century. There was a time when Arab nationalism did enjoy a place of some prominence in the comparative study of nationalism, but later it became the domain of specialists, which was perhaps just as well. Arnold Toynbee and Hans Kohn, who first attempted to integrate Arab nationalism into some wider comparative framework, became its virtual partisans between the world wars despite their own reservations about nationalism in

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general. In a spirit of mea culpa—Toynbee's for British policy, Kohn's for Zionist—they accepted the most extravagant slogans of Arab nationalism as statements of sociological fact or incontrovertible moral claims, and saw none of the contradictions beneath its surface. When the Arab states gained independence after World War II, these contradictions surged to the fore in all their complexity, and kept later theorists at arm's length. "No brief summary of the long and intricate history of the Arab world could hope to disentangle the forces which have shaped its states and peoples," wrote Rupert Emerson in scarcely concealed exasperation. "For a full-scale analysis it would be necessary to evaluate the whole record of Arab experience, including such matters as the tribal, sectarian, and other divisions, the effects of Ottoman rule, the machinations of the European powers, and the role of Islam and of the Arab language and culture."[5] In short, it was a job for someone else who knew it better. But even those comparativists who knew Arab nationalism quite well chose not to make it the pivot of their comparisons, perhaps for fear of losing the general reader in a labyrinth.[6]

The Arab case does remain a dauntingly complex one by the standards of Europe. The speakers of Arabic today number over two hundred million, in a zone stretching from the Atlantic shores of Morocco to the Arabian Sea—a region that extends parallel to all of Europe from the Atlantic seaboard of Iberia to the Urals. No European nationalism has claimed a potential constituency as large, as far-flung, or as fragmented. It has never been easy to document the historical evolution of political consciousness across this zone, and a thinness persists in its study.

Nor did Arab nationalism originate as a straightforward reaction to Western imperial rule, of the kind familiar elsewhere in Asia and Africa. Some Arab peoples experienced over a century of direct Western rule, while others experienced none at all. As a result, Arab nationalism followed distinct courses of development in the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian peninsula, the Nile valley, and the North African coast. Each of these zones encountered the West on different terms, at different times. Variations on Arab nationalism multiplied, sometimes even inspiring separate classifications, such as Nasserism and Ba'thism, and even more arcane subclassifications, such as neo-Ba'thism. Many of these became rivals, even to the point of bloodshed. This has made it difficult to generalize about Arab nationalism, and

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treacherous to deploy such generalizations in the larger debate over nationalism.

The purpose in the following pages is not to attempt the treacherous. It is to attempt what Emerson wished, as a prelude to comparison: to trace the political trajectory of Arab nationalism plotted by the poets, to walk an idea briskly through its historical phases, and to characterize its relationship to those other ideas and identities that have appealed to "the speakers of the *dad*," that sound which is unique to Arabic. It is the story of a nationalism that arose fitfully, spread dramatically, then faltered and failed. It is an account of how millions of people imagined themselves to be Arabs and then, as though in a case of mistaken identity, claimed to have been someone else all along.

THE EMERGENCE OF ARABISM

Arabism first arose in the nineteenth century not as a direct reaction to Western rule, but as a critique of the state of the Ottoman Empire, whose reach had extended over most of the Arabic-speaking peoples since the early sixteenth century. For nearly four hundred years, these Arabic speakers had been fully reconciled to their role in the Empire. The seat of the Empire was in Istanbul, and its vast domains were administered in Ottoman Turkish. But the Ottomans professed Islam, as did the overwhelming majority of their Arabic-speaking subjects. Their state evolved as a partnership in Islam, embracing all of the Ottoman sultan's Muslim subjects, whatever language they spoke.

Muslims who spoke Arabic retained a pride in their language: God revealed the Qur'an in Arabic to an Arab prophet in the seventh century. They also celebrated the history of the early Arab conquests, which carried Islam from the Oxus to the Pyrenees. And they took pride in their genealogies, which linked them to Arabia at the dawn of Islam. But that very fidelity to Islam bound them to Muslims who spoke other languages and prided themselves on other genealogies, and who brought new vitality to the defense and expansion of Islam. Since the fifteenth century, the Ottomans showed precisely this vitality, harnessed to an Islamic zeal that had carried Islam to the very gates of Vienna. All the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman house saw themselves as participants and beneficiaries in

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this shared Islamic enterprise, and they drew no distinction between Arab and Turk.

But with the relative decline in Ottoman power, especially in the nineteenth century, the foundations of this symbiosis began to weaken. The great Ottoman carpet was being rolled up at both ends: by Europe's Great Powers, locked in imperial rivalry, and by the discontented Christian subjects of Ottoman rule in Europe, whose struggles for independence took a nationalist form. The Ottomans embarked on a succession of Westernizing reforms but eventually lost their footing in the Balkans, the Caucasus, North Africa, and Egypt. As the Empire dwindled, so did the confidence of its remaining subjects, and some discontent even appeared in the remaining Arabic-speaking provinces of the Empire, in Arabia and the Fertile Crescent—a discontent that would come to be known as the Arab "awakening."[7]

Many controversies still surround the nature and extent of this discontent, but it is generally agreed to have drawn upon two sources. First, there were the minority communities of Arabic-speaking Christians, much influenced by European currents, who worked to transform Arabic into a medium of missionary work and modern learning. From about the middle of the nineteenth century, their efforts did much to kindle interest in secular Arabic belles-lettres, through adaptation of Arabic to the modern conventions of the press, the novel, and the theater. The Arabic literary revival, centered in Beirut, did not translate immediately into Arab nationalism. But it did argue for the existence of a secular Arab culture, to which Christians and Muslims had supposedly contributed in equal measure. By elaborating upon this shared Arab legacy, the Christian minority sought to erode the prejudice of the Muslim majority and to win for Christians their full equality as fellow Arabs.

Arabism also arose from a second source. Rivalries had always absorbed the Arabic-speaking Muslim elite, especially in the keen competition over appointments to Ottoman government positions and bureaucratic sinecures. The grievances of those passed over for such spoils by Ottoman governors occasionally turned into the demand that Istanbul accord the Arabic-speaking provinces more autonomy in the conduct of their own affairs. As the twentieth century opened, this Arabism spread to all the major cities of the Ottoman Empire where Arabic was spoken, but it centered upon

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Damascus, where its adherents began to organize. While the Arabism of Muslims resembled that of Christians in its pride of language, it differed fundamentally in its deep attachment to Islam. It appealed to Muslims by arguing that the greatness of the Arabs resided in their privileged understanding of Islam. The Arabs, acting in the name of Islam, had created a great empire and civilization, and only the Arabs could restore Islam to its pristine grandeur. There was nothing secular about this assertion of Arab genius, which became closely associated with Islamic apologetics and reformism.

This "Arab awakening," Christian and Muslim, failed to produce a trenchant social criticism or a truly modern language of politics. Ultimately, it would defeat itself by its apologetic defense of tradition and religion.[8] But it did go far enough to shake the confidence of some Arabic speakers in the legitimacy of Ottoman rule. A few pamphleteers even tried to conjure up Ottoman fears (and foreign subsidies) by publishing tracts in the name of an "Arab movement." Most of these appeared in Europe, and some journals of opinion in Europe's capitals began to debate "the Arab question." The debate was premature. In 1907 the English traveler Gertrude Bell gave the commonplace assessment of these stirrings:

> Of what value are the pan-Arabic associations and inflammatory leaflets that they issue from foreign printing presses? The answer is easy: they are worth nothing at all. There is no nation of Arabs; the Syrian merchant is separated by a wider gulf from the Bedouin than he is from the Osmanli, the Syrian country is inhabited by Arabic speaking races all eager to be at each other's throats, and only prevented from fulfilling their natural desires by the ragged half fed soldier who draws at rare intervals the Sultan's pay.[9]

Yet by the eve of World War I, Arabism did begin to take a more palpable form against the two challenges of Turkification and Zionism.

Turkification threatened the cultural status quo. The Turkish-speaking subjects of the Ottoman Empire had been exposed to European-style nationalism, largely through its penetration into the Balkans. Turkish-speaking Muslims then began to construct for themselves a new identity as Turks, a trend strengthened by Western philologists and romantics who sought to establish the greatness of an ancient "Turanian" civilization.[10] As the Ottoman Empire stumbled, Ottoman authorities attempted to give the polyglot Empire more of the character of a European nation-state by enforcing the

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use of Turkish at the expense of other languages, including Arabic. This policy, never fully implemented, caused some apprehension in the Arab provinces on the eve of World War I, and may have helped to rally the supporters of cultural Arabism to a political purpose.

Zionist settlement in Palestine threatened the political status quo. Ottoman authorities tolerated the influx of Jewish immigration in the belief that it would ultimately benefit the Empire, as it had in successive waves since the Spanish Inquisition. But not all of the sultan's subjects concurred, since this latest wave of immigrants saw the land on which they were settling not merely as a refuge but as a state in the making. As the pace of Zionist immigration and settlement increased, their immediate neighbors grew apprehensive about the looming possibility of dispossession. From the turn of the century, Ottoman policy toward Zionism became a matter of growing debate and criticism in the Arabic press.[11]

Arabism thus arose from a growing unease about the pace and direction of change. Yet, while the Ottoman Empire lasted, this Arabism did not develop into full-fledged nationalism. Its adherents pleaded for administrative decentralization, not Arab independence, and they had no vision of a post-Ottoman order. They imagined a solution in the form of an accountable government and professed a vague admiration for the liberal democracies of the West, especially of France and England, although they had an imperfect grasp of the meaning behind the slogan of "liberty." Above all, they were practical. They did not indulge in dreams of Arab power. Their grievances, in the words of a critic of later Arab nationalism, "were local and specific; they related to the quality of government services or to the proper scope of local administration; and those who sought redress for such grievances were mostly men well known in their communities, able perhaps to conduct a sober constitutional opposition but not to entertain grandiose, limitless ambitions."[12] On the eve of World War I, they were probably still in the minority, outnumbered by Arabic-speaking Muslims and Christians who raised no doubt about the legitimacy of Ottoman rule, and even stood prepared to defend it.

THE ARAB NATION AND THE EUROPEAN EMPIRES

World War I forced a choice upon the adherents of Arabism. After some hesitation, the Ottoman Empire entered the European war on

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the side of Germany, prompting Britain and France to fan every ember of dissent in the Empire. The Allies held out the prospect of independence for something they called "the Arab nation," and they eventually found a partner in a local potentate of Mecca, the Sharif Husayn. The Sharif had an ambitious vision of a vast "Arab kingdom" for his family, and in 1915 he secured commitments from Britain regarding its future independence and frontiers. In 1916, he finally raised the standard of revolt against Ottoman rule. The Arab Revolt which began in Arabia had little to do with the Arabism that had emerged in the Fertile Crescent. It more faithfully expressed the dynastic ambition of the Sharif, and the enthusiasm for British guns and gold among Arabia's desert tribes. However, the Sharif's sons, the Emirs Faysal and Abdallah, also established contacts with the existing Arab societies in Damascus, and the revolt recruited dissident Arab officers who had deserted Ottoman ranks. These officers had attended Ottoman military academies, where they had imbibed the idea of the army as the "school of the nation" from the German officers who had trained and advised them. The revolt thus made for a volatile mix, whose diverse participants dreamed the different dreams of Arab kingship, desert anarchy, liberal constitutionalism, and military dictatorship. While the revolt lasted, they suspended their differences in the drive for independence.

In 1918, as the Ottomans retreated before British arms in Palestine, the Arab Revolt culminated in triumph when Faysal led his followers into Damascus and there formed an "Arab Government." In 1919, he went to Versailles, where he asked that "the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia" be recognized as "independent sovereign peoples," and that "no steps be taken inconsistent with the prospect of an eventual union of these areas under one sovereign government." Finally, in 1920, a "General Syrian Congress" declared the independence of a "United Kingdom of Syria" including the entire Levant, and proclaimed Emir Faysal king. From Damascus, an "Iraqi Congress" also proclaimed Iraq independent, under the kingship of the Emir Abdallah.[13]

An Arab nation had entered the game of nations, and from the outset, its members made far-reaching claims which ran up against other claims. Most notably, Britain had made wartime commitments to France and the Zionist movement. The first, the so-called Sykes-

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Picot agreement, secretly recognized most of the northern Levant as a zone of French privilege; the second, the Balfour Declaration, publicly supported a Jewish national home in Palestine. Britain also had strategic and economic interests in the territories demanded by the Sharif Husayn and his sons. The contradictory claims were sorted out in April 1920, at the San Remo conference, where Britain and France settled on the division of occupied Ottoman territory, which they planned to administer as separate League of Nations' mandates. On the basis of these agreements, French forces drove Faysal and his followers from Damascus in a brief battle in July, and imposed French rule on Syria that would last for a quarter of a century. At the same time, Britain began to fulfill its commitment under the Balfour Declaration by opening Palestine to more extensive Zionist immigration and settlement. Arab violence against Jews first broke out in April, presaging the strife between Arab and Jew that would become a fixture of the British mandate for Palestine. In June, a widespread insurrection against the British broke out in Iraq, which British forces suppressed by force. Increasingly Arab nationalists charged that Ottoman rule had been replaced by British and French imperialism, government even more alien than its Muslim predecessor. Britain did move to compensate the leaders of the Arab Revolt in 1921: it appointed Faysal as the king of Iraq in expanded borders, and carved an emirate of Transjordan out of the Palestine mandate, which it then exempted from Zionist immigration and turned over to Abdallah. But the Arab nationalists now nursed a deep grievance against Britain and France over the partition of the territories they wanted, and the denial of independence in Palestine and Syria, which they believed had been promised to them. Arab nationalism, once inspired by the West's liberalism, began to redefine itself as a negation of its imperialism.

The Arab nationalist lament against the arbitrary partition of the Fertile Crescent had much validity. None of the new states was commensurate with a political community. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine, Lebanon—these names derived from geography or classical history, and their borders largely reflected the imperial jostling for strategic position or oil.[14] Only the idea of Lebanon had some historical depth, since the Maronite Christians of Mount Lebanon maintained a strong sense of separate identity and had achieved some autonomy even in the late Ottoman period.

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But the Maronites were too few, and the borders of Lebanon drawn in 1920 by the French (at Maronite insistence) included large numbers of Muslims. Maronites would later attempt to manufacture the idea of a Lebanese nation, distinguished by a seafaring commerce and culture dating back to the Phoenicians—safely before the rise of any of Lebanon's contemporary religions. But the Maronites failed to persuade the Muslims in Lebanon that the idea of "eternal Lebanon" expressed anything more than the sectarian solidarity of the Maronites themselves. Half of Lebanon's population regarded their forced inclusion in Lebanon as still another trick of imperialism, as cruel as the other tricks the Arab nationalists thought had been played against them in 1920.[15]

But the idea of an Arab nation seemed just as arbitrary to most of its supposed members. It satisfied the makers and backers of the Arab Revolt, who regrouped in Iraq after their flight from Syria, and there established another Arab nationalist state. But in the fragmented societies of the Fertile Crescent, few persons were accustomed to regarding themselves as Arabs. As in Ottoman times, most continued to classify themselves by religion, sect, and genealogy. They were Muslims or Christians, Sunnis or Shiites, Maronites or Druzes, members of this or that clan, family, tribe, village, or urban quarter. They did not wish to be ruled by foreigners from over the sea. But neither did they desire to be ruled by strangers from across the desert, even if those strangers spoke Arabic. During the war, some of them had made their own diplomacy, to secure separate independence.[16] After the war, their allegiance proved difficult to win, as the Arab nationalists soon discovered. The Arab nationalist state under Faysal in Damascus proved to be chaotic, and his subsequent reign in Iraq rested on the bayonets of the British. In correspondence, the British called Faysal "The Great Imposed," a stranger to his subjects, who had been awarded a fragmented polity in arbitrary borders. The Arab nationalists in Faysal's entourage dreamed of a great Arab state, but it was all they could do to keep together the would-be Arabs that they ruled.

Faced with masses of people who had not chosen to be Arabs, the Arab nationalists developed a doctrine that denied them any other choice. Between the wars, the Arab nationalists progressively discarded the French idea of the nation as a voluntary contract, formed by individuals to secure their liberty. Increasingly their nation resembled

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the German *Volk*, a natural nation above all human volition, bound by the mystery of language and lore. Only the unity of this nation could restore its greatness, even if the price of unity meant the surrender of freedom.

This struggle had to be conducted not only against imperialism, but also against the would-be Arabs themselves. Not all of them were eager to be Arabs, and some openly professed to be something else. In such instances, Arab nationalism assigned itself the task of educating them to an Arab identity, preferably by persuasion but if necessary by compulsion. According to Sati' al-Husri, Arab nationalism's first true ideologue and a confidant of Faysal,

> Every person who speaks Arabic is an Arab. Everyone who is affiliated with these people is an Arab. If he does not know this or if he does not cherish his Arabism, then we must study the reasons for his position. It may be the result of ignorance—then we must teach him the truth. It may be because he is unaware or deceived—then we must awaken him and reassure him. It may be a result of selfishness—then we must work to limit his selfishness.[17]

This ominous passage presaged the drift of Arab nationalism away from the liberal model of a voluntary community. "We can say that the system to which we should direct our hopes and aspirations is a Fascist system," wrote al-Husri in 1930, raising the slogan of "solidarity, obedience, and sacrifice."[18] The idea of the nation as an obedient army immediately appealed to the army itself, especially its officers. It went hand in hand with a growing militarism, and the belief that only the armed forces could rise above the "selfishness" of the sect and clan, enforcing discipline on the nation. Iraq pioneered this trend. The country became independent in 1930, and joined the League of Nations in 1932. Less than a year later, the army conducted a massacre of the Assyrian (Nestorian Christian) minority, accused of infidelity to the Arab cause. In 1936, a coup d'état established a thinly-veiled military dictatorship, in the name of national unity. Finally, in 1941, a junta of colonels led Iraq into a war of "liberation" with Britain, which it promptly lost, and in the course of which the nationalists inspired a pogrom against the Jews of Baghdad.

Mistreated minorities, military strongmen, lost battles—in retrospect, Iraq's early experience of independence anticipated an

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entire era of Arab nationalism. Yet this nationalism, and its extravagant extrapolation, pan-Arabism, gained immensely in popularity from the 1930s. Accelerated migration from desert encampment to settled town, from village to city, began to unloose primordial ties, diminishing resistance to nationalist ideology. With the expansion of education, Arab nationalist pedagogues indoctrinated masses of young people, from primary school through university. The spread of literacy and the growth of the Arabic press brought the message of Arab nationalism into every classroom, clubhouse, and coffee shop. In the public arena, Arab nationalism gradually achieved a firm hold on political discourse, and all other loyalties became unspeakable.[19]

It also began to spread beyond the Fertile Crescent, to include first Egypt, then North Africa. Arabic-speaking Africa had come under foreign rule earlier than Arabic-speaking Asia. France began colonization of Algeria in 1830 and occupied Tunisia in 1881, while Britain occupied Egypt in 1882. In every instance there had been resistance to foreign rule. But it had been formulated as local patriotism, in most instances strongly tinged with Islam. Until the 1930s, few Egyptians saw themselves as Arabs, and the earliest Arab nationalists did not include Egypt in their vision.[20] In North Africa, a large proportion of the population spoke Berber, and resistance to foreign rule took an Islamic form, since only Islam united its inhabitants. But no definition of the Arab nation based on language could long exclude Arabic-speaking Africa, and the very geography of imperialism created a potential bond of solidarity between the Algerian and the Syrian, the Egyptian and the Iraqi. In time, a growing number of Egyptians and North Africans began to see themselves as Arabs. Paradoxically, the empires of Britain and France linked together Arabic-speaking lands which had enjoyed few if any organic ties in Ottoman times, inspiring for the first time the idea of an Arab world stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf.

At the time, the division of this world did not yet seem permanent, and the message of Arab nationalism, calling for the full independence and unity of all Arabs everywhere, did not seem completely contrived. After World War II, weary Britain and France began to divest themselves of the more troublesome portions of their empires. Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan became independent. Egypt and Iraq, their independence effectively revoked by Britain during the

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war, began to renegotiate the terms of British withdrawal. Full independence for the great majority of Arabs seemed only a matter of time. It would be acquired piecemeal by individual states, but Arab nationalists hoped that an Arab commonwealth might emerge from this fluid situation. Elaborate plans for Arab unification proliferated.

But these plans quickly ran aground. By now each state possessed its own ruling elite, bureaucracy, flag, and anthem. Their proposals and counterproposals, for "Fertile Crescent unity," "Greater Syria," and "Arab federation," were schemes for self-aggrandizement.[21] After much Arab negotiation and British mediation, the independent Arab states established the Arab League in 1945, a compromise that recognized the distinct sovereignty of each of them. In the end, independence did not alter the map drawn by imperialism. The member states of the Arab League promised to assist one another, but none would sacrifice their prerogatives of sovereignty, which the Arab League charter meticulously upheld. In particular, ARTICLE 8 of the charter upheld the principle of nonintervention: "Each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as the exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government."[22]

Yet the article of nonintervention, while sanctifying the status quo, pointed to its greatest weakness. Not all of these states and their rulers commanded the unencumbered allegiance of their citizens and subjects. By their own rhetoric, they admitted as much. They invariably justified their actions as advancing a larger Arab purpose, even when they were pursuing their own parochial purposes. Especially in the Fertile Crescent, states created without reason lacked the confidence to invoke openly reasons of state. The paradox could pass so long as Arab nationalism remained a loose mélange of slogans about independence and solidarity. But a growing number of intellectuals and officers, abhorring ambiguity, turned their Arab nationalism into a rigorous doctrine. They saw the Arab nationalism professed by rulers and states as posturing and began to argue the need for revolution. Their moment came when the fragile Arab order stumbled over Israel.

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The rhetorical gap turned into a chasm in 1948, after the United Nations authorized the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. When the neighboring Arab states moved against Israel in 1948, they claimed to be fighting in concert, to uphold their brotherly commitment to the Arabs of Palestine. In fact they did just the opposite: each waged its own war to defend its own interests, each sought a separate modus vivendi with Israel. It was a hard-fought war, which ended with Israel in possession of even more territory than had been allotted to her by the United Nations, and with the Arab states as reluctant hosts to seven hundred thousand Arab refugees.

The events of 1948, like those of 1920, shifted the ground from beneath Arab nationalism. While the Arab states negotiated fitfully with Israel, disaffected intellectuals and officers began to stir. The intellectuals, exemplified by the Syrian historian Constantin Zurayk, leveled a withering criticism against the conduct of the war, and made it difficult for Arab states to present 1948 as anything less than a rout. Then the officers moved, charging they had been stabbed in the back by politicians and senior commanders. Syria's old-guard nationalist leadership was turned out by a military coup in 1949; two more coups followed that year, with another in 1952, and yet another in 1954. Abdallah, who in 1949 renamed his kingdom Jordan, and in 1950 annexed the adjacent remnant of Arab Palestine as his "West Bank," was assassinated in 1951 for his dealings with Israel. The monarchy barely held on. In 1952, a group of "free officers," invoking Egypt's failure in the Palestine war and allegations of official corruption in its conduct, overturned the monarchy in a bloodless coup and established a revolutionary republic. By 1954, one of these officers, Gamal Abdul Nasser, had emerged as undisputed leader. In 1958, a sanguinary coup by more "free officers" destroyed the Iraqi monarchy, and the regicides established a "popular republic."

Arab nationalism, which became "anti-imperialist" after 1920, became "revolutionary" after 1948. The war in Palestine had demonstrated that the Arabs, despite their formal independence, remained politically disunited, militarily weak, and economically underdeveloped. The failure could still be blamed on imperialism,

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and much Arab nationalist thought went into drawing images of a global conspiracy, which allegedly implanted Israel to assure the West's continuing domination of the Arabs. But some intellectuals also began to suggest the existence of intrinsic weaknesses in Arab culture and society, arguing that these had made the task of the Zionists easier. The new champions of Arab nationalism, fiery young colonels, now promised a social revolution that would overcome these weaknesses and propel the Arab world to unity, power, and prosperity. In the spirit of the times, they usually defined this revolution as socialism—or, more precisely, Arab socialism, lest it be alleged that the changes were not authentically Arab in inspiration. Arab nationalism no longer meant only literary revival and anti-imperialism. It meant land reform, extensive nationalization, and five-year plans, all in the name of "the revolution." And if, in their new lexicon, Arab nationalists cast themselves as "revolutionaries," then their opponents could only be "reactionaries."[23]

The new dispensation took two parallel forms, which became known as Nasserism and Ba'thism. Nasserism married revolutionary nationalism to the personality cult of Gamal Abdul Nasser, who enjoyed immense prestige in the Arab world after he pulled a political victory from the combined British, French, and Israeli attack on Suez in 1956. Nasserism combined a program of socialist-like reform with the idea that Egypt under the charismatic Nasser constituted the very heart of the Arab world, and had the resources and will to lead all Arabs to unity. A streak of pragmatism ran through Nasserism, which evolved from day to day while Nasser held power. It was too makeshift to constitute an ideology and relied more on Nasser's warm glow than on any systematic doctrine. And while Nasser gave first priority to Egypt's Arab character, at times he made Egypt out to be Muslim, African, or Afro-Asian—whichever served his particular purpose. But it was precisely that ambiguity which made Nasser all things to all Arabs, and permitted Egypt to imagine herself to be the bridge to Arab nationalism, linking the Arabs of Asia and Africa in the march to unity.[24]

Ba'thism tended to be more ideologically stringent, if only because its founders were Sorbonne-schooled Syrians, mostly teachers hailing from minority sects, who had filled their spare time with academic debates and Nietzsche, Fichte, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain. They chose to call themselves the Ba'th, meaning resurrection, and

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they were "revolutionaries" as a matter of principle. Their constitution, adopted in 1947, announced that their goals could not be achieved "except by means of revolution and struggle. To rely on slow evolution and to be satisfied with a partial and superficial reform is to threaten these aims and to conduce to their failure and loss." The first of these goals was the creation of a single Arab state, since all differences among Arabs were "accidental and unimportant. They will all disappear with the awakening of Arab consciousness." And they regarded socialism as "a necessity which emanates from the depth of Arab nationalism itself."[25] As an early member attested, the Ba'th demonstrated all the characteristics of an ideological party: "their interpretation of events was almost identical, but they did not trust one another; they loved the people, but hated the individual; they held the whole sacred, but they despised the parts."[26] The Ba'th spread its influence by penetrating the junior officer corps and eventually acquired power through military coups in both Syria and Iraq. The usual pattern was for the military wing of the local party to purge the civilian wing and install a military dictatorship, under the Ba'th slogan of "unity, freedom, socialism."[27]

Nasser and the Ba'th carried Arab nationalism to the summit of its achievements. Nasser's early gambles paid off because he was the first Arab nationalist leader who was positioned to play foreign powers against one another in a game he called "positive neutralism." When the Americans refused to finance the Aswan Dam, the Soviets came to his rescue. When his nationalization of the Suez Canal and backing of the Algerian uprising provoked an attack by Britain and France (in league with Israel), the United States came to his rescue. The Arab world, glued to these maneuvers through the now ubiquitous radio transistor, stood breathless before Nasser's high-wire act. The Ba'th in Syria longed to join it and pushed for negotiations with Nasser over unity. In 1958, the talks culminated in the birth of the United Arab Republic—a union of Egypt and Syria, offered to the Arab world as the first step toward a general Arab union. The names of Egypt and Syria disappeared from the map, replaced by a "southern region" and a "northern region." Arab nationalism reached its high-water mark during Nasser's first visit to Damascus, where he was greeted by wildly enthusiastic crowds. Other Arab leaders trembled as "Nasserists" filled the streets of their capitals to clamor for their long-awaited Bismarck. Lebanon invited American troops

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to stem the tide; Jordan accepted British forces. No Arab state seemed capable of withstanding the march of Arab unity on its own.

But in the end, it was the United Arab Republic that succumbed. The marriage of Nasser and the Ba'th turned into a struggle for domination within the camp of Arab nationalism. In this uneven contest, the Egyptians ran Syria like a colony—and a badly run colony at that. The union did not release some pent-up potential which only the combining of Egypt and Syria could tap. Quite the opposite: the union threatened to kill all productive initiative, especially in Syria, through the imposition of "Arab socialism." In 1961, a Syrian coup ousted Nasser's viceroy from Damascus and declared the union finished. The breakup demonstrated the salience of differences far too deep to be blown away by blithe slogans. There would be more negotiations between Nasser and the Ba'th in 1963, and more unity schemes and treaties. But there would never be a repeat of the United Arab Republic.[28]

In retrospect, the collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian union in 1961 marked the beginning of the long slide of Arab nationalism. The following year, Nasser contributed to its undoing by his massive intervention on behalf of the "revolutionary" side in Yemen's civil war. Everything Egypt did in Yemen, including aerial bombing and napalming, had the opposite of the intended effect. A British journalist who watched the Egyptians at work in Yemen was amazed by their ignorance and arrogance.

> It was one of the more piquant experiences of my post-revolutionary stay in Sanaa to be hailed by most of them with a chummy affability that implied as clearly as any words that they and I were somehow in this thing together as embattled representatives of civilisation in the midst of savagery. "What can you do with these people?" they would often laugh, in tones of vastly superior deprecation, "They are not like us, you see. . . ." Having come directly from British colonial Aden I recognised the symptoms all the more easily. Creeping imperialism is a catching disease, and those Egyptians were only a step away from clapping their hands together and shouting, "Boy!" when they wanted service.[29]

In Yemen, as in Syria, vast differences overwhelmed any remote similarity, leaving Arab to war Arab in a spirit of mutual incomprehension.

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Nationalist theory had promised that unity would bring liberation from foreigners, but in the hands of actual practitioners it had became a whip of domination, wielded by some Arabs over others. The number of Arabs bearing its scars began to grow, as did the disillusionment. The Arabs, wrote one Syrian, were "like the inhabitants of an island who have been promised that the ship of deliverance will soon arrive. They have buried their tools and packed their meager belongings; but when the ship arrives, it is a slave boat."[30] The will to believe still remained strong in some quarters, but an edge of doubt began to show. Arab nationalism's supply of persuasive words began to dwindle. Its champions responded by making more frequent use of the persuasive prisons of Abu Za'bal and Tura near Cairo, Mezze in Damascus, and the cellars of the Nihayyah Palace in Baghdad.

The crisis finally broke in 1967. The Arabs may well have blundered into war with Israel that June, but once they were in the thick of it, they expected more than in 1948. Most assumed that they had been strengthened, not weakened, by nearly two decades of Nasser and the Ba'th, social revolution, and the militarization of politics, all under the banner of Arab nationalism and the struggle against Israel. Instead, they got less: a truly ignominious defeat, delivered in six days. Its territorial consequences included the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza—all densely populated by Arabs—and of the Sinai and the Golan, two geographic buffers that had kept Israel at a distance from Cairo and Damascus. The defeat represented nothing less than "the Waterloo of pan-Arabism."[31] When Nasser offered to step down, the crowds filled the streets to demand that he continue as their leader. Through years of pounding indoctrination, Nasser and the Ba'th had managed to silence every other voice, and many only understood and spoke the limited language of Arab nationalism. But as defeat worked its way deep into the collective psyche, two other voices would be raised in opposition to Arab nationalism. One spoke the language of allegiance to individual states. The other spoke of loyalty to a universalist Islam.[32]

THE TRIUMPH OF THE STATE

Since their creation, individual Arab states had never hesitated to give priority to their separate interests. Yet they had been persuaded

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by their perceived lack of legitimacy to pledge formal fidelity to the Arab nation, and thus risked being dragged into crises generated by other Arab states, or being accused of breaking Arab ranks for staying out. As 1967 proved, however, such crises could deteriorate quickly into war, and exact a steep price in lives, territory, and prestige. Many of these states already lumbered under immense economic burdens. They did not have the means to assume the burdens of their neighbors, especially the weighty load of Palestine. Even mighty Egypt could no longer assume the sole custodianship of the Arab cause (an Egypt which sent tens of thousands of troops to defend the Arab cause as far away as Yemen, yet had difficulty feeding its own people at home). If these states were ever to set their own priorities, they would have to justify openly their separate existence, and demand the primary loyalties of their citizens and subjects.

Paradoxically, Egypt led the way again, this time under Anwar as-Sadat. Sadat launched an attack against Israel in October 1973, but this time Egypt fought a strictly Egyptian war for the return of the Israeli-occupied Sinai. Although Egypt waged the war in tandem with Syria, it quickly broke with Syria in the war's aftermath. By the decade's end, Sadat had given Israel a peace treaty in return for the Sinai. Sadat's recognition of Israel, his reliance on the United States, and his economic liberalization turned all the assumptions of Arab nationalism on their head—and Sadat offered no apologies for doing so. Instead, he made an explicit case for Egypt's right to chart its own course and address its own problems first. Sadat paid for his policies with his life, and Egypt was briefly ostracized for its peace with Israel. But other Arab states cautiously followed suit. More often than not, they now justified their choices by invoking Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi, or Iraqi national interests, not Arab national destiny. And by legitimizing themselves as states, despite their origins in imperial map rooms, they came that much closer to legitimizing Israel, despite its origins in Zionist drawing rooms.

For the first time, it became possible to criticize the myths of Arabism, and to see the differences among Arabs not as "accidental" but as living realities, even deserving of respect. Lebanon's most prominent historian, Kamal Salibi, criticized Arab nationalism for "deluding the general run of the Arabs into believing that the political unity they had once experienced under Islam was in fact an

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Arab national unity which they have subsequently lost, or of which they have been deliberately robbed." This made it "difficult for them to properly accommodate to the political realities of the present." Salibi called on intellectuals to:

> discount the erroneous Arab nationalist view of this history as a united national march that went wrong at some point, and correctly assess it as the parochial history that it normally was: an account of so many different Arab regional experiences of one kind or another, fitting more or less into a general pattern. No Arab country today need feel any guilt about accepting its actual existence as a willful or unwillful departure from an Arab national historical norm. It is only when the Arabs succeed in ridding themselves of the highly idealized Arab nationalist vision of their past that they will be able to live together in the modern Arab world as a coherent political community whose various members relate to one another constructively and without reserve.[33]

After 1967, this once surreptitious view could be pronounced openly, and it laid the intellectual foundation for the growing self-confidence of individual states.

But that self-confidence rested as much on power as on persuasion. Despite their difficulties on the battlefield, these states had mastered the technologies of domestic surveillance. The regimes realized that defeat left them vulnerable, and they resolved to forestall any dissent by using these technologies to make the state ubiquitous. The approach largely worked. Unlike the defeat of 1948, which inaugurated a bout of instability, the even more humiliating defeat of 1967 marked the beginning of an era of unprecedented stability, even immobility. The flood of oil income that followed the 1973 war also permitted regimes to buy off dissent. The state had not only become legitimate, it had become omnipotent. In the words of one Syrian intellectual: "The cancerous growth of the state has been accompanied by the increasingly diminished power of everybody and everything else, especially what some Arab thinkers and leaders enjoy calling 'The People.'" As a consequence, "Arab society is on the whole cancelled out as a reality of political significance in the reckonings of all Arab regimes."[34] By the time communism collapsed, the Arab lands had become the last preserve of protracted one-man rule, and so they remain today. The king of Jordan has reigned now for forty years, the king of Morocco for thirty-two years. Libya's

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leader made his coup twenty-four years ago. The chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has held his title for twenty-four years. Syria's president has held power for twenty-two years. Iraq's ruler has held sway over the country for twenty-two years, the last fourteen as president. The emir of Kuwait has reigned for fifteen years, the king of Saudi Arabia for eleven years. Egypt's president has held office for twelve years. Not one of these states could be categorized as a democracy, although after 1967 they laid unprecedented claims to the loyalty of their citizens and subjects, and intruded upon virtually every aspect of society.

Only Lebanon, the perennial exception, proved incapable of enhancing its legitimacy and its power over society after 1967. In this birthplace of Arab nationalism, social peace had come to depend on an equilibrium between the myths of "eternal Lebanon" and "one Arab nation." The Maronites agreed to march in step with the Arabs, so long as they could carry the flag of Lebanon; the Muslims agreed to parade behind the flag of Lebanon, provided the parade marched to an Arab cadence. By this understanding, Lebanon would supply intellectual rationales for Arab nationalism; others would provide the soldiers for its battles. For a time the equilibrium held, and Lebanon established a quasi-democratic public order and a free-market economy. In times of regional crisis, Lebanon did its duty by words, and managed to dodge war with Israel. But after 1967, Lebanon began to lose its balance. The Muslims, wracked by guilt, demanded that Lebanon finally take up the Arab burden of Palestine, and open its southern border to attacks against Israel. The Maronites, awed by Israel's example, thought they could turn the state of Lebanon into something comparable: a small powerhouse, armed to the teeth, defiant of the Arab world around it. In 1975, the situation exploded in civil war, and Lebanon virtually disappeared under a checkered map of militia fiefdoms, crisscrossed by green and red lines. The only lines that did not count were Lebanon's borders, and both Syria and Israel entered the fray. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, it worked feverishly with its Lebanese allies to remake the country in its image, but to no avail. Since 1989, Syria has tried to do the same, with more resolve and success.

Aside from Lebanon, all other states exercised more confident power over their societies, and more independence from one another. Before 1967, Arab nationalism appeared to drain states of their

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legitimacy. After 1967, its slippage seemed to produce a surge of legitimacy that strengthened both states and incumbent regimes. This strength had severe limitations: Arab states still could not stand up to powerful external enemies such as Israel. But they could ward off interventions by one another, and enforce their will over their own societies with an almost ruthless efficiency.[35]

THE CHALLENGE OF ISLAM

The voice of Islam also bid to fill the silence left by Arab nationalism. Arab nationalists had always regarded Islamic loyalty as a potential rival, and had tried to disarm it by incorporating Islam as a primary element in Arab nationalism. Even the Christians among them went out of their way to argue that Arab nationalism complemented rather than contradicted the Islamic loyalties still felt by so many Arabs. "The power of Islam," affirmed Michel Aflaq, the founding ideologue of the Ba'th and a Christian by birth, "has revived to appear in our days under a new form, that of Arab nationalism."[36] But many Muslim Arabs saw this as a confidence game, and regarded Islam and any form of nationalism as mutually exclusive. For Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian ideologue of Islam who was executed by Nasser in 1966, Arab nationalism signified "spiritual decadence." If the Prophet Muhammad had so wished, he "was no doubt capable of setting forth a movement of pan-Arab nationalism in order to unify the strife-riven tribes of Arabia." Instead, he called all of mankind, Arab and non-Arab, to submit to God. The Arabs thus enjoyed no privileged standing in Islam, of the kind claimed by Arab nationalism: "God's real chosen people is the Muslim community, regardless of ethnic, racial, or territorial affiliation of its members." Reflecting on early Islam, Qutb concluded that the "sole collective identity Islam offers is that of the faith, where Arabs, Byzantines, Persians, and other nations and colors are equal under God's banner." During his police interrogation, Qutb announced that Arab nationalism had "exhausted its role in universal history."[37]

The Islamic critique of Arab nationalism extended beyond its theory to its practice. Arab nationalism had erred in breaking the primary bond of Islam during the Arab Revolt—a bond that linked Arab and Turk. The Arab nationalists betrayed their fellow Muslims

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in order to side with the British, who naturally betrayed them—a just reward for those who placed their trust in unbelievers. The Arab nationalists then compounded their error by abandoning reliance on God and his divine law, in order to become liberals, fascists, and socialists, in mimicry of foreign ideological fashion. And while they professed respect for the faith of Islam, they filled their prisons with the truly faithful, whom they accused of subversion for preaching the word of God. Who did not doubt that the rout by the Jews, and the falling of Jerusalem into Zionist hands, constituted a punishment for straying from God's path? Did not Israel itself prove the power of religion and state combined?

This brand of Islamic loyalty enjoyed an immense appeal among the members of two underclasses. The first was composed of Shiites, who formed a majority in Iraq and Kuwait, the largest single confessional community in Lebanon, and important minorities in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states. Arab nationalism acknowledged them as fellow Arabs, but it glorified precisely that "golden age" of Arab history which the Shiites mourned as disastrous, during which its heroes were martyred by the very same caliphs lionized in Arab nationalist historiography. In the present, the institutions of Shiite Islam, and even many Shiite families, straddled the divide between the Arab states and Iran, so that many Shiites regarded Arab nationalism as an artificial division, incompatible with the Arab-Persian symbiosis of contemporary Shiism. After Iran's revolution in 1979, many Shiites in Arab lands identified so strongly with its success that they declared their allegiance to the revolution's leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and repudiated both Arab nationalism and loyalty to the individual states in which they lived. Lebanon's Hezbollah took this the furthest, professing absolute obedience to the leader of the Islamic revolution, and denouncing "the Arabs" for self-worship and their capitulation to Israel.

The other underclass consisted of the tens of millions of indigents who had abandoned the countryside and flooded into the cities, and whose lot worsened as populations grew and oil incomes fell. In the slums and bidonvilles of Cairo and Algiers, not only did the doctrines of Arab nationalism sound obsolete, but the promises of prosperity made by states also rang hollow to those in the grip of grinding poverty and unemployment. In growing numbers, the dispossessed gave their loyalty to Islamic movements which employed

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a more familiar vocabulary and called for the reinstitution of Islamic law as the panacea for all political, social, and economic ills. These Islamic movements were prepared to work within existing states, but only as a matter of convenience. They professed loyalty only to Islamic law, and committed themselves to fight for its implementation wherever possible, even in distant Afghanistan, where many thousands of Arab Muslims fought as volunteers against Soviet forces and their "atheistic" Afghan clients. For these believers, their political community did not end at the border crossing of any state, or even where Arabic ceased to be spoken. It extended to any place where Islam reigned supreme or had to be defended.

In the void left by Arab nationalism after 1967, two ideas of community thus competed for primacy. On the one side stood those who argued that the inhabitants of any one state constituted a distinct people in a political sense. Regimes championed this idea, for it legitimized their claim to act solely in the interests of the state—identified increasingly with one ruling group or one ruler. On the other side stood those who believed that all Muslims constituted a universal political community, standing above any narrower political authority. This idea suited opposition movements, since it denied legitimacy to virtually all existing regimes. An immense gap separated these two visions, but their adherents agreed on one point: Arab nationalism had failed irredeemably, having been either too broad or too narrow to satisfy the quest for identity.

ARAB NATIONALISM ADRIFT

And what of the remaining Arab nationalists? After 1967, their numbers and influence steadily dwindled, except among intellectuals. Many intellectuals actually did live a pan-Arab reality. They wrote in Arabic for an audience that stretched "from the Ocean to the Gulf," and published in pan-Arab journals that circulated just as widely. They jetted from capital to capital for conferences on the state of the Arabs. They had one foot (and sometimes both) in the West, where the freest Arabic press and publishing houses did their business. In this rarefied atmosphere, the myths of Arab nationalism could still be sustained. For the most part, these intellectuals did not regard the defeat of 1967 as a failure of their idea, but rather as a failure of its implementation by others, who were criticized for not

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being sufficiently radical or sufficiently ruthless. Much of the Arab nationalist "self-criticism" after 1967 pushed even further toward advocacy of violent change. But intellectuals lacked an Arab Bismarck who could revive an idea whose time had come and nearly gone. Nasser had faltered, and in 1970 he died. The Ba'th in Syria, after more twists and turns, came to rest in 1970 under Hafiz al-Asad, a master of realpolitik who put Syria above all. For lack of better alternatives, Arab nationalists fixed their hopes first on the Palestinians, and finally on Saddam Hussein.

The Palestinians were a desperate choice, since they themselves had largely despaired of other Arabs. At the height of Nasser's powers, they had allowed themselves to believe in him, and to see him as their redeemer. Nasser also prompted the creation of the PLO in 1964, under the auspices of the Arab League. But even before the Arab armies collapsed in 1967, Palestinians had begun to transform the PLO into an instrument of their own. The dominant Fatah component had no pan-Arab pretensions. Fatah demanded the moral support of the Arab states, and even exterritorial zones of operation, especially along Israel's frontiers. It was prepared to fight to assure the independence of these bastions. But it promoted no message of Arab revolution, and it gave first priority to the establishment of a Palestinian "entity," presumably a state, which would fit into the existing Arab state system.[38]

But other Palestinian groups took a different course, announcing that they would work to topple the "petty bourgeois regimes" of the Arab states as a stage in their struggle to liberate Palestine. This was the pan-Arab promise of the so-called Arab Nationalists Movement and its most flamboyant offspring, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), both founded by students at the American University of Beirut. Their high-strung rhetoric and hijackings made them the heroes of many Arab intellectuals who, like their New Left contemporaries in the West, demanded "revolution" now. The fedayeen, the Palestinian guerrillas in the rock-strewn hills opposite Israel, became the symbols of this struggle. Living on the edge and citing Mao and Guevara, they were themselves celebrated in poetry and song by the pan-Arab intellectuals. But although the fedayeen sought to imitate the methods of guerrilla warfare which succeeded elsewhere, they completely failed to liberate any part of Palestine or the Arab world, and they provoked Jordan's

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ruthless suppression in 1970. As Jean Genet recorded, the Palestinian "revolution" could be summed up in the phrase, "to have been dangerous for a thousandth of a second."[39] As the second passed, Arab nationalist enthusiasm for the Palestinian fringe waned, and even the fringe finally endorsed the mundane demand for a Palestinian state alongside Israel—one more Arab state, prepared to make one more compromise. "Our future is with Israel," the spokesman of the PFLP, Ghassan Kanafani, told a French academic in 1970—two years before his assassination by Israel. "Neither Europe, nor China, nor the Soviet Union, nor the Arab states, collectively or individually, are interested in us or would do anything decisive for us."[40] The Palestinian uprising that began in 1987 in the West Bank and Gaza was just that: a Palestinian uprising, relying not on the massive quantities of arms in Arab arsenals, but on stones and knives. The Palestinians would fight their own fight, in an effort to win the far more valuable sympathy of the West.

The choice of Saddam as the pan-Arab hero represented an even more desperate step. If anything, Saddam had done more than any modern Iraqi ruler to cultivate a specific Iraqi loyalty, drawing upon the legacy of ancient Mesopotamian civilization. In art, architecture, and poetry, the state encouraged the use of Mesopotamian motifs, and it lavished funds upon archaeological digs and restorations. Since no loyalties had survived from antiquity (which well predated the Arab conquest), all Iraqis could be accommodated by the Mesopotamian myth—Arabs and Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites. After Saddam blundered into war with Iran in 1980, Iraq billed herself as the defender of the eastern Arab flank against the Persian hordes—all the better to justify the demand for war loans from Gulf Arab states. But Saddam was no ardent pan-Arabist, and in 1982 he dismissed the pan-Arab vision as an idea whose time had passed:

> The question of linking unity to the removal of boundaries is no longer acceptable to present Arab mentality. It could have been acceptable ten or twenty years ago. We have to take into consideration the change which the Arab mind and psyche have undergone. We must see the world as it is. . . .The Arab reality is that the Arabs are now twenty-two states, and we have to behave accordingly. Therefore, unity must not be imposed, but must be achieved through common fraternal opinion. Unity must give strength to its individual partners, not cancel their national identity.[41]

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Those twenty-two states, on which unity "must not be imposed," included Kuwait.

In 1990, Saddam's Iraq invaded Kuwait, declaring it a province of Iraq. Possession of Kuwait would have filled the Iraqi treasury in perpetuity (a treasury that held a cash reserve of $30 billion back in 1980 but groaned under a debt of more than $100 billion a decade later). Significantly, Iraq did not formally justify its invasion as an act of Arab nationalist unification. Iraq claimed that Kuwait belonged properly to the state of Iraq, and that the annexation asserted an Iraqi legal right, not an Arab moral claim. But Arab nationalists seized upon Saddam as though he were a reincarnation of Nasser, and an improvement at that, for being far more reckless and ruthless. While he lacked Nasser's charm, he had oil, missiles, nerve agents, and nuclear potential—power, he hinted, that would be put at the service of all the Arabs. He would be their sword, much like the four giant swords he had cast for his victory arches in Baghdad, dedicated at a ceremony in 1989 during which he paraded upon a white horse.[42]

Hichem Djaït, the preeminent Tunisian historian, exemplified the euphoria of the intellectuals. In 1978, in a sober mood, he wrote that "it would not be healthy to pin all hopes on achieving some sort of absolute unity," and that an attempt by any Arab state to use its power for that purpose would be "not only dangerous but doomed to failure." No Arab state had sufficient power to effect such unity, and no Arab could "entertain the notion that America, Europe, or Russia would allow so cohesive a unity to be founded in the heart of the Old World."[43] The analysis makes perfect sense to this day, yet Djaït threw it to the winds after Saddam annexed Kuwait. Thanks to Saddam Hussein, he declared, "a new perspective is opening up, that of unification. And Iraq is its pole and motor." If that meant war, or even defeat, it still represented a start:

> I don't have to tell you, as Europeans, that your nations were born out of wars. In annexing Kuwait, Saddam Hussein has entered the dynamics of history. He was trying to make sure of a source of wealth for himself, material means. In addition, he was undertaking the beginning of the unification of the Arab world. Sometimes legitimacy is more important than legality.[44]

"Our goal let us seek by the edge of the sword / For our goals we pursue are thus surely secured." This verse from Yaziji's ode of

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1868 anticipated the preference for coercion that ran beneath the surface of Arab nationalism. Once its slogans no longer swayed millions, Arab nationalism gave up even the pretense of persuasion, to worship raw power. But Saddam had not amassed enough of that power; despite incredible military expenditures, Saddam's Iraq, like the Palestinian fedayeen a generation before, could only be "dangerous for a thousandth of a second." In the end, Djaït was right when he wrote in 1978 that an attempt by any Arab state to force unity would be "doomed to failure." In battle, the Iraqi "motor" of unification immediately broke down, and the scenes of surrendering Iraqi soldiers and burned-out armored columns recalled nothing so much as the defeat of 1967. And, in the end, Saddam was right when he said in 1982 that the "Arab mind and psyche" would not accept the imposition of unity or the removal of existing borders. Most of the Arab states joined the international coalition against him, to uphold a state system which had become their own, even if it originated long ago in an imperial partition. And it was not only Arab governments which rejected the invasion: the publics in the Arab coalition states, according to polls, never took Saddam seriously as a pan-Arab savior.[45] The Arab nationalists called 1991 a defeat of the Arabs as a whole, analogous to 1967. But it was not analogous. In 1967, three Arab states were defeated, Arab territory was lost to foreign occupation, and all Arabs felt humiliated. In 1991, only Iraq was defeated, the sovereignty of an Arab state was restored, and millions of Arabs in Casablanca, Cairo, Damascus, and Riyadh considered themselves the victors.

In the war's aftermath, the United States, the Arab states, and Israel moved to translate that victory into a new regional order that would represent the ultimate undoing of Arab nationalism. That order, Middle Eastern rather than Arab, would include Israel as a legitimate state among states, to be recognized by all Arab states following a negotiation of peace and a definition of Israel's borders. The new order would also include Turkey, and perhaps other states that wished to define themselves as Middle Eastern. The rationale for the idea of the Middle East, made most fully by some Cairo intellectuals, argued that the Arab nationalist vision had become anachronistic. It was ideological in a postideological age, and it pressed for a continuation of a costly Arab cold war against Israel, although the Arabs could no longer count on any outside support

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following the end of the Superpower Cold War. The moment had come to shift priorities to the domestic agenda of economic growth, lest the Arab world sink under the weight of its swollen populations. As the unification of Europe seemed to demonstrate, the economic future belonged to regional formations composed of many nations. These cooperated to promote economic growth and collective security, relieving economies of the massive burden of military expenditure. Water, arms control, the environment, trade, tourism—these and hundreds of other issues could not be negotiated to a resolution by the Arabs alone. Arab states were also Middle Eastern states, and while they belonged to an Arab state system, they also belonged to a Middle Eastern regional order. The shape and content of that order would evolve over time; a first step would be the progress of Arabs and Israelis at the negotiating table.[46]

The idea of the Middle East as a framework of identity faces many obstacles. It has nothing like the depth of the idea of Europe. The Middle East is a term that was first put into wide currency by an American naval strategist, who in 1902 described it as "an indeterminate area guarding a part of the sea route from Suez to Singapore."[47] It remains a colorless and inaccurate term, but the idea of an Arab nation "from the Ocean to the Gulf" is no older, and the term Middle East passed long ago into common Arabic usage. Its translation into an organizing principle of regional relations would constitute the final triumph of the real map over the imaginary map. All depends now on adding the last touches on the real map — the mutually agreed borders that will define Israel.

TALKING DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM

Is it true, as Fouad Ajami wrote, that this signifies the "end of Arab nationalism"? Do its defenders, mostly in exile, inhabit "fortresses at the end of the road that are yet to receive the dispatches that all is lost and the battle is over"?[48] Arab nationalism has suffered yet another blow, and has retreated almost to its point of origin, inspiring a few societies and clubs in Beirut, and some newspapers and journals published in Europe. With the exception of Libya under the mercurial Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi, no Arab state makes any credible pretense of championing Arab nationalism. Yet Arab nationalists have not lost hope that from their last fortresses, they

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might return triumphant to recapture the center. Did that not happen in the case of Iran, where an old ayatollah, banished to one of the last bastions of Shiite Islam, launched a revolution and swept to power? The return of political Islam from purgatory holds out hope to Arab nationalists that they might do the same. Their desperate gamble on Saddam failed, but there are other avenues of return, provided Arab nationalism can adapt to the changing spirit of the times.

Arab nationalism has never been totally averse to such adaptation. The core of its message has never changed, and remains the existence of one Arab nation, destined to be drawn together in some form of unity, and poised antagonistically against an array of external enemies. But in the past, Arab nationalism borrowed supplementary themes and vocabulary from liberalism, fascism, socialism, radicalism, and messianism. As the division of the Arab world became ever more established and recognized, this borrowing achieved less, so that Arab nationalism became ever more utopian in its presumptions. But given the immense economic and social problems that face Arab societies, there are Arab nationalists who believe that any moment might become a revolutionary one. They intend to be there.

Since the "defeat" of 1991, they have bid to stay in the contest by presenting Arab nationalism as the natural ally of democracy and Islam. In theory, Arab nationalism never required a commitment to either, and in practice it showed a strong preference for revolutionary dictators and a strong aversion to Islamic movements. In their prime, Arab nationalists had no qualms about banning political parties and executing Islamic activists, all in the name of Arab unity. That they now have fixed upon democracy and Islam is less a matter of conviction than convenience. They understand that the prevailing order has two weaknesses. First, it is not democratic. Its aging rulers, in power now for a generation, are under pressure from a populace that gets younger every year, and that yearns for a measure of political participation. Second, it is not legitimate in the eyes of the growing numbers of frustrated people who have filled the ranks of Islamic movements. They genuinely yearn for a measure of authenticity, which they believe can only be achieved by the creation of an Islamic state under Islamic law. Somewhere in the Arab world it is possible that a regime might succumb to one of

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these weaknesses. Arab nationalists hope to join the resulting fracas and perhaps emerge triumphant by championing either democracy or Islam or both.

From a reading of the leading journals of pan-Arab opinion, it appears that the slogan of Islam has been more difficult to sing. There is plenty of common ground with Islamic discourse, most notably in the shared conviction that the Arab world still suffers from imperialist domination and that Israel's presence must not be normalized. But Islam already has its champions, in the form of well-organized and disciplined mass movements, and these express almost no interest in an alliance with the discredited stragglers of Arab nationalism. The lengthy round-table debates among Arab nationalist intellectuals about their possible relationship with Islamic movements are not reciprocated by the Islamists, whose leaders have no need for guidance from others, especially those who once persecuted them.[49] Still, some Arab nationalist intellectuals, from their perches in Europe and America, have offered their intellectual services to the defense of Islamic movements before Western opinion—something Islamic movements have been ill-prepared to undertake themselves. This has created the foundations of a relationship, although not all Arab nationalists are pleased or prepared to become apologists for varieties of Islam which, only a few years ago, they denounced with all their polemical force.

In contrast, the slogan of democracy is easier to appropriate. There are no mass democracy movements, and while virtually every Arab regime now claims to be committed to democracy, their late conversion often seems less credible than that of the Arab nationalists themselves. And so the pan-Arab journals brim with articles, conference proceedings, and study-group reports on the methods and means of promoting democracy in the Arab world. The assumption underlying this sudden enthusiasm for political pluralism and free elections is that if the people were only allowed to express themselves, they would endorse the Arab nationalist program: greater Arab unity, repudiation of the United States, and withdrawal from the Arab-Israeli peace process.[50] This belief flies in the face of the existing attitudinal surveys, which show a continuing shift of self-identification away from the Arab nation, and toward either the state or Islam. The results of those relatively free elections held to date show a similar polarization between the party of the state and

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the party of Islam. No Arab nationalist parties have been a factor in these elections. And while there is a constituency for some elements of the Arab nationalist program, it clearly belongs to Islamic parties, whose platforms incorporate similar repudiations of American hegemony and Israel, but are couched in the language of Islam. In these circumstances, the commitment of Arab nationalists to democracy remains as superficial as that of the Islamists and the regimes. It is seen as one more slogan for mass mobilization and undermining or overturning the existing order, and then as a shield against the revenge of a triumphant Islam. But even as the Arab nationalists speak of democracy, their eyes remain fixed on the horizon, awaiting the next Nasser, the next Saddam—the man who will save the Arabs from themselves and unite them. Even now, when the slogan of democracy is on everyone's lips, half of the Arab nationalist intellectuals in a recent survey believe that Arab unity can only be achieved by force, not by democracy.[51]

But Arab nationalism, having lost almost everything, now has little to lose, and its endorsement of democracy and Islam has been made in just that spirit. That Arab nationalism should now cast itself as the defender of freedom and the faith is ironic. The irony is not lost on the Arabs themselves, who have a strong sense of history and long memories. They discarded Arab nationalism because it failed to keep its promise of power, even as it exacted an exorbitant price in freedom and faith. It was not the only utopian ideology to do so at the time. And perhaps the more useful comparison, when the perspective is longer, may be between Arab nationalism and Soviet communism: two great myths of solidarity, impossible in their scale, deeply flawed in their implementation, which alternately stirred and whipped millions of people in a desperate pursuit of power through the middle of the twentieth century, before collapsing in exhaustion—and stranding their last admirers in the faculty lounges of the West.

ENDNOTES

[1]Ibrahim al-Yaziji, "Tanabbahu wa istafiqu" ("Awake and Arise").

[2]George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (London: H. Hamilton, 1938).

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[3]Mahmoud Darwish, "Bitaqa hawiyya" ("Identity Card").

[4]Nizar Qabbani, "La buda an asta'dhina al-watan" ("I Must Ask the Homeland's Permission").

[5]Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 126.

[6]See, for example, Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960); and Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

[7]First assessed by Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*. For subsequent accounts, see Zeine N. Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Beirut: Khayat's, 1958); Sylvia Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1962); Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1973); Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); A. A. Duri, *The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation*, trans. Lawrence I. Conrad (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry*, 2d ed., trans. Marion Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); and Rashid Khalidi et al., eds., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

[8]For the most systematic critique of the "awakening," see Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970). For its difficulties in creating a modern vocabulary of politics, see Ami Ayalon, *Language and Change in the Arab Middle East: The Evolution of Modern Arabic Political Discourse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[9]Gertrude Bell, *The Desert and the Sown* (London: W. Heinemann, 1907), 140.

[10]Turkish nationalism, inspired by Balkan nationalisms, in turn inspired much of the outlook of early Arab nationalism. On its genesis, see David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908* (London: Cass, 1977).

[11]See Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976).

[12]Elie Kedourie, "Pan-Arabism and British Policy," in Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 213.

[13]On Arab politics in the immediate postwar period, see Zeine N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria*, 2d ed. (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1977).

[14]For the genesis of the names that filled the postwar map, see Bernard Lewis, "The Map of the Middle East: A Guide for the Perplexed," *The American Scholar* 58 (1) (Winter 1988–1989): 19–38.

[15]The deep debate in Lebanon over the very definition of its history is considered by Ahmad Beydoun, *Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains* (Beirut: L'Université Libanaise, 1984); and Kamal Salibi,

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A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988).

[16]While the story of the Arab Revolt has been told many times, most famously by T. E. Lawrence and George Antonius, there are fewer accounts of the rival campaigns for separate independence in different part of the Fertile Crescent. For a widening of the perspective, see Eliezer Tauber, *The Arab Movements in World War I* (London: Frank Cass, 1993).

[17]Quoted by William L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' al-Husri* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 127.

[18]Ibid., 163 – 65.

[19]On this evolution, see C. Ernest Dawn, "The Formation of a Pan-Arab Ideology in the Inter-War Years," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 20 (1) (February 1988): 67–91.

[20]On the Egyptian debate over identity, see Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[21]These plans have been considered in great detail by Yehoshua Porath, *In Search of Arab Unity 1930 – 1945* (London: Frank Cass, 1986).

[22]J. C. Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), 736.

[23]For a contemporary discussion of the transition to ideological politics, see Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York: John Wiley, 1964).

[24]For an assessment, see Nissim Rejwan, *Nasserist Ideology: Its Exponents and Critics* (New York: John Wiley, 1974).

[25]Translation in Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*, 233– 41.

[26]Sami al-Jundi, a member of the Ba'th from its earliest years who wrote a devastating account of the party, as quoted by Elie Kedourie, "Arabic Political Memoirs," in Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 201.

[27]For the early history of the Ba'th, see Kamel S. Abu Jaber, *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966); John F. Devlin, *The Ba'th Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976); and Kanan Makiya [Samir al-Khalil], *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989), 149–257.

[28]For this period, see Malcolm H. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958 –1970*, 3d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); and P. J. Vatikiotis, *Conflict in the Middle East* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1971).

[29]David Holden, *Farewell to Arabia* (New York: Walker, 1966), 101.

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[30]Abdul Aziz Said, "Clashing Horizons: Arabs and Revolution," in Michael Curtis, ed., *People and Politics in the Middle East* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1971), 279.

[31]Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," in Tawfic E. Farah, ed., *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 98.

[32]The most thought-provoking account of the post-1967 crisis of Arab nationalism remains Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Other works representative of the reassessments made by Arab nationalist intellectuals include Abdallah Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?,* trans. Diarmid Cammell (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976); Samir Amin, *The Arab Nation* (London: Zed Press, 1978); and Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). For a variety of assessments by non-Arabs, see Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Jacques Berque, *Arab Rebirth: Pain & Ecstasy,* trans. Quintin Hoare (London: Al Saqi Books, 1983); David Pryce-Jones, *The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989); and Olivier Carré, *Le nationalisme arabe* (Paris: Fayard, 1993).

[33]Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions,* 218, 231.

[34]Kamal Abu-Deeb, "Cultural Creation in a Fragmented Society," in Hisham Sharabi, ed., *The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), 165.

[35]The strengthening of the Arab state served as the theme of a multiyear project on "Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World," which generated four volumes of detailed studies. The most significant of these studies are collected in Giacomo Luciani, ed., *The Arab State* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990).

[36]Michel Aflaq, *Fi sabil al-ba'th* (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1963), 55.

[37]Quoted by Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), 30–32.

[38]On the evolution of this approach, see Moshe Shemesh, *The Palestinian Entity 1959–1974: Arab Politics and the PLO* (London: Frank Cass, 1988).

[39]Jean Genet, *Prisoner of Love,* trans. Barbara Bray (London: Picador, 1989), 239.

[40]Quoted by Carré, *Le nationalisme arabe,* 175.

[41]Quoted by Amatzia Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968–89* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 121. The book includes a detailed discussion of the issue of identity in Iraqi politics, and the genesis of the Mesopotamian myth.

[42]See Kanan Makiya [Samir al-Khalil], *The Monument: Art, Vulgarity and Responsibility in Iraq* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991).

[43]Hichem Djaït, *Europe and Islam* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985), 140–41.

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[44]Quoted by Kanan Makiya, *Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World* (New York: Norton, 1993), 242. The second half of this work is devoted to the rush of Arab nationalist intellectuals to endorse Saddam Hussein before and during the Gulf crisis.

[45]David Pollock, *"The Arab Street"? Public Opinion in the Arab World,* policy paper no. 32 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 29–41.

[46]An example of this trend is the article by the Egyptian intellectual Lutfi al-Khuli, "Arab? Na'am wa-lakin sharq awsatiyin aydan!," *al-Hayat* (London), 20 May 1992.

[47]Roderic Davison, "Where is the Middle East," in Richard Nolte, ed., *The Modern Middle East* (New York: Atherton, 1963), 16–17.

[48]Fouad Ajami, "The End of Arab Nationalism," *The New Republic* (Washington), 12 August 1991.

[49]For an example of such a debate, see the proceedings of a roundtable of Arab nationalist intellectuals on the possibility of a nationalist-Islamist rapprochement in *al-Mustaqbal al-arabi* (Beirut) (161) (July 1992): 96–119.

[50]For a typical statement of this view, see As'ad AbuKhalil, "A New Arab Ideology?: The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism," *Middle East Journal* 46 (1) (Winter 1992): 22–36.

[51]The survey was conducted by researchers at Yarmuk University, and included almost one thousand respondents from several Arab countries. See *al-Mustaqbal al-arabi* (164) (October 1992): 27–33.

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Benjamin I. Schwartz

Culture, Modernity, and Nationalism—Further Reflections

IN ALMOST ALL CURRENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE present situation in the East Asian cultural sphere, and of the "non-Western" world in general, there are two terms which seem to be unavoidable: "culture" and "modernity." Both categories are, of course, of modern Western origin, although I would be prepared to argue that in East Asian thought one can find concepts which resemble the modern Western cultural-anthropological concept of culture. The category of modernity, however, remains incorrigibly Western in most of its terms of reference. Any sustained scrutiny of the meaning of these terms will thus inevitably be highly Eurocentric and abstract. Those of us who use these terms—whether Westerners or East Asians—must continue to examine the latent assumptions which govern their use, despite the vast libraries of books which have been written on both terms. The question of where "the heart of the matter" lies remains unresolved.

To what kinds of entities or states of affairs do the terms culture and modernity refer? I discuss them together because, in an odd way, both categories present certain common semantic perplexities. In current discourse, both are often treated as closed totalities or wholes that subsume a wide variety of themes and components. They are often treated as wholes in the strongest possible ontological sense—almost as two physical objects which cannot occupy the same space. Occasionally, the prevailing metaphor is that of the static, unproblematically integrated "system." Sometimes the underlying metaphor is that of the biological organism. There are obvious differences between culture and modernity. "Primitive"

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and "traditional" cultures are treated as finished, static structures whose origins are lost in the mists of prehistory, while modernity is a kind of "turn" which emerges in the history of Western civilization in recent centuries. We have thus been able to observe not only its origins but its subsequent ongoing evolution in the "process of modernization"—a process which has been completed even now only in certain societies. Much of the discussion of modernity has in fact centered on the process of modernization. While the debates about the process and models of modernization rage on, modernity itself is nevertheless assumed to represent a final stable structure. It is like a mesa plateau whose ascent has been achieved by few, while others are still involved in the painful process of the ascent. Once achieved and globalized, it will constitute an essentially homogeneous "total state of affairs"—a kind of "end of history."[1] It can thus also be described as a closed, static totality.[2]

If culture and modernity do represent "wholes," they are wholes in a weak, unstable, and indeterminate sense, eminently open both to influences from without and to the effects of an unknown future. Not only may we find deep diachronic and synchronic tensions and conflicts among the components of the "system," but elements of the system—as in chemical compounds—may be quite detachable from the whole. Furthermore, these components, far from being unique and incommensurable, are often easily comparable to the components of other structures.

Without automatically accepting the fashionable authority of Jacques Derrida, it seems that there is much to be learned from some of his remarks on structures which claim to be holistic. He points out that any structure which claims some kind of internal coherence must have some center or underlying principle which governs the structure as a whole. In a highly-articulated rigid system, this central principle acts as an organizing core which tightly governs the play of elements within the system.

When I suggest that categories such as culture and modernity are in some sense wholes, they are so in a precarious and loose sense that is very much open to influences from the outside. In neither case is it easy to achieve any agreement on where the center or the heart of the whole resides. Furthermore, the question of how the parts relate to the whole, and to each other synchronically or diachronically, remains open to constant reexamination.

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In this essay, I shall attempt to concretize some of the questions which have arisen in my efforts to struggle with both of these vast and unstable categories.

In dealing with the term "culture" in *The World of Thought in Ancient China,*[3] I chose to refer to what Derrida calls the "center of the structure"[4] as "persistent dominant orientations" of Chinese culture. Many have referred to a kind of "monistic" or "organismic" holism—the predilection for a notion of an all-embracing order which is pervasive in much of Chinese "high cultural" thought, and has even been internalized, up to a point, in the mentalities of the "popular culture." Others more particularly concerned with the sociopolitical aspects of Chinese culture have been deeply impressed by the "fusion of the political and cultural order" (*cheng chiao ho i*) which is not only implicit in most varieties of Chinese political thought but is strikingly apparent in the actual practice of the Chinese polity over centuries. Others have suggested different central principles. I use the word "orientations" in the plural since there is, of course, no agreement concerning which orientation provides the ultimate key or on how they relate to each other. Despite their pervasiveness and persistence, these orientations do not give rise to a static, integrated, and closed system. In their confrontation with the complexities of human experience, they give rise to diverse and even conflicting modes of reflective thought. They produce not an integrated harmony but ongoing *problématiques*. These *problématiques* were not resolved throughout the long history of China, even after "official Confucianism" had presumably won a clear ascendancy on the high cultural level.

I refer to dominant cultural orientations because one can in fact find (even on the level of high culture) the presence of deviant countertendencies which challenge the dominant orientations themselves. In texts such as the *Zhuangzi* and *Mozi,* one can find minority challenges both to the moral-spiritual claims of the political order and to the holistic-organismic bent of Chinese cosmology. On the level of popular culture and religion, one finds over the centuries both an internalization of the dominant orientations and a stubborn resistance to them.

I would also suggest that neither the dominant orientations nor the *problématiques* to which they gave rise are incommunicably unique or incommensurably "other." However different they may

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be, they relate to universally shared areas of human concern. Confucius' observations concerning the family and its function may be refracted through the medium of shared Chinese cultural orientations and Aristotle's observations through the shared ancient Greek cultural orientations. Yet, with all due respect for the formidable problems of translatability, they do in fact discuss communicable issues.

There may be some areas of experience within which different cultures are indeed irreducibly unique, particularly the sensual-aesthetic sphere. Chinese architecture, ancient bronze vessels, ceramics, painting, food, and dress may be unique, but they are hardly incommunicable. There are Westerners who may find East Asian landscape painting incommunicable, but the same individuals may find John Cage's music even more incommunicable.

If neither the dominant orientations nor the *problématiques* of East Asian culture are unique and "other," they are also not in principle hermetically sealed off against influences from outside the cultural orbit. I am referring not only to the diffusion of separate technologies and the borrowing of artistic motifs and forms, but even of fundamental ideas, despite the inertial resistance of long established cultural ideas and practices. Buddhism, as we know, was to have a profound impact on Chinese culture on the level of both high and popular cultural life. It made its impact during a period of internal crisis by relating to problem areas which were already present within the Chinese world. Again, I am not asserting that the total *problématique* of Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism as it had developed in India and Central Asia up until the second and third centuries corresponded to a totalistic *problématique* of Chinese thought. To many Chinese, however, it appeared that various aspects of Buddhism seemed to offer fresh and even novel approaches to concerns which had already been addressed within the culture. In its novel aspects it may have turned attention to other concerns which had not, in the perceptions of many, been adequately addressed in the dominant orientations of Chinese culture.[5] I am here, of course, positing the possibility of universal human concerns transcending the different cultural responses to such concerns. There are indeed vast problems of translatability in the broad meaning of the term. Yet the assertion that the Chinese could not possibly understand what was different in Buddhist texts is in my

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mind an unproven dogma. Also, it is quite clear that Buddhism in its various forms inevitably underwent adjustments to the environment of Chinese culture as a whole which had by no means been displaced by a total Buddhist culture. Yet, modern Chinese cultural nationalists, who lean very heavily on the Western metaphor of the notion of culture as a biological organism, will insist that China finally "digested" whatever was consumable by the Chinese organism, rejecting the foreign "Indian" elements. Others skeptical of this image might say that the absorption of Buddhism may have changed and complicated the very nature of the "organism" as a whole.

It need hardly be pointed out that certain extremely strong versions of cultural holism—particularly those concerned with "primitive" societies—have in the past devalued the significance of historic change. Claude Levi-Strauss, whose view of culture exalted the clear and invariant structures of primitive cultures both from an intellectual and a moral point of view, seemed reluctant to apply the very concept of culture to the large higher civilizations which have not escaped the vast disorganizing effects of historic change.

In the modest version of cultural holism which I am advocating, there is no necessary contradiction between the presence of persistent cultural orientations and the fact that China has had a long and significant history. Even if we ignore the undoubted effects of external forces, the fact is that the persistent orientations discussed above give rise not to closed, totally integrated structures but to unresolved *problématiques,* sharp historic changes, and even convulsive crises in intellectual, social, and political life. In the sphere of aesthetic and art history, the changes and innovations are indeed palpable and undeniable.

To many, this history is not significant since it does not lead to some of the crucial outcomes which we call modern. It is nevertheless interesting to note that within Chinese—particularly Confucian—culture, one actually finds a deep concern with historic process even though this concern is not necessarily linked to a theory of inevitable progress.[6] Much of this historic concern involves an inquiry into why and how the actual course of history does or does not actualize the highest norms of the culture (often called the *Tao*) either in individual, familial, or social life. Often, to the extent that the history becomes a kind of intellectual history (as in Huang Zong-xi's history of schools of thought in the Ming dynasty, the "Ming-

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Ju xue-an"), we are also made aware of far-ranging controversies concerning the nature of the *Tao* itself, thus vividly illustrating the problematic nature of basic cultural orientations.

This acute awareness of the gap between culture as normative ideal and culture as it works itself out in historic actuality is in sharp contrast to the views of some cultural anthropologists who are not inclined to dwell on the discrepancy between "norm" and "actuality," as this is perceived even within the literature of the culture in question. In the case of "primitive" cultures where literary texts do not exist, it is generally assumed that the gap between the two is nonexistent. We, as outsiders, may find the norms totally unacceptable or even revolting, but there seems to be a widely accepted assumption that, whether good or bad, the norms are basically actualized— except perhaps for those individuals who are constitutionally incapable of fulfilling the requirements of the norms.

In fact, in the case of the higher civilizations, we find that during the ages in which these norms prevailed, both the cultural elites and the masses were often acutely aware of the gaps between professed norms and actual behavior. Indeed, my own unfashionable respect for some of the great books of the high cultural canon rests on the realization that what makes them great is not that they are rapturous enunciations of the inherited norms but that they often relate themselves in profound ways to the question of why the ideals are not fully or even partially realized. One may, of course, question both the norms of these great books and the analyses and diagnoses provided by the texts, but at least in such texts one is always aware of the gap between norms and actualities.

When we turn, however, to the apologetic defense of the culture of the past which we often find among modern cultural nationalists, we tend to see an overwhelming tendency both to minimize the synchronic and diachronic tensions and conflicts among norms within the culture and to avoid an account of the gaps (often clearly perceived within the culture of the past) between the norms and the actualities. Their need to assert their "national identity," whether in the mood of victims or victors, seems to require a basically unrelieved "happy story" in which the richness and complexity of the past is sacrificed for the image of the happily integrated whole.

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When we turn to the totalistic conception of modernity we confront other problems. As already mentioned, modernity conceived of as a total structure is seen as a major turn in Western civilization over the last few centuries. The question of the relationship of this turn to the Western culture of the past remains a matter of ongoing dispute. One view is that modernity as a total state of affairs represents a qualitative break with the traditional Western society of the past—a break which is in essence so radical that it amounts to nothing less than a Cartesian "beginning from scratch." To others, the turn would have been inconceivable without the presence of certain powerful predispositions already present in the Western past. To those who stress the radical qualitative break with the past, the basic antithesis is not between Western culture and other cultures but between traditional society and modern society. Here, the basic metaphor is that of the growth of the biological organism. Presumably all the civilizational cultures of mankind, like all "normal" biological individuals, traverse a certain unilinear path of growth and development. On the whole, many intellectuals in non-Western cultures who have come to accept the universal validity of modernity tend to prefer the unilinear tradition/modernity dichotomy to the notion of essential cultural difference—a notion which seems to imply innate cultural superiority. Premodern Western society was after all no less "traditional" than any other. The fact remains that this view hardly mitigates the problem of cultural arrogance. If the West was the first society to achieve the full breakthrough to modernity, one must ask why this is so. If one does not have the problem of cultural superiority, one does have the problem of arrested (or retarded) development.

The weaker and more problematic versions of both culture and modernity here proposed may make it possible to avoid these stark alternatives. The modern turn in the West may indeed draw on certain predispositions which were most strongly developed in the premodern West. It thus may indeed be true that the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries drew heavily on both the pre-Socratic and the Platonic strains of ancient Greek thought. Yet, the same scholars who would support this contention would emphasize the fact that Aristotelian rationalism was not particularly favorable to the perspectives of the scientific revolution. Within the larger *problématique* of premodern Western culture,

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there existed tendencies both favorable and unfavorable to the emergence of the total configuration of the scientific revolution.

By the same token, it is by no means impossible that many of the predispositions which were to play a role in the modern turn in the West were also present in greater or lesser degrees in other cultures. Thus, there is no reason to deny that the slow premodern economic growth from a basically natural agrarian economy to a more commercialized, more monetarized, and more urban economy did take place in China without, as both Marx and Weber have suggested, *necessarily* leading to the total configuration of a modern industrial economy. The same can be said of the premodern progress of mechanical invention, of bureaucratic "rationalism," and even of certain modes of "individualism." It now appears that many social and cultural habits and predispositions often associated with Confucianism have proved in actuality to be favorable to the project of economic modernization in East Asia in the twentieth century. The question remains whether the major orientations of Chinese culture would themselves have led to the modern Western overwhelming obsession with economic and technological rationalization.

This, however, still leaves us with a question: What is the center or the heart of that whole which we call modernity? To many, the heart of the matter is, in fact, the scientific revolution and/or the economic/technological rationalization. However, there are others more oriented to questions of social ethics for whom the liberation of the individual from all authority both human and supernatural is central. Some see the equalization of all human conditions as the ultimate promise of modernity. Others may point to the dominant role which modern secular nationalism has played and continues to play within the mix of factors which we call modern. On the level of philosophic and religious thought, there are those who stress that science has totally reincorporated the human into the reductionist universe of Darwinian biology or of particle physics, while others see a radical disjuncture between the human and nonhuman realms. Whether the essence of the human lies in the human subject, in culture, in the social system, in language, or in the historic process, the human's total being is primarily shaped by forces operative within an anthropocentric realm. It is a curious fact that both of

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these utterly contradictory visions can be derived from the paradoxical dualism of Cartesian thought.

The effort to comprehend the interrelations of these factors has been undertaken by a variety of ideologies ever since the eighteenth century. "Individualism" itself assumes a multitude of forms ranging from Immanuel Kant's conception of moral autonomy, to the romantic individualism of the nineteenth century, to the economic individualism of the classical economists. The relations of individual liberty to equality remains a matter of continuous debate. The relationship of economic and technological growth to what might be called the social-ethical dimensions of modernity has been fiercely debated in a host of divergent ideologies from conflicts between Rousseau and the philosophes until the present.

At the moment, with the seeming retreat of the radical antiliberal outlooks of communism and fascism which had won such a position of prominence for much of this century, there has been the resurgence in the West of the older liberal (in the broadest sense) conviction that the heart of modernity is to be found in the combination of constitutional democracy and market capitalism, although the question of the relationship between the two has by no means been resolved.

The notion that at the heart of modernity lies an absolutist dichotomy between "individualism and collectivism" has made it plausible to describe the entire antiliberal wave of the mid-twentieth century as a throwback to premodernity. Yet, there are excellent reasons to doubt whether the individualism/collectivism antithesis is the central shared orientation of modernity. To Max Weber, the heart of modernity lay in the processes of rationalization which involved not only the economic but the political, military, and legal orders as well. It is true that in his account of the origins of capitalism in *The Protestant Ethic,*[7] Weber concentrates on the inner life of individuals. Yet, in his more general discussion of rationalization in the fields of politics, and the economics of "capitalism" as an ongoing concern, the emphasis tends to fall very much on the rationalization of large collective organizations, and on what he unenthusiastically called the bureaucratization of modern society. The absolute states of the early modern period were thus not simply extensions of premodern feudalism but had in many ways prepared the groundwork of rationalization in many areas of social life.

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In the 1930s and 1940s, there were many brilliant people in the West who saw the very culmination of economic rationality in the Stalinist leadership of the Soviet Union. Rationality was not to be found in the immanent forces of the market system but in the minds of rational social engineers who would not only create a more dynamic economy but also realize the eminently modern ideals of social and economic equality. Fascism and Nazism had elevated the modern phenomenon of nationalism to the level of a kind of modern religion of societal solidarity. To the extent that both were in their ascendancy, both found support in the modern historicist notion of the inevitable "wave of the future."

The basic suggestion here is that the radically antiliberal ideologies and movements of the twentieth century were not a throwback to premodernity despite the Nazi appeals to the mythical past of the German *Volk* and despite Mussolini's invocation of the glories of ancient Rome. Marxist-Leninist communism was in its professed doctrine resolutely modern and future-oriented.

If one can speak here of a culture of modernity, we find that, as in the traditional cultures, its central orientations, whatever they may be, have given rise to a vast and by no means completely resolved *problématique*. One crucial aspect of this *problématique* is the fact that the nation-state societies which have emerged within the precincts of modernity, such as France, Germany, and the United States, have produced highly diverse subcultures of their own. We also find that it is by no means easier to define the term "modernity" in wholly normative terms of good and evil than it is to define traditional cultures in such terms. If fascism and communism were indeed modern phenomena, we cannot allow ourselves to be detached completely from the evils of these modern societies, including the enormities of both fascism and Marxist-Leninist communism, anymore than we can accept the entirely "happy stories" of tradition-oriented cultural nationalists.

I shall not venture here to provide an answer to the question of where the heart of modernity lies. Certainly, the scientific revolution and Max Weber's notion of the unlimited "rationalization" of every sphere of social, economic, and political life immediately come to mind. Yet, what I would point to here is not so much the direct effects of these developments but the philosophic perspectives with which they are associated—particularly, the radical post-Cartesian

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disjuncture between the human realm conceived of as totally encapsulated within itself and a nonhuman realm to which we relate only in theoretical, scientific, and technological terms. It seems that it is this perspective which has made possible the entire Faustian thrust of the modern world and which has deeply affected every other aspect of modern culture. How this perspective relates to the more purely socioethical aspects and nationalist aspects of modernity remains a question of unresolved complexity.

At this moment, it may indeed be appropriate to focus attention more closely on that particularly problematic strand of modernity which has been called nationalism. While the presumption is now widespread that market economy and democracy have gained a decisive victory over communism, we are acutely aware of the resurgence of nationalism in many parts of the world. Indeed, despite all the talk of globalization, it is by no means dead in the very heart of the "industrial democracies" themselves.

If nationalism is a strand of modernity, it remains one of the most problematic and elusive strands. Among many of those who tend to define modernity in terms of a total break with the reactionary culture and histories of the past, the tendency among many cultural nationalists to exalt the national culture and history is often regarded as a simple manifestation of an antimodern traditionalism. Yet some of the most recent books on nationalism such as Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*[8] and Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities*[9] emphasize the modernity of nationalism. As in the past, however, there is little agreement on where the heart of its modernity lies.

Perhaps one of the more positive aspects of the entire postmodern development is that we are now no longer so inclined to dismiss an entire area of discourse because of the absence of an exhaustive definition which demands total consensus. While my own perception of where the heart of the matter lies may be no more accurate than many others, I would agree with those who accept the reality of nationalism. I would also agree that it belongs to the complex of modernity. Again, however, as in the case of the other strands which enter into the complex of modernity, I see no need to posit a total rupture between the modern and the premodern. Nationalism may in fact draw on many factors and predispositions which can be found in the Western past as well as in the history of other cultures.

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Because of the incorporation of the word "nation" in the term nationalism, there are many who believe that the definition of nationalism is very much dependent on the preexistence of entities defined as nations. Some also insist that the nation itself is a peculiarly modern creation. I would nevertheless suggest that entities which in many ways resemble what we now call nations or even nationalities or ethnic groups are to be found in many times and places. They are not exclusively modern. In the Hebrew Bible we find reference to groups such as Edomites, Moabites, and Midianites who are often referred to as *goyim,* a word which has frequently been translated as "nations." Is this translation justified? In fact, they do share many of the attributes which we often ascribe to nations. There is often the shared assumption of common kinship origins, of a shared intelligibility of language. They frequently occupied given territories and were governed by their own polities. They may have shared cultural traits with their neighbor but were also often marked by their own subcultural traits, and often had their own patron deities. They probably perceived themselves as belonging to a kind of multinational world made up of comparable entities with which they were involved in competitive and agonic relationships.

It would appear that such rudimentary nations also existed at various times in ancient and medieval India and in China during the "Warring States" period. It may be argued that such regional, sociopolitical entities were basically states rather than nations in any full-bodied sense of the term, yet in rough ways they often related to regional, cultural, and linguistic differences. Such regional states were perhaps more like the dynastic monarchies of late medieval and early modern Europe. If we bear in mind Ernest Barker's somewhat extreme and unqualified statement that "historically the state precedes the nation; it is not the nations which make states; it is states which create nations,"[10] it may not be fanciful to think of the states of Lu, Chu, and Qin in "Warring States" China as in some sense nations. It nevertheless remains a fact that neither in India nor in China did such rudimentary nation-state formations become "terminal communities." While they operated within a kind of de facto competitive multistate order, such an order never became institutionalized as a normative order. In the Near East as well, we find that many of the nations mentioned in the Bible

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disappeared without a trace into the Assyrian, Persian, and Hellenistic universal empires.

This fact forcibly reminds us that even if something resembling nations existed in the premodern world, in many parts of that world they confronted the more formidable model of the "universal" empire conceived of as continuous with the ecumene of a universally conceived higher civilization. The polity of such empires is often envisioned as a unique polity of civilization culminating in a universal state and incommensurable with any "barbarian" polity. The relationship between the universal civilization and the polity differed markedly in all these empires. Indeed, in the case of ancient Greek civilization one would have to say that during the classical age of the city-state, there was a complete disjuncture between the Panhellenic civilization and the plural nature of the local polities. It is only in Alexander's empire that polity and civilization become united. Yet, however different, they all seem to share a profound consciousness of the crucial nature of the divide between the realm of civilization and the realm of the barbarian. It was a way of conceiving the "other" which probably differed markedly from the way in which the Moabite regarded the otherness of the Midianite.

It should nevertheless be noted at this point that in a most stimulating essay recently written by Prasenjit Duara, professor of modern Chinese history at the University of Chicago,[11] we find a striking challenge both to the view that premodern China was not a nation and even to the view that the term nationalism cannot be applied, at least to some extent, to premodern China.

In making these assertions, Duara raises some very pertinent questions about the formula "from culturalism to nationalism" which has often been used to describe at least one salient aspect of modern China's evolution. While the word nationalism seems to imply the notion of a nation as the social bearer of nationalism, the word culturalism almost seems to imply that China was maintained only by the disembodied essence of a culture. The Chinese themselves, as Duara asserts, remain convinced that Chinese culture was always maintained by a tangible politicosocial bearer clearly marked off from other politicosocial entities. In choosing to call this entity a nation, Duara refuses to accept the theories of Gellner and Anderson who insist on the modernity not only of nationalism but even of the nation. In Duara's words, they insist that "national identity is a

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radical novel form of consciousness."[12] In their view, it is only in the modern nation "that people from various locales could imagine themselves as part of a single community."[13] Both Gellner and Anderson attribute this either to the rise of industrial economy as such or to what Anderson calls the rise of a "print capitalism" which created the horizontal, densely interconnected communities of the national society.[14] In contrast, we are led to believe that in premodern societies the illiterate masses were barely conscious of the larger cultural and political structures with which they were involved. Duara is quite right when he attacks this overdrawn contrast. In China there were complex relations between the political, cultural, and economic networks and "the widespread presence of common cultural ideas which linked the state to communities and sustained the polity." What he says concerning China may be equally true of the Roman Empire, of India, and even of medieval Europe. My main objection lies in his insistence that any political community thus constituted must be called a nation. The nonliterate inhabitants of the Roman Empire were, on the whole, quite aware that they were part of the Roman imperial political order and of what they regarded as high civilization. In the parlance of the average premodern Chinese, the phrase *tian-xia* (under Heaven) as a way of referring to the ecumene of civilization to which he belonged was much more common than any term which might be called ethnic. The same was true for the religiously based Islamic civilization despite the early collapse of its universal polity.

Duara, however, not only asserts that premodern China was a "self-conscious political community" (and thus in his view a nation) but in some of its aspects might be called nationalistic. Some Chinese have over the centuries defined their differences from others not simply in terms of a superior universal culture which might conceivably be internalized by others but in terms of something like a built-in "racial" superiority based on irreducible geographic, climatic, and even biological factors. In later centuries, it became common among some to refer to Chinese culture as the culture of the "Han" people. It thus sees the culture as the outgrowth of a natural ethnicity.[15] This is indeed a theme which can be linked to Johann Gottfried von Herder's concept of the nation as a kind of primordial natural growth which engenders its own national culture.[16] In the West, this theme could be linked to the benign version of nationalism

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which accepts the essential equality of all national cultures. In the case of the Chinese "protonationalist" Wang Fu-zhih, however, it by no means shook his profound convictions concerning the objective and unique superiority of Chinese civilization over barbarian cultures. In sum, while accepting Duara's critique of the concept of "culturalism" and his focus on protonationalist themes in premodern China, I believe that nationalism nevertheless represents a fundamental "turn" in modern Chinese culture.

Finally, in seeking anticipations of modern nationalism in premodern societies, something must be said concerning the ancient Greek city-state, which bequeathed to later ages a most vivid and tangible embodiment of the idea of patriotism as a sentiment binding individuals to the city envisioned as an almost palpable organism. Here, we find the image of the city as a kind of terminal community and supreme focus of loyalty as well as the fact that, in effect, these polities were conceived of as competitive actors in a multistate arena. In the West, this model exercised its fascination for many centuries. The effort to apply this model of what might be called the city-state protonationalism of ancient Greece to the large territorial state of modern Europe produced its own dilemmas.

In surveying some of these premodern anticipations of nationalism, we have not yet answered the question: What is modern about nationalism? If we assume that a truly modern nationalism came into being sometime during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it may be highly relevant to examine the rise of the territorial states of early modern Europe. While it may be true that something like nations, nationalities, or ethnic groups existed long before modern times, it is a fact that these states, which witnessed the rise of many other aspects of modernity, also created the most vividly articulated and full-bodied image of the nation which has ever existed. They strongly promoted the official vernacular language, fostered the notion of a national high culture, affirmed the idea of the supreme sovereignty of the secular nation-state, and played a crucial role to the extent that they could in promoting the kind of early industrial development so much stressed by Ernest Gellner. It was also in this period that the multistate system became more or less institutionalized as a normative legal state of affairs. While it may be true that most of these states were ruled by dynastic monarchies whose concepts of dynastic interests may not have always coincided

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with what might be regarded as national interests, it was the nation which became their fundamental base of operation. Again, while they may have based their legitimacy on the divine right of kings, in the vast controversies over the jurisdiction of the sacred and secular power which marked late medieval Europe, the kings represented the secular even when, in the theories of Marsiglio and Bodin, they claimed their power directly from God. It may also be true, as Isaiah Berlin insists, that Herder's decidedly nonpolitical eighteenth-century version of the nation as the embodiment of *Volksgeist* was to become a crucial aspect of later nationalism. It was, however, combined in the early nineteenth century with a decidedly political German nationalism. One reason why the French Revolution is often cited as the birthplace of modern nationalism is because it (and also the American Revolution) shed a clear light on the ambiguities of the words *Volk* and people. The people as the collectivity of the oppressed in confrontation with the oppressing ruling classes speedily becomes the people as a collective subject or collective organism regarded as the bearer of such clearly national attributes as common national language and national culture. It was only natural that "people" in this sense should achieve their own political expression and independence. We thus find that in the era of nationalism, almost all nations, whatever the nature of their polity, tend to claim to derive their sovereignty from the people.

It is in the light of such consideration that I find that my own tentative view on the question of where the modernity of nationalism lies tends to be somewhat close to that of Anderson in *Imagined Communities* (despite my disagreements with many aspects of his book). Anderson maintains that in an age in which cosmically rooted religion has declined, nationalism has provided a quasi-religious center of meaning for vast multitudes. Its primary significance does not lie in its supposedly instrumental, functional role. The nation is not only a collective subject realizing its collective destiny over the course of history. It is a kind of immanent deity emerging wholly out of the human realm which is able to provide present meanings to those who participate in its radiant sphere. To many, it provides the sense of grandeur, glory, honor, and feeling of connectedness with some more ultimate state of affairs—feelings of transcendent loyalty and gratitude otherwise absent in their lives. Whatever Marxists may say about "false consciousness," to the

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members of great successful nations it provided the sense of participation (on however humble a level) in the glory and power of one's country. To those who consider themselves members of victim nations or ethnicities, it lends a transcendent dimension to their fears, hatreds, and desires for revenge.

As many recent writers on nationalism have pointed out, nationalism as the religion of the nation does not really require the long historic preexistence of ready-made nations. Once the nationalist model of the nation is posited, the model of nationhood can come to be adopted by a variety of collective actors. The administered territories arbitrarily created by colonial powers in Africa can become the focus of nationalisms built up around the state structures left by colonial administrators. This again, however, reminds us of Barker's view that even in Europe "states created nations." In the case of Japan, the premodern polity and even culture easily adapted to the religion of nationalism. In China and India, there have been major efforts to convert universal communities into nations. Nations controlling multiethnic empires have both attempted to absorb subject communities into the national religion and also attempted to keep them out. As we can see, the question of what kind of community will or will not constitute a nation still remains unresolved. For a time it seemed that the Soviet Union, although it was a multiethnic empire, was nevertheless eminently a nation in the full nationalist sense which could draw on a large reservoir of "Soviet patriotism." The same was true of Yugoslavia. We thus find that within the nationalist dispensation, it is most difficult to predict the history of what groups will or will not come to provide the nucleus of nationhood.

In focusing here on nationalism, it has not been my intention to maintain that it is a strand which can be considered in isolation from the entire complex of modernity. On the contrary, it has, of course, from the outset been intimately entangled in complex and even paradoxical ways with all the other aspects of modernity as well as with the premodern cultures of the past.

We have spoken of nationalism as a quasi-religion not necessarily instrumental to other goals. Yet, there can be no doubt that what attracted the eye of many in the non-Western world to the powerful nation-states of the West was the entirely unprecedented growth in the wealth and power of these states. Indeed, the fact that they were

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all more or less equivalent entities striving with each other in a battle for ascendancy as well as the more ominous fact of the inability of others to compete with them in this Darwinian agon led to a concentrated attention on the power of nationalism as an organizing and mobilizing force.

The relationship of nationalism to the more universalistic ideologies and values of the modern West—to all the varieties of liberalism, socialism, scientific humanism, and romanticism—has been most complex and entangled from the very start. In the abstract, the quasi-religion of the love of one's nation can be conceived of as a highly particularistic love requiring no transcendental claims to the possession of universal truths or values. In fact, of course, modern nations have claimed to be the bearers of universal truths and values such as the American way of life, or the Soviet model of socialism, or the civilizing mission of French culture. Again, there is the Janus-like aspect of nationalism which leads some to believe that the flourishing and power of the nation requires a radical rupture with the premodern past and others to feel that a high sense of national identity requires a devotion to and pride in the culture of the past. This does not necessarily mean that all commitments to either the culture of the past or to modern universal values always tend to serve the national interest or reinforce the sense of national identity. Many Americans genuinely believe that aspects of the American political experience may be of universal relevance. There are also Chinese who deeply believe that aspects of the Chinese cultural tradition may be of universal human value. To the integral nationalist, however, the universalistic cultural claims, whether modern or traditional, are clearly functional to the promotion of the national communal interest or the enhancement of national pride. His view tends to be indiscriminately holistic and celebratory.

Despite the recent resurgence of nationalism in large parts of the world, the question of its long-term fate as an aspect of modernity remains an open question. We are aware of the predictions of those who maintain that it will soon be overwhelmed by the leveling effect of economic and technological globalization. Yet, we are also aware that the notion that nationalism is an anachronism within the world of modernity was already widely held among the classical economists of the early nineteenth century.

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The point to be reemphasized is that modernity does not represent an end of history in either the West or the non-West. In the course of its transactions with other cultures, many separate aspects of the modern "turn" have indeed been globalized even though the *problématiques* internal to modernity have not yet been resolved either in the West or in other culture areas. Nor have we yet seen any conclusion of the transactions between modernity and all the cultural experiences of the past.

ENDNOTES

[1]There is, to be sure, the entire "postmodern" movement in the West which claims to have gone beyond the boundaries of modernity. Much depends here on how one defines the "central principles" of modernity. In my view, the postmodern movement still operates within the boundaries of modernity.

[2]It may seem strange to speak of modernity as a fixed, stable structure, since some aspects of modernity such as the notion of unlimited technological and economic growth suggest constant change. It is often implied, however, that such change represents quantitative growth within a stable culture of modernity.

[3]Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985).

[4]Some of Jacques Derrida's reflections on the nature of closed structures are extraordinarily illuminating. See Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play," in Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 278 – 80.

[5]While the impact of Buddhism is often thought of as affecting mainly the conscious level of Chinese life, the totally novel institution of the monastery was to have a profound effect on the sociopolitical history of later centuries.

[6]Here again one may find some strains of historic thought which suggest some notion of progress and even "Buddhist-Taoist" views which suggest an ultimate eschatology.

[7]Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

[8]Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[9]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

[10]Ernest Barker, *National Character and the Factors in its Formation* (London: Methuen, 1927), 15.

[11]Prasenjit Duara, "De-constructing the Chinese Nation," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (30) (July 1993).

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[12]Ibid., 6.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, chap. 3.

[15]Ironically, the word "Han" refers not to an ethnicity but to an identification with the glories of the Han dynasty which provided the model of the later imperial state.

[16]See Isaiah Berlin, *Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 145–216.

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Ashutosh Varshney

Contested Meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the Politics of Anxiety

THE PRIMARY IMPULSE OF THIS ESSAY IS explanatory, not normative. It is important to keep this distinction in mind because the subject—the rise of Hindu nationalism—generates strong emotions. While dealing with Hindu nationalism, the customary intellectual tendency is to denounce or celebrate, not to explain. For an academic analysis, however, explanation must take clear precedence over denunciation or celebration.

The essay makes three arguments. First, a conflict between three different varieties of nationalism has marked Indian politics of late: a *secular* nationalism, a *Hindu* nationalism, and two *separatist* nationalisms in the states of Kashmir and Punjab. Hindu nationalism is a reaction to the two other nationalisms. In imaginations about India's national identity, there was always a conceptual space for Hindu nationalism. Still, it remained a weak political force until recently, when the context of politics changed. The rise of Hindu nationalism can thus be attributed to an underlying and a proximate base. Competing strains in India's national identity constitute the underlying base. The proximate reasons are supplied by the political circumstances of the 1980s. A mounting anxiety about the future of India has resulted from the separatist agitations of the 1980s, and from a deepening institutional and ideological vacuum in Indian politics. India's key integrative political institution since 1947, the Congress party, has gone through a profound organizational decay, with no centrist parties taking its place. And secularism, the ideological mainstay of a multireligious India, looks pale and exhausted. Claiming

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to rebuild the nation, Hindu nationalists present themselves as an institutional and ideological alternative.

Second, India's secularism looks exhausted not because secularism is intrinsically unsuited to India and must, therefore, inevitably come to grief. That is the principal claim of the highly influential recent writings by T. N. Madan and Ashis Nandy.[1] Insightful though their arguments are, Madan and Nandy do not sufficiently differentiate between different varieties of secularism. The secularism of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi was not a logical culmination of the secularism of Nehru. Politics over the last decade discredits the kind of secularism practiced by the various regimes in the 1980s. It does not discredit secularism per se.

Third, though a reaction to separatist and secular nationalisms, Hindu nationalism poses the most profound challenge to the governing principles and intellectual maps of an independent India. Hindu nationalism has two simultaneous impulses: a commitment to the territorial integrity of India as well as a *political* commitment to Hinduism. Given India's turbulent history of Hindu-Muslim relations, it is unlikely that Hindu nationalism can realize both its aims. What happens to India, therefore, depends on how powerful Hindu nationalism becomes, and the way in which this contradiction is resolved.

The national question is, of course, not the only contentious issue in India. Apart from the national order, two other orders—social and economic—have been challenged in recent times. The traditional caste hierarchy of the Hindu social order, slowly eroding due to the political equality of liberal democracy, has been explicitly confronted by politics emphasizing the mobilization of lower castes. The Fabian socialist core of the economic order is in its death throes, being attacked by an emerging market orientation and international openness in the country's economic policy. Some of this change is welcome in India, but much of it has come suddenly and simultaneously. Because of the simultaneity of change at several levels, and especially because of threats to the nation's integrity—the most serious since independence—Indian politics in recent years have been experienced by a large number of Indians as an anxiety, as a fear of the unknown, and on occasions such as the demolition of the Ayodhya mosque, even as a loss of inner coherence. A yearning for

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reequilibrating designs that can impose some order on anxieties is unmistakable. Politics remains central to this enterprise.

THE CONTEXT: THREE CONTESTING NATIONALISMS IN INDIA

> People everywhere have an idea of who they are and what they owe themselves. . . .The liberation of spirit that has come to India could not come as a release alone. . . .India was now a country of a million little mutinies. . . .But there was in India now what didn't exist 200 years before: a central will, a central intellect, a national idea. The Indian Union was greater than the sum of its parts.
>
> —V. S. Naipaul[2]

While one may disagree with Naipaul about whether a "national idea" existed in India in earlier times, he is rightly pointing to a paradox: both little mutinies and a "central" or "national idea" are surfacing at the same time. As disintegrative tendencies deepen, a sense of pan-Indian nationalism is also growing. The two tendencies—the mutinous disaggregation and a national resurgence—are fighting it out, with no clear victor at the moment. Recent accounts of India, especially the journalistic ones, have mostly concentrated on the disintegrative tendencies. The merit of Naipaul's position lies in his recognition that the political tendencies are dualistic, not unitary. It is also the kind of duality for which direct evidence, privileged in the social sciences, cannot yet be provided. No large-scale surveys exist. One has either to derive inferences from available political trends, or, like Naipaul, one has to travel, talk, hear, and see—that is, follow the method of a "writer."

Separatist nationalisms in Kashmir today and in Punjab until recently have been the most powerful expressions of the disintegrative tendency.[3] The other two varieties of nationalism—secular and Hindu—are committed to India's territorial integrity, though they seek to do it in different ways.

The three nationalisms do not have the same conception of the nation. Separatist nationalists claim that Sikhs and Kashmiris are not part of the Indian nation. They are nations by themselves. Their point is not simply that there is something distinctive about the Sikh and Kashmiri identities that separates them from India; rather, to use Ernest Gellner's words, "the political and the national unit should be congruent."[4] A nation is not merely a cultural

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configuration; it means investing a cultural community with sovereignty, and, at the very least, with political autonomy.[5]

These movements, then, are not mere ethnic assertions. Ethnicity as a term designates a sense of collective belonging, which may be based on common descent, language, history, or even religion (or some combination of these).[6] An ethnic group may function without a state of its own; a nation implies bringing ethnicity and statehood together. In principle, this congruence may be satisfied in a federal arrangement, in which case the concerned nationalism becomes a subnationalism or an ethnicity. The larger federal entity, then, has the highest claims on that group's loyalty. Alternatively, one may opt for nothing short of sovereignty. That is what Sikh nationalists aimed at and Kashmiri nationalists are still fighting for. A Bengali can be both a Bengali and an Indian, so can a Gujarati. Bengalis and Gujaratis are ethnic groups: for separatists, Sikhs and Kashmiris are nations. However, for Indian nationalists—both secular and Hindu—the Sikhs and Kashmiris are ethnic groups, not nations.

The separatists, of course, may not succeed in their aims, in which case they may settle for the status of a state in the Indian federation. Sikh nationalism seems to have entered this phase already. It is important to remember, however, that the Sikh uprising was not simply a cultural battle for a separate identity; it was a political battle for nationhood. A nation, to repeat, is not just a cultural community; rather, it is a sovereign cultural community.

Unlike separatist nationalisms, secular nationalism, the official doctrine of India's national identity since independence, seeks to preserve the geographical integrity of India. In principle, it includes all ethnic and religious groups in its definition of the nation, and respects their beliefs and cultures. Giving security to the various ethnic and religious groups is considered part of nation-building. One can be a good Muslim or a good Bengali and a good Indian at the same time.

That, to Hindu nationalists, is the opposite of nation-building. A salad bowl does not produce cohesion; a melting pot does.[7] Hinduism, to Hindu nationalists, is the source of India's identity. It alone can provide national cohesiveness. This claim inevitably begs the question: Who is a Hindu? Savarkar, the ideological father of Hindu nationalism, explains: "A Hindu means a person who regards this land. . .from the Indus to the Seas as his fatherland as well as his

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Holyland."[8] The definition is territorial (land between the Indus and the Seas), genealogical ("fatherland"), and religious ("holyland"). Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists can be part of this definition, for they meet all three criteria. All these religions were born in India. Christians, Jews, Parsis, and Muslims, however, can meet only two criteria. India is not their "holyland."

Can non-Hindu groups be part of India? Yes, but only by assimilation, say the Hindu nationalists. Of the groups whose holyland is not India, Parsis and Jews are, according to Hindu nationalists, already assimilated, having become part of the nation's mainstream.[9] With the departure of the British, Christianity also lost its political edge, being no longer associated with foreign rulers. Ultimately, Muslims became the principal adversary of the Hindu nationalists, in part because of their numbers, but also because a Muslim homeland in the form of Pakistan caused India's partition in 1947. Twenty-five percent of pre-1947 India was Muslim. Even after the formation of Pakistan, Muslims remained the largest minority, constituting about 12 percent of the country's population today. This explains, in part, the enormous attention given to Islam by Hindu nationalists.

The Hindu nationalist claim is not that Muslims ought to be excluded from the Indian nation. While that may be the position of Hindu extremists,[10] the generic Hindu nationalist argument is that to become part of the Indian nation, Muslims must agree to the following: *1)* accept the centrality of Hinduism to Indian civilization; *2)* acknowledge key Hindu figures such as Ram as civilizational heroes, and not regard them as mere religious figures of Hinduism; *3)* accept that Muslim rulers in various parts of India (between roughly 1000 to 1857) destroyed the pillars of Hindu civilization, especially Hindu Temples; and *4)* make no claims to special privileges such as the maintenance of religious personal laws, nor demand special state grants for their educational institutions. They must assimilate, not maintain their distinctiveness. Through *Ekya* (assimilation), they will prove their loyalty to the nation.[11] It is interesting to note that the Muslim politicians who have accepted this argument—for example, Sikandar Bakht and Arif Beg—have been members of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), the principal political party representing the ideology of Hindu nationalism in the electoral arena.[12]

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Hindu nationalism thus has two simultaneous impulses: building a united India as well as "Hinduizing" the polity and the nation. Muslims and other groups are not excluded from the definition of India, but inclusion is premised upon assimilation, on acceptance of the political and cultural centrality of Hinduism. If assimilation is not acceptable to the minorities, Hindu nationalism becomes exclusionary, both in principle and practice.

Created in 1925 in the state of Maharashtra, the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS, National Voluntary Corp) is the institutional core of Hindu nationalism.[13] The ideological trend, however, goes much further back. Viewed as a way to resurrect India's cultural pride, Hindu revivalism in the second half of the nineteenth century was a response to British rule. This revivalism preceded the national movement headed by the Congress party in the first half of the twentieth century, but it could not dominate the movement itself.[14] There were two principal modes in the national movement: Nehru's secularism and Mahatma Gandhi's Hinduism. Nehru's hostility to religion is well-known. Even a devoutly religious Gandhi could not be called a Hindu nationalist. He was a Hindu and a nationalist, not a Hindu nationalist. Gandhi's Hinduism was inclusive and tolerant. Being a good Hindu and having respect for other religions were not contradictory.[15] Inclusion of non-Hindus in the Indian nation followed as a corollary of this position. Gandhi's love for Muslims even during the formation of Pakistan was, for Hindu nationalists, incomprehensible. In 1948, when a Hindu fanatic assassinated Gandhi, Hindu nationalism was set back by decades. In popular perception, Hindu nationalists killed the Mahatma, the father of the nation.[16] Many in the post-1948 generation were told by their parents to keep a safe distance from Hindu nationalists.

A weak political force for a century, Hindu nationalism has acquired unprecedented political strength since the mid-1980s. At no point before 1989 did the Hindu nationalists receive even a tenth of the national vote. The average was 7 percent. In 1989, this share increased to 11.4 percent, and, in 1991, to over 20 percent. Electorally confined to northern and western India, Hindu nationalism has politically penetrated all parts of India, including the South and the East. In the southern state of Karnataka, it won nearly 29 percent of the vote in 1991.[17] In Gujarat, Mahatma Gandhi's home state in western India, its share of the vote in 1991 was a remarkable 51

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percent. The 1991 elections brought BJP governments to power in four states: Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh. Of these, Uttar Pradesh is the biggest state in India, and Madhya Pradesh among the biggest.

Equally important, by 1991 support for Hindu nationalism had gone beyond the urban trading community, its customary base, to include villagers and the modernized (and modernizing) middle classes.[18] Hardly known for Hindu religiosity and Westernized in their daily life, nearly thirty retired generals, including a Jewish former general, joined the BJP in 1991. So did a host of former civil servants. For a party customarily associated with obscurantism, it was a moment of great symbolic significance. The BJP savored the moment and proudly displayed its modern recruits.

It is not clear whether the demolition of the Babri mosque in December of 1992 will ultimately hurt or strengthen the Hindu nationalists.[19] That something as inconceivable as the mass demolition of a mosque could be undertaken and executed as a political project demonstrates, in and of itself, the new mobilizing capacity of this ideology.[20] The assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 was the last politically critical act of Hindu nationalism, but that was not a manifestation of its organized strength nor an expression of its capacity to mobilize the masses. It was an insane act of an angry individual who was motivated by the ideology of Hindu nationalism.[21]

THREE STRAINS AND TWO IMAGINATIONS: INDIA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY AND HINDU NATIONALISM

Who is an Indian? Deceptively simple, the question is hard to answer, as indeed it is with respect to several other nations in the world.[22] Literature on comparative nationalism suggests that national identities have historically been based on several principles of collective belonging: ethnicity (Japan, Italy, Germany, and much of Europe), religion (Ireland, Pakistan, and parts of the Middle East), ideology (successfully in the United States, unsuccessfully in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), and territory (Spain, Switzerland, and a number of Third World nations).[23] One should note that the territorial idea inevitably becomes part of all nation-states, but territory does not have to be the defining principle of national identity.[24]

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Moreover, in some cases, there may be no clear principle of collective belonging. Rather, competing notions of identity may exist, one of which becomes dominant at one time, the other at another time. As Stanley Hoffmann argues, there are two competing views about the French identity. One is based on the French Revolution and the principles of freedom and equality, which bring French national identity quite close to the definition of the American nation. A second one is based on quasi-ethnicity (conceptualized as history and heritage), which in French history leads to the Vichy regime and to Le Pen today.[25] In the United States, as Samuel Huntington has argued, the key constituents of the "American creed"—liberty, equality, individualism, democracy, and the rule of law— have not always existed together, nor can they possibly, for they do not form a coherent logical set.[26]

What turns on the distinctive principles of national identity? Their political implications vary. Some of the most passionate political moments of America have been over the issues of freedom and equality, just as those of Germany have been over ethnicity. Similarly, competing strains in national identity open up distinctive political logics. Excessive drift in one direction brings forth a reaction, and competing strains begin to acquire political momentum. A rising number of French people today are feeling threatened by the increasing ethnic diversity of France, which is conceptualized by some as a monoethnic society, a conception opposed by others as too narrow and destructive of the principles of the Republic.[27] In American history, as Huntington has argued, "Conflicts easily materialize when any one value is taken to an extreme: majority rule versus minority rights; higher law versus popular sovereignty; liberty versus equality; individualism versus democracy."[28]

Since the rise of the Indian national movement, three competing themes about India—territorial, cultural, and religious—have fought for political dominance. The territorial notion is that India has a "sacred geography," enclosed between the Indus river, the Himalayas, and the Seas, and emphasized for twenty-five hundred years since the time of the Mahabharata.[29] The cultural notion is that ideas of tolerance, pluralism, and syncretism define Indian society. India is not only the birthplace of several religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism), but in its history it has also regularly received, accommodated, and absorbed "outsiders" (Parsis, Jews, and "Syrian"

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Christians—followers of St. Thomas, arriving as early as the second century, thus Christianity reached India before it reached Europe). In the process, syncretistic forms of culture and even syncretistic forms of religious worship[30] have emerged and become part of India. Apart from syncretism, which means a coming together and merging of cultures, pluralism and tolerance have also existed with different communities finding their niche in India and developing principles of interaction.[31] *Sarva Dharma Sambhava* (equal respect for all religions) is the best cultural expression of such pluralism. Finally, the religious notion is that India is originally the land of the Hindus, and it is the only land which the Hindus can call their own. India has the Hindu holy places (Benaras, Tirupati, Rameswaram, Puri, Haridwar, Badrinath, Kedarnath, and now Ayodhya) and the holy rivers (Cauveri, Ganga, Yamuna, and the confluence of the last two in Prayag). Most of India is, and has been, Hindu by religion[32]—anywhere between 65 to 70 percent in the early twentieth century and 82 percent today. A great deal of ethnic diversity may exist within Hindu society: a faith in Hinduism brings the diversity together. India viewed in this fashion is a Hindu nation.[33]

The three identity principles have their political equivalents. In political discourse, the territorial idea is called "national unity" or "territorial integrity"; the cultural idea is expressed as "political pluralism"; and the religious idea is known as *Hindutva,*[34] or political Hinduism. The political notion of pluralism itself has two meanings, dealing with the linguistic and religious issues. The principle of federalism was developed to respect the linguistic diversity of India: not only would the states be organized linguistically but the ruling party would also be federally organized, leaving enough autonomy for state-level party units. The political principle about religion has two levels. In general, religion would be left untouched so that religious pluralism in society could exist, but if the state did have to intervene in religious disputes, it would do so with strict neutrality. The state would maintain a posture of equidistance, a principle that came to define India's secularism.

These three strains have yielded two principal imaginations about India's national identity—the secular nationalist and the Hindu nationalist. The former combines territory and culture; the latter religion and territory. For the secular nationalist construction, the best source is Jawaharlal Nehru's *The Discovery of India.* Syncretism,

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pluralism, and tolerance are the main themes of Nehru's recalling of India's history:

> Ancient India, like ancient China, was a world in itself, a culture and a civilization which gave shape to all things. Foreign influences poured in and often influenced that culture and were absorbed. Disruptive tendencies gave rise immediately to an attempt to find a synthesis. Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. That unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a standardization. . .of beliefs. It was something deeper and, within its fold, the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practised and every variety acknowledged and even encouraged.[35]

Notice that Nehru, unlike Hindu nationalists, finds unity in culture, not in religion.[36] He has no conception of a "holyland." Ashoka, Kabir, Guru Nanak, Amir Khusro, Akbar, and Gandhi—all syncretistic or pluralistic figures, subscribing to a variety of Indian faiths[37]—are the heroes of India's history in *The Discovery of India,* while Aurangzeb, the intolerant Moghul, "puts the clock back."[38]

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the difference between culture and religion is to cite Nehru's will. Nehru wanted his ashes scattered in the Ganga, not because it was religiously necessary but because it was culturally appropriate:

> When I die, I should like my body to be cremated. . .A small handful of (my) ashes should be thrown into the Ganga. . .My desire to have a handful of my ashes thrown into the Ganga at Allahabad has no religious significance, so far as I am concerned. I have been attached to the Ganga and Jamuna rivers in Allahabad ever since my childhood and, as I have grown older, this attachment has grown. . . .The Ganga, especially, is the river of India, beloved of her people, round which are intertwined. . .her hopes and fears, her songs of triumph, her victories and her defeats. She has been a symbol of India's age-long culture and civilization, ever-changing, ever-flowing, and yet ever the same Ganga. . . .Ganga has been to me a symbol and a memory of the past of India, running into the present and flowing on the great ocean of the future.[39]

To religious Hindus, the river Ganga is sacred. To Nehru, it was part of India's culture, and equally dear. The sacredness was not literal, but metaphorical. Similarly, India's geography was sacred, not literally but metaphorically. The emotions and attachment

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generated by the geography were equally intense. To draw a parallel, one does not have be a religious Jew to celebrate and love the land of Israel. Secular Jews can also do that. Consider how Nehru narrates the geography of India—as territory and topos, not as a holyland:

> When I think of India, I think of broad fields dotted with innumerable small villages. . .of the magic of the rainy season which pours life into the dry parched-up land and converts it suddenly into a glistening expanse of beauty and greenery, or great rivers and flowing water. . . of the southern tip of India. . . .and above all, of the Himalayas, snow-capped, or some mountain valley in Kashmir in the spring, covered with new flowers, and with a brook bubbling and gurgling through it.[40]

As discussed earlier, multiple strains of a national identity have their own political implications. An excessive shift towards one of the strains produces a reaction. Let us take secular nationalism as an example. If secular nationalists violate the principle of pluralism—let us say, by attacking federalism on the argument that too much federalism weakens national unity— they undermine a serious principle of the nation itself, and begin to generate a reaction. Such attacks do not correspond to the concerned state's view of national identity, which has a place for regional identity as well. A man from Tamilnadu is both a Tamilian and an Indian. Sometimes the reaction takes the form of separatist agitations. And these agitations, in turn, generate concern about territorial integrity. The centralizing solution thus worsens the disease. Indira Gandhi repeatedly undermined federalism on the grounds of "national integrity," only to generate separatist nationalisms.

On the other hand, one can also go too far in protecting pluralism. Kashmir was given a special status in the Indian Constitution. Delhi was to be responsible only for foreign affairs, defense, communications, and the currency; the state government would handle the rest. Other Indian states had fewer powers. The Kashmir arrangement, thus, had the potential of contradicting the territorial principle if Kashmiris claimed they were still unhappy. Nehru loved Kashmir and was instrumental in shaping its special status, but he himself had to deploy force to quell Sheikh Abdullah's vacillations between India and independence.[41] A second form of pluralism

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deemed excessive and therefore harmful for national integrity concerns "personal laws." Should the various religious groups in India be under a common civil code or under their distinct religious laws? If secular nationalists claim that separate personal laws destroy national unity, they generate a reaction in the religious community whose personal laws are at issue. If, on the other hand, they promote personal laws on the argument that such concessions make minorities secure, they set off a reaction in the majority community that the state may have gone too far in minority appeasement, opening up fissiparous tendencies and undermining national unity.[42]

Since the territorial principle is drawn from a belief in ancient heritage, encapsulated in the notion of "sacred geography," and figures in both imaginations, it has acquired political hegemony over time. It is the only thing in common between the two competing nationalist imaginations. Therefore, just as America's most passionate political moments concern freedom and equality, India's most explosive moments concern its "sacred geography," the 1947 partition being the most obvious example. Whenever the threat of another breakup, another partition, looms, it unleashes remarkable passions in politics. Politics based on this imagination is quite different from what was seen when Malaysia and Singapore split from each other in the 1960s, or when the Czech and Slovak Republics separated in 1992. Territory not being such an inalienable part of their national identity, these territorial divorces were not desecrations. In India, however, they become desecrations of the sacred geography.

If national identities are imaginations (though not unreal for that reason),[43] an important counterfactual question remains to be answered. Why did secular nationalists not put the ideas of pluralism, tolerance, and syncretism at the heart of India's definition, so that the territorial idea was displaced? Why could it not be a purely cultural imagination of tolerance, pluralism, and syncretism which in principle could be a solution for the tensions between territory and culture? Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation, embodied these ideas in his person and politics.[44] That, however, was a source of strength as well as an impediment. Gandhi, a devout Hindu both in his private and public life, used religion to mobilize the masses in the national movement, turning a movement confined to the educated and anglicized upper middle classes into a mass movement in the 1920s. Given Gandhi's religiosity, these ideas got inextricably

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entangled with Hinduism, making them suspect in the eyes of many Muslims. For Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, Indian nationalism under Gandhi was Hindu nationalism. The nonviolent, inclusive mass movement created a nation and shook the British, but the religious foundations of mass politics led also to Hindu-Muslim riots.

Because pluralism, syncretism, and tolerance became associated with Gandhi and Hinduism, the secularists in their construction of national identity sought to escape the religious trappings. The political challenge consisted in putting these ideas at the heart of India's definition, making them part of India's dominant political discourse without linking them to Hinduism—that is, explicitly defending them as inalienable parts of Indian culture common to all religious traditions and communities of India. It is conceivable that a secular Nehru and his colleagues might have undertaken this challenge. They did not. Nehru sought instead a solution in modernity and economic development: big dams became "temples of the modern age." Believing that all interpretations of India's past would generate controversy, that creating a national idea in terms of India's past was inherently problematic, he tried to make modernization and economic development the basis for national identity, something on which presumably everyone could agree. National identity, by this reading, could dissociate itself from a common past or from common origins, and gravitate towards a common future or a common purpose. Let us forget the traditional past, let us build a modern future: this was Nehru's political refrain. State policy, institutions, and ideological discourse, Nehru thought, would deepen the nation's commitment to modernity. As a consequence, the historically derived ideas of pluralism and tolerance became the implicit idiom of Nehruvian politics: while they informed his political conduct, they were not explicitly articulated as the basis of India's national identity. Politics since Nehru has paid even less attention to the principles of pluralism and tolerance.

From Religion versus Culture to Religion as Culture

Finding a blending of territory and pluralism insufficient, the Hindu nationalists argue that politics, laws, and institutions do not make a nation. Emotions and loyalty do. Pluralism in the secular view is embodied in laws (such as personal laws and the protection of

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minority educational institutions) and in political institutions (such as federalism). According to Hindu nationalists, laws can always be politically manipulated,[45] and a proliferation of prominority laws has not led to the building of a cohesive nation. Instead, "fissiparous tendencies" have regularly erupted. Rather than running away from Hinduism, which is the source of India's culture, one should explicitly ground politics in Hinduism, not in laws and institutions:

> The Hindu *Rashtra* [nation] is essentially cultural in content, whereas the so-called secular concept pertains to the state and is limited to the territorial and political aspects of the Nation. [T]he mere territorial-cum-political concept divorced from its cultural essence can never be expected to impart any sanctity to the country's unity. The emotional binding of the people can be furnished only by culture and once that is snapped then there remains no logical argument against the demand by any part to separate itself from the country.[46]

In their conception of Hinduism, Hindu nationalists fluctuate between two meanings of Hinduism—Hinduism as a culture (as the above quotation suggests), and Hinduism as a religion. "Hindu is not the name of a religious faith like the Muslim and the Christian; it denotes the national life here," declares Sheshadri, a top-ranking RSS leader. In the same vein, Advani, President of the BJP, once argued that since Hinduism is the description of the nation, Muslims could be called Muslim Hindus, Sikhs could be called Sikh Hindus, and Christians could be called Christian Hindus.[47]

However, when Hindu nationalists make speeches for the liberation of Lord Ram's birthplace, the phraseology is imbued with religious imagery, and the rituals are *sanatani* (religious in an idol-worshipping sense). It is not at all clear what the intended distinction between religion and culture is for Hindu nationalists. While they are correct that the term Hindu, in its original meaning, meant those who lived in Hindustan (the everyday term for India in much of the North), over the last few centuries the term "Hindu" has become a religious term, and "Indian" has replaced "Hindu" for the civilizational meaning.[48] Labels acquire new meanings in history.

For a secular nationalist, the two terms—religion and culture—are clearly separable: syncretism and tolerance are properties of all religions and communities in India, and not simply of Hinduism. A celebration of Indian culture does not require one to be a Hindu.

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For Hindu nationalists, the two terms—India and Hindu—are synonymous. They make no special attempts to incorporate Muslim symbols into their conceptions of culture. The Hindu nationalist attitude to the great Moghul monuments such as the Taj Mahal remains unclear. Many object even to the Muslim names of North Indian cities: Aligarh, they say, should be called Harigarh, Allahabad Prayag, and Lucknow Lakshmanpur.[49] In *Hindutva,* the cultural and religious meanings of Hinduism blend into each other, and the distinction so critical for the secular nationalist disappears.

The Hindu nationalist discourse on Islam is selective and ominous. In India, Islam developed two broad forms: syncretist and exclusivist. Syncretistic Islam integrated into the preexisting Indian culture, just as Indonesian Muslims retained their pre-Islamic heritage of Ramayana and Mahabharata. Exclusivist Islam may be a personal faith, or may also enter the political sphere, becoming an ideology, sometimes displaying fundamentalist qualities.[50] Syncretistic Islam has produced some of the pillars of Indian culture, music, poetry, and literature. It is not possible to conceptualize India's culture today if Muslim influences are completely excluded. Moreover, Indian Muslims have also fought wars against Pakistan. By generating an anti-Muslim discourse, Hindu nationalists threaten embittering 110 million Muslims permanently, including those syncretistic in their religiosity and culture, and also those for whom Islam is a faith, a way to sustain troubled private lives, but not a political ideology. One may argue that the political and ideological battle of nationalists is against Islamic fundamentalism and Muslim separatism. How can it be against all those who profess faith in Islam? In the Hindu nationalist discourse, these distinctions easily blur. An anti-Muslim hysteria is its natural outcome.

It should now be clear why secular and Hindu nationalisms are ideological adversaries, and have remained so for decades. In an ingenious way, Mahatma Gandhi sought to combine the two. Tolerance and pluralism, he argued, stemmed from his belief in Hinduism. Being a Hindu and having respect for Muslim culture could easily go together. Frequently referring to his appreciation of Christianity, Buddhism, and Jainism, he never defined India as a Hindu nation.[51] The nation, he argued, should incorporate all religions; being a Muslim in no way excluded one from being an Indian.

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Gandhi, of course, succeeded and failed. India acquired its political identity and independence, but he was unable to persuade Jinnah and the Muslim League from creating Pakistan. "Midnight's Children," independent India and Pakistan, were born together. Gandhi's failure to prevent the partition of India sent two signals. To the secular nationalists, it highlighted the antinomy between religion and Indian nationalism. To the Hindu nationalists, it reinforced their belief in the complementarity between Hinduism and the Indian nation on the one hand, and a basic antinomy between Islam and Indian nationalism on the other. Since Gandhi's death, therefore, Hindu and secular nationalisms have been locked in a conflict for political power and for the ideological shaping of India. The first battle for political and ideological hegemony after independence was won by secular nationalism; the battle today is not so clearly in favor of secular nationalists. The context since the 1980s has changed.

HAS THE "SECULAR PROJECT" UNRAVELED?

The Organizational Decay of the Congress Party

In twentieth-century India, the principal organizational embodiment of secular nationalism has been the Congress party. Once a powerful organization associated with the founding and building of the nation, the Congress party is today a rusty, clay-footed colossus. Nations, as we know, are politically created; they do not naturally exist. Just as peasants were turned into Frenchmen over the course of many years,[52] the Congress attempted to turn an old civilization into a nation in the first half of the early twentieth century. Of the other large multiethnic countries in the world,[53] the Communists in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia also sought to create nations, but not on the basis of conciliation and democracy. Because their nation-building was based on coercion, it was not clear how deeply a Croat felt for Yugoslavia, or how ardent a Georgian or a Balt was for the Soviet Union.[54] The Congress party mobilized the masses into a national movement, generated pride and belief in India, and, most of all, maintained an ideology of nonviolence, an ideology that emphasized that even the British were to be politically defeated, not killed. While violence erupted periodically, it was not the

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cornerstone of the national movement. The mobilization lasted almost three decades. As a result, the idea of India as a nation reached every part of India. By the 1930s and 1940s, Gandhi, Nehru, and the Congress party were everywhere. In Punjab, the site of an insurgency until recently, they were viewed as local folk. In today's insurgent Kashmir, a Hindu-Muslim-Sikh coalition openly embraced Gandhi even as the rest of India was burning with communal violence over partition. The emergence of Pakistan was the greatest failure of the Congress. The Muslim League could not be won over. Nor could the Muslim League win over all Muslims in the subcontinent, in good part because of the interreligious idea of India so painstakingly promoted by the Congress party.

Under Indira Gandhi (1969–1984) and Rajiv Gandhi (1985–1991), the Congress declined as an institution. Electoral success coexisted with organizational emaciation. The organizational decay of the Congress coincides with Indira Gandhi's rise to unquestioned power by the early 1970s. Nehru had used his charisma to promote intraparty democracy, not to undermine it, strengthening the organization in the process. Indira Gandhi used her charisma to make the party utterly dependent on her, suspending intraparty democracy and debate, and weakening the organization as a result. Nehru's ideological positions were openly debated in party forums, and sometimes rejected. Party elections regularly produced state-level leaders; their democratic victories, even when disagreeable, were respected. Indira Gandhi imposed her positions on the party. She would suspend the state-level leaders if they dared to oppose her; she would not allow the state unit to elect its leader. Since this could not be done in a party that elected its office holders, she finally did away with party elections.[55] She also tried to suspend national elections, but that attempt failed miserably.[56]

By the late 1980s, there was an organizational and ideological vacuum in Indian politics. Organizationally, the Congress was listless. Ideologically, it was not obvious what it stood for. Professing secularism, its leaders were unafraid to use religion for political purposes. Professing socialism, some of its leaders wholeheartedly embraced the market. The Congress is no longer a party but an undifferentiated, unanchored medley of individuals sustained by patronage. What is worse, most opposition parties have followed

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the Congress' lead. They do not have organizational elections either, nor for that matter do they show ideological cohesion.

There have been two major exceptions to this institutional rot: the Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPM) and the BJP. The class-based mobilization of the CPM has some inherent limitations in India, making it hard for the CPM to extend its popularity beyond isolated pockets. At the national level, the discipline of the BJP may emerge as an alternative to the Congress. If the available reports are correct, the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya was the party's first major failure in discipline.[57] Before that, the BJP came increasingly to be associated with a party that could claim discipline, probity, principles, and organization. Having not been in government for long,[58] it was not tainted with a lust for power or corruption. Most politicians and parties looked hopelessly compromised by the end of the 1980s. It is to be seen whether these images of the BJP will survive the Ayodhya imbroglio.

Secularism as a Modernist Ideology

> It is not modern India which has tolerated Judaism in India for nearly 2,000 years, Christianity from before the time it went to Europe, and Zorastrianism for more than 1,200 years; it is traditional India which has shown such tolerance. . . .As India gets modernized, religious violence is increasing. . .In the earlier centuries, inter-religious riots were rare and localized. . . .[S]omewhere and somehow, religious violence has something to do with the urban-industrial vision of life and with the political process the vision lets loose.
>
> —Ashis Nandy[59]

> Social analysts draw attention to the contradiction between the undoubted though slow spread of secularization in everyday life, on the one hand, and the unmistakable rise of fundamentalism, on the other. But surely these phenomena are only apparently contradictory, for in truth it is the marginalization of faith, which is what secularism is, that permits the perversion of religion. There are no fundamentalists or revivalists in traditional society.
>
> —T. N. Madan[60]

With these words written by T. N. Madan and Ashis Nandy, a powerful argument against secularism has emerged in India in recent years. India's secularism is collapsing, according to the antisecularist view, not because it has not gone far enough, but

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because it has gone too far. Secularism is a victim of its official success.

The antisecularist argument proceeds at two levels—a larger theoretical level and an India-specific level. The theoretical attack on secularism is embedded in the generic critique of modernity, now so common in the disciplines of anthropology, literary criticism, and history (especially of the developing world). Secularism, in this view, is a necessary concomitant of the project of modernity, science, and rationality. Modernity is viewed as facing serious political difficulties all over the world, leading to religious (and ethnic) revivals. The basic flaw of modernity, according to this view, is that it mocks the believer for his morality, but it provides no alternative conception of what the purpose of life is, what the good life is, or how we should conduct ourselves in our families and communities. Politics founded on such a modernist, secular vision suffers from irremediable defects. No means are considered detestable enough so long as they facilitate the realization of political ends. Holding nothing sacred, lacking an alternative source of ethics, and having no internal restraints on political behavior, modernity and secularism denude politics of morality. Because human beings cannot live without notions of right and wrong, the secular and modernist project creates increasing popular skepticism. Moreover, because it also generates condescension toward religion, secularism puts the believer on the defensive, setting off a religious reaction.

Pointing to the origins of secularism, the antisecularists also argue that it is a Western concept with foundations in the Enlightenment and Reformation. The Enlightenment heralded the supremacy of reason over belief, and, by making the individual responsible for his salvation without the intermediation of the Church, the rise of Protestantism made the separation of the state and Church possible. Secularism became embedded in Western culture. There is no similar civilizational niche for secularism in India. Religion was, and remains today, the ultimate source of morality and meaning for most Indians. Communal riots never took place in traditional India, for traditional religiosity allowed for principles of religious tolerance and coexistence. Modernity, however, has led to two results in the realm of religion and politics. Because of the link between secularism and amoral politics, communal riots in India have increased with the advent of modernity. And because

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secularism places the believer on the defensive, fundamentalism and secularism have become two sides of the same coin. Principles of tolerance will have to be derived from traditional India in the manner of Mahatma Gandhi, not from modernist secularism as Nehru did.

This is not the place to engage in an argument about the relationship between modernity and morality. For purposes of this paper, the application of "modernist logic" to Indian politics is more pertinent. It will suffice to note that the view that modernity and secularism lead to a moral and spiritual vacuum in human life is philosophically grounded in the Counter-Enlightenment. The themes of the Counter-Enlightenment continue to reverberate in several fields of knowledge: literature, philosophy, social sciences, and surprisingly, even in the natural sciences.[61] Moreover, several leading students of rationality accept the claim that rationality (and science) are morally neutral. As Albert Einstein argued, science and rationality are essentially about "is," not about "ought." Unless morally grounded, rationality can indeed be destructive. Embedded in moral ends, however, it can make a remarkable contribution to human life. Nuclear energy, according to Einstein, is the best example of this reasoning.[62]

The antisecularists may indeed be right that modernity is morally neutral. It does not follow, however, that modernity (or secularism) therefore leads to intolerance and violence. Given contrasting conceptions of truth, religiously driven men may also be intolerant and violent, notwithstanding the morality of each religious system. Moral men do not necessarily make a tolerant society if there are multiple and exclusive conceptions of morality.

The antisecularists do not distinguish between different types of tradition, or between the various types of modernity. Akbar, the tolerant Mughal ruler, and Aurangzeb, the intolerant one, were both products of medieval India. Akbar built bridges across communities; Aurangzeb destroyed them. Not only did he repress "infidels" (the non-Islamic religious groups), but he also sought to impose religious purity within the Muslim community, targeting "heretics" and "apostates," and killing his own brother, Dara Shikoh, in the process. Shikoh's crime was heresy: he used Islam

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to justify his attempt to combine features of Islam and Hinduism. Religion and tradition can thus be tolerant as well as brutally violent.[63]

Varieties of Secularism (and Modernity): Tolerance, Arrogance, and Innocence

Similarly, modernity and secularism can come in various forms. Two trends have marked the recent behavior of India's secular politicians. One may be called secular arrogance, the other secular innocence. Secular arrogance was best exemplified by Indira Gandhi, secular innocence by Rajiv Gandhi. Both of these variants are very different from Nehru's secularism, which can be called secular tolerance.[64] Nehru, a modernist, might have held strong reservations about religion, but his private beliefs did not translate into an arrogant abuse of religion in public life. It is principles in public life, rather than cosmologies governing private life, which are at issue. In their private lives, Nehru, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi may have all been a-religious (though there are indications that Indira Gandhi turned towards religion in the last years of her life). In their public life, however, they were profoundly different. Secular arrogance and secular innocence, associated with India's political decline of the last decade, fit the Nandy-Madan view best. It was not preordained that tolerance over time would degenerate into arrogance and innocence.

Secular arrogance is the idea that political power may be used either to co-opt the believer, or to subdue him. The believer is viewed not only as an object of modernization/secularization (an aim which a number of modernists including Nehru agreed with), but also as a pawn on the political chessboard, which modernists like Nehru never imagined. In its worst form, secular arrogance combines two drives: the use of the believer by the politician for secular, political purposes, and the wish to crush him.

This kind of process was initiated by Indira Gandhi. Her political dalliance with Sikh religious extremism in the late 1970s was dangerous. To defeat the Akali Dal, a moderate Sikh party which competed with the Congress in Punjab, she used a religious leader, Sant Bhindranwale. Religious preachers like Bhindranwale felt that the Sikh community was losing its soul, in part by the economic prosperity that the Green Revolution had brought about. Indira

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Gandhi would not concede the secular demands of the moderate Akali factions (a greater share of river waters or a larger federal investment of fiscal resources), but she conceded several demands of the religious extreme (declaring Amritsar a Holy City, banning smoking there, and allowing Sikh religious broadcasts over the state-controlled radio).[65] That was in striking contrast to the situation in the late 1950s and early 1960s when religious issues figured in Punjab politics. Nehru refused to legitimate the Master Tara Singh faction associated with a religiously based politics. Instead, he strengthened the Sant Fateh Singh faction associated with *linguistic* demands, defeating the *religious* faction in the end.[66] He would neither politically trifle with religion, despite his opposition to religion, nor would he legitimate religious leaders in politics.

Indira Gandhi used religion for political purposes; Bhindranwale used politics for his religious pursuits. She achieved a dubious success in the end. The moderate Akali factions, her rivals in party politics, were weakened, but the preacher and his men went out of control. Seeking to restore piety, Bhindranwale and his followers targeted the heretics and apostates, then the "infidels." They eventually took shelter in the Golden Temple, the Vatican of the Sikhs, and conducted their religious mission from there. Indira Gandhi finally ordered the army to invade the temple.[67]

The desecration of the Golden Temple was a transformative event in Hindu-Sikh relations. It led to Indira Gandhi's assassination by her Sikh bodyguards. June 6, 1984 (the attack on the Golden Temple) and October 31, 1984 (Indira Gandhi's assassination) began a cycle of desecration and revenge. Even the most patriotic Sikhs felt violated by her desecration of the Golden Temple. A large part of the Hindu middle class was equally revolted by the action of her Sikh bodyguards. Indira Gandhi's motivations remain unclear, although several interpretations are possible. Amoral, Machiavellian statecraft was known to be her hallmark. Weakening the moderate Akalis was her goal; the legitimacy of means was not an issue for her. Given her notion of politics and power, in all probability she imagined that state power would ultimately subdue Bhindranwale; that even after a mighty desecration, the enticements of power would either co-opt the Sikh community, or crush its "pretensions." She paid for this arrogance with her life, and it may take a long while before the Hindu-Sikh wounds are fully healed.

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Secularism as innocence can also spell danger if combined with India's definition of secularism. In India, secularism is not defined as a radical separation between the state and church.[68] The founders argued that in the Indian context, keeping the state equally distant from all religions and not letting it favor any one in public policy was the best solution.

Unlike the clarity entailed in a radical church-state separation, secularism as equidistance is a nebulous concept. *Equal distance* can also be translated as *equal proximity*. If it is alleged that the state is moving towards one particular religion, the state, to equalize the distance, can subsequently move towards other religions. Each such equalizing step may be aimed at soothing the religious communities. But the state gets more embroiled in religion. An unstable equilibrium results, breeding distrust all around. Under Nehru, equidistance was not turned into equiproximity. Under Rajiv Gandhi, it was.

The turning point was the Shah Bano case in the mid-1980s. Shah Bano, a Muslim woman, filed for maintenance after being divorced by her husband. The husband argued that maintenance was not permissible under Islamic law. Shah Bano sought protection under the country's civil law, not the Islamic personal code. The Supreme Court argued that the country's civil law overrode any personal laws.[69] Faced with a Muslim furor, Rajiv Gandhi first supported the Court. Then, to soothe Muslim feelings, he ordered his party to pass a law in parliament that made the *Shariat* (Islamic personal law) superior to the civil law in matters concerning the maintenance of divorced Muslim women. He argued that secularism required giving emotional security to the minorities. A Hindu storm consequently erupted. The Temple-Mosque site in Ayodhya, closed for years, was opened to Hindu pilgrimage and worship. The largest demonstration of Muslims seen in Delhi followed, with riots breaking out. Ostensibly trying to equalize the distance between religions, the government became more entrapped in religion.

Twisted Meanings, Embattled Symbols

The Shah Bano case gave Hindu nationalists a remarkable opportunity to press their claims on the disputed Temple-Mosque site. Hindu belief about the birthplace of Ram, argued Hindu nationalists, was enough for the construction of a Ram temple. Courts, they said,

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could not pronounce judgments on matters of faith. The government's response that civil laws were prior to religious faith (or religious laws) had become a contradiction in terms. In the Shah Bano case, after all, the superiority of religious faith over civil law had already been affirmed by the government, and the Supreme Court had been overturned. The secular contention about the superiority of law over faith could not possibly apply to only one community.

After agitating for and getting a faith-based legislation, Muslim leaders could not, without contradiction, claim the mosque. Their arguments were either religious or legal. The religious argument was that a mosque was always a mosque even if it was not in use as the disputed mosque had been for several decades. And the legal argument was that as a mosque, the building was their property and could not be destroyed. By the time L. K. Advani led the mobilization to rebuild the Ram temple in 1990, these arguments, whatever their legal validity, were becoming part of the political process where a different logic operated.[70] Arguments were not only to be made; they also had to be made acceptable to the masses in general.

It is in the political realm that the secular and Muslim leadership showed a lack of imagination, playing into the hands of Hindu nationalists. So long as the issue was presented as a mosque versus temple issue, the dispute remained religious, and could not generate a movement. But when it became a Ram versus Babur issue, which is how the BJP simultaneously presented it, it took on nationalistic overtones. Babur was unquestionably an alien conqueror; Ram was not. Babur, of Turko-Mongol descent, invaded India with an army and founded an empire. Though several of Babur's descendants, especially Emperor Akbar, blended into India's culture, Babur himself remains an outsider in popular imagination. Contrariwise, though no Hindu god is uniformly popular all over India, for all of Hinduism's pantheism, Ram is one of the most popular. His popularity has made him both a religious and cultural figure. The Ramayana (the tale of Ram) is the most popular epic, especially in North India. An annual and popular enactment of the tale of Ram (*Ramlila*) in which many Muslims have traditionally participated, makes Ram a part of everyday culture in much of India. One does not have to be religious to experience culturally the Ramayana in India.

Muslim and secular leadership dwelled on the religious meaning of Ayodhya, and refused to encounter the second, nationalistic

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meaning. The various mosque-action committees (and the secular historians) initially argued that Ram was a mythological figure; there was no historical proof either for Ram's existence or for his birthplace. This was a gratuitous argument. Core beliefs of many religions flourish without proof. How can one *prove* that Prophet Mohammed's hair was brought to a mosque in Sri Nagar: Muslims of Kashmir believe so. Similarly, how can one prove that Buddha left his tooth in Sri Lanka, or that Jesus was born of a virgin. Religious belief does not depend on rational evidence. If the *Shariat* was the word of God for which no proof was required—as the Muslim leaders had claimed in the Shah Bano controversy—how could proof be sought for a Hindu belief?

The problem was compounded by three more facts. First, it is widely known that the disputed mosque had not been used for the last several decades. Second, mosques are known to have been moved in the past, even in Muslim countries. By repeatedly attacking an article of faith over a mosque not used for decades, the mosque-action committees and Muslim leadership gave the appearance of utter intransigence. Was Babur so much more important than Ram in India? The question was repeatedly asked by a large number of Hindus, many of them nonreligious.[71]

Finally, while the Muslim leadership was conducting its struggle to save the Babri mosque, some of the most visible leaders of the Muslim community, for example, Shahabuddin and Imam Bukhari, gave a call for the boycott of India's Republic Day. The aim, according to them, was to draw attention to their demands. This strategy was symbolically disastrous not only for Hindu nationalists, but for a large number of secular Indians. The fight was presumably with Hindu bigotry, not with India as a nation. The Republic Day was a matter of pride for the entire nation, not simply for the Hindus. Some of India's Muslim leaders did indeed reject the call for a boycott. Unfortunately, the most visible leaders continued undeterred. There were also moments when Shahabuddin tried to identify with Sikh militants who were bent upon undermining the nation.

As I have argued, Indian Islam has taken syncretistic as well as separatist forms. Most Muslims are syncretistic in their culture, if not in their religious beliefs. Why Muslim leadership did not reflect the cultural syncretism of Indian Muslims but chose instead dangerous

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symbolic politics is an unresolved puzzle. A reaction against the existing Muslim leadership may well be emerging, rooted in the increasing realization that Muslim leadership in India has not taken good care of the Muslim community.[72]

The context, thus, provided muscle to the BJP's critique of the actually existing secularism in India. Secularism in India, Advani argues, is a pseudosecularism; it has meant excessive appeasement of minorities, or what he calls "minorityism." The argument is both right and wrong, but the wrong side was scarcely noticed in the politics of the late 1980s.

Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, and Buddhists, added to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (nonreligious minorities, nonetheless viewed as minorities), constitute more than 37 percent of India's electorate.[73] In a "first-past-the-post" British-style parliamentary system, a 40 percent vote can easily translate into 50 to 60 percent of the legislative seats. Since, according to conventional wisdom, the fractious majority community does not vote as a bloc but the minorities do, there is a temptation in the system for power-seeking centrist parties to develop prominority programs. Purely in an electoral sense, therefore, India's political system does indeed gravitate towards the minorities, though the minorities may feel that this is not enough, and there is some justice in their claim.

Whatever the objective truth—if there is one—the problem of perceptions dominates the discussion. Minorities are visible in India's upper political, bureaucratic, and cultural layers. Roman Catholics and Sikhs have led the armed forces of India. General Jacob, a famous Jewish general, led India to victory in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. Muslims have regularly occupied positions in the Cabinet. The man who produced India's first medium-range missile is a Muslim. The man who leads the national cricket team, a sport that generates national hysteria, is a Muslim. Muslims are among the leading classical musicians of the country. Muslim film stars have been role models, even for Hindu youth. Minority educational institutions have legal privileges, enjoying special grants from the government. The Constitution gives Kashmir, India's only Muslim-majority state, a special status, making several federal laws inapplicable there even as the rest of the states are bound by these laws. Finally, in 1986, the government, on political grounds, overruled the Supreme Court by declaring that Muslim personal law was superior to the

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country's civil law in matters of marriage and divorce, and no Muslim woman could opt out of it without leaving the faith itself.[74] If Muslims remain unhappy, many secularists and Muslim politicians argue, the state ought to do more.

The same set of facts, however, is used to present the BJP story. Muslim film and sports stars, musicians, and scientists are proof that talent matters irrespective of religion and that a largely Hindu society may not be unfair. This argument has a serious flaw. The BJP forgets that Muslims, despite these special provisions, are among the poorest and least educated community in the country. Often, they are also the object of police brutality in riots.

The problem of perceptions boils down to how many concessions to the minorities are sufficient. There is no objective answer to this question, in India or elsewhere. Muslim politicians and secularists point to the economic backwardness of Muslims and argue for greater assistance. The BJP points to the visibility of minorities in India's political and cultural life, saying that enough is enough.

When secularism was equated with secular tolerance and legitimated by Nehru's principled behavior, arguments that it was the responsibility of the majority community to make minorities secure could be openly made.[75] Despite such open arguments in favor of minorities, Hindu nationalists were not able to win against Nehru. When principled secularism—not legitimating religion in political mobilization but maintaining a concern for minority welfare—was replaced by unprincipled secularism, the secular project began to unravel.

This weakening does not disprove the worth of secularism as a political principle, as Nandy and Madan have argued. Morality and meaning in politics, first of all, do not have to emerge from religion; they can also emerge from a modernist, liberal conception of ethics. Nehru was moral as well as a-religious. Moreover, nonreligious ethical behavior can also be politically legitimated, even in societies marked by intense religiosity. Secularism by itself thus does not make one amoral or unethical. If this is how secular politicians of the 1980s behaved, it is not what secularism as a principle entails. This distinction is crucial for explaining the events of the last decade.

If the India of the 1990s did not follow from Nehru's secularism, is reviving Nehru's secular modernism a solution for the current

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difficulties? The defense of Nehru's secularism should not be construed as an argument for its revival. As already indicated, the Nehruvian rationale for secularism relied on certain ideas of political liberalism and modernity. Nehru did not make a case for his project in terms of India's civilization, for which *The Discovery of India* laid the groundwork. He wanted Indians to leave their pasts and become modern. While futures are indeed created, they are not typically created on a clean slate. It is hard for nations to leave their pasts behind. The more pertinent issue is: How does a nation reconstruct its past? Which traditions should be revived, and which ones dropped? Since a nation's past is not undifferentiated, contesting visions are generally available. The ideological task is to retrieve that which is valuable, and to make this selective retrieval a political reality. An England could not have been, and cannot be, created in India; only a future consistent with one of India's several pasts is possible.

Strictly speaking, Nehru's political pluralism and his opposition to religion are separable. One does not depend on the other. It is possible to reconceptualize secular nationalism, by combining Nehru's political pluralism with his understanding that India's history is marked by cultural pluralism. One does not have to defend political pluralism and tolerance in terms of a modernist liberal theory; one can also defend it in terms of India's historical and cultural traditions. A pluralist democracy and secularism can thus be civilizationally anchored. This vision of politics requires recalling the pluralistic and syncretistic heroes of India's past, explicitly defending a politics and ideology of secularism in cultural terms, and mobilizing the people on that understanding.

CONCLUSION

What happens to India now depends on who rules India and what the ruling ideology is going to be. Hindu nationalists have a moderate faction and an extremist faction. The moderate faction emphasizes *dialogue* with the Muslim community on a common civil code, state grants to minority educational institutions, and the special status of Kashmir (making it equal to all other states).[76] This faction, though not dominant, is not inconsequential. Against these ideological pushes towards a center-right position, the right wing staged a coup in Ayodhya.[77] Many of the cadres were galvanized into action by

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the promise of a Ram temple and wanted that promise to be kept, regardless of the political implications. It is still not clear which of these two factions will win out in the long run.

At the national level, there are four possibilities: *1)* a continuation of Congress rule, though with a changed, promarket economic ideology (with or without a revived organization); *2)* the rise of the BJP to national power with the center Right in command; *3)* the rise of the BJP with the right wing in command; and *4)* a non-Congress coalition, or a coalition of the Congress with other anti-BJP parties. Politics, as we know, is considerably open-ended. As of now, we can only present scenarios.

If Hindu nationalism were to come to power at all, the second scenario could be its relatively peaceful face. It would probably entail an inclusive view of Hinduism. Whether or not the moderates can define BJP politics remains unclear. Much depends on where the most popular leaders of BJP go and how well they communicate with the base, how the Congress behaves, and whether Muslim politics change at all.

It is the third scenario which means the end of India as we know it civilizationally (and perhaps also territorially). As Ayodhya has shown, the right wing is bigoted, communal, and exclusionary. Hatred is the cornerstone of its politics. It will bring back the hatred associated with the 1947 partition, not the understanding that created India as a nation. To believe that 110 million Muslims can be beaten into submission is to believe a lie, a most dangerous lie.

Much, therefore, is at stake. Politics created a nation in the first half of the century. Politics will revive it, add to its troubles, or even unmake it. Syncretism, pluralism, and tolerance—defended as attributes of Indian culture as it has historically existed, not simply those of Hinduism, and placed at the center of India's political discourse—remain India's best bet. The political party that can give a forceful and organized political expression to this cultural reading has the best chance of keeping India together. It is not clear which political party will mount an ideological challenge to the BJP on these lines.

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ENDNOTES

[1]T. N. Madan, "Secularism in its Place," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 46 (4) (November 1987); and Ashis Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance," *Alternatives* 13 (3) (1988).

[2]V. S. Naipaul, *India: A Million Mutinies Now* (New York: Viking, 1990), 517–18.

[3]Reports indicate that by now the insurgency in Punjab, after a decade of brutal violence, has in all probability died down. Even though Sikh militants threatened violence if the people participated in elections, the last two elections saw large turnouts of over 70 percent, indicating an erosion in the ability of militants to shape politics. See "A Victory for Hope," *India Today*, 15 February 1993.

[4]Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

[5]See Isaiah Berlin, "The Bent Twig: On the Rise of Nationalism," *The Crooked Timber of Humanity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992). Also see Stuart Hampshire's review of Berlin's views in "Nationalism," in Edna and Avishai Margalit, eds., *Isaiah Berlin: A Celebration* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[6]Some would like to separate religion from this list, letting ethnicity incorporate the other attributes. From the viewpoint of political identities and group solidarity, it is not entirely clear that this separation is justified in principle. It does become critical, however, when ethnicity and religion clash (East and West Pakistan, Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims, Irish Protestants and Catholics, Black and White American Christians). See Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985).

[7]I borrow this way of distinguishing models from Ashis Nandy, "The Ramjanmbhumi Movement and the Fear of Self," paper presented at the CFIA South Asia Seminar, Harvard University, April 1992.

[8]V. D. Savarkar, *Hindutva* (Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1989), 110–13.

[9]Nanaji Deshmukh, *Rethinking Secularism* (Delhi: Suruchi Prakashan, 1989).

[10]One only has to hear the tapes of Sadhvi Ritambhra, a prominent Hindu activist repeatedly allowed by the BJP to make speeches during 1990–1992, to appreciate how much hatred the right wing has for the Muslims.

[11]Savarkar, *Hindutva*; Deen Dayal Upadhyay, *Akhand Bharat Aur Muslim Samasya* (*Undivided India and the Muslim Problem*) (Noida: Jagriti Prakashan, 1992); and M. S. Golwalakar, *Rashtra* (*The Nation*) (Delhi: Suruchi Prakashan, 1992), 301–306.

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[12]Sikandar Bakht is a Vice President of the BJP. His position on the demolition of the Babri mosque is explained in an interview in *Saptahik Hindustan* (Delhi), 23–30 December 1992.

[13]The RSS does not participate in elections. The best study of the RSS is Walter Anderson and Sridhar Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1986).

[14]The three main proponents of Hindu nationalism within the national movement were Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Sardal Patel, and P. D. Tandon.

[15]For a brief view of Gandhi's position on religion, see Mahatma Gandhi, *My God* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1962) and *Hindu Dharma* (New Delhi: Orient Paperbacks, 1978). See also Margaret Chatterji, *Gandhi's Religious Thought* (London: MacMillan, 1983).

[16]A government investigation committee found that the RSS was not directly involved in the assassination; some RSS individuals were. In the eyes of the populace, this was not an important distinction. For details, see Bruce Graham, *Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 3.

[17]See James Manor, "BJP in South India: 1991 General Elections," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 13–20 June 1992.

[18]India now claims to have a two hundred million strong middle class. It is generally believed that a fairly large segment of the new middle class supports Hindu nationalism. For how the rise of Hindu nationalism may be related to the emergence of a new middle class, see Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, "Modern Hate," *The New Republic*, 22 March 1993.

[19]Opinion polls indicate that the BJP has benefited in the short run. The most reliable opinion survey indicates that if elections had been held in December 1992, the BJP would have won 170 seats in parliament instead of its current 119, though it would still not have won as many as the Congress party. Cf. Prannoy Roy, *India Today*, 15 January 1993.

[20]For a detailed analysis of the Ayodhya movement, see Ashutosh Varshney, "Battling the Past, Forging a Future? Ayodhya and Beyond," in Philip Oldenburg, ed., *India Briefing* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

[21]For an analysis of Mahatma Gandhi's assassination, see Ashis Nandy, "The Final Encounter: The Politics of Gandhi's Assassination," in Ashis Nandy, *At the Edge of Psychology* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981).

[22]For earlier scholarly attempts at defining India's national identity, see Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India* (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1970), chaps. II, VII, VIII; Ravinder Kumar, "India's Secular Culture," in Ravinder Kumar, *The Making of a Nation* (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1989); and Ainslie Embree, *Imagining India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[23]Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

[24]See David Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Religion and Politics Among the Yoruba* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

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[25]Stanley Hoffmann, Tanner lectures on "The Nation, Nationalism and After: The Case of France," (forthcoming); also see Stanley Hoffmann, "Thoughts on the French Nation Today," in this issue of *Dædalus*. For a comparison of French and German national identities, see Rogers Brubaker, *Immigration and Citizenship in Germany and France* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[26]Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), chap. 2.

[27]Judith Miller, "Strangers at the Gate," *The New York Times Magazine,* 15 September 1991; and *The Economist,* 22 March 1991.

[28]Huntington, *American Politics,* 16.

[29]Diana Eck, "The Mythic Construction of the Land of India," paper presented at the South Asia Seminar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 16 March 1990. Also see Ainslie Embree, ed., *Alberuni's India* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1971).

[30]P. M. Currie, *The Shrine and Cult of Muin-al-Din Chishti of Ajmer* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989); Susan Bayly, *Saints, Goddesses and Cults: Islam and Christianity in South India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[31]A clear distinction between three terms —pluralism, syncretism, and assimilation— should be made here. Pluralism would indicate a coexistence of distinctive identities. Syncretism would signify not a tolerant coexistence of distinctions but a merging of cultures/religions, leading to a new form of culture/religion. In its interaction with Hinduism, Islam, especially Sufism, developed forms of piety and culture that represented Indian as opposed to Arab versions of Islam (for example, worship at the graves of great Sufi saints). Syncretism should also be distinguished from assimilation. Whereas assimilation means absorption into the dominant culture/religion, syncretism means a give-and-take between cultures and religions.

[32]Some historians disagree. They argue that a Hindu identity is at best a creation of the last two hundred to three hundred years. Before that, there were different sects, but no Hindu identity as such. See Romila Thapar, "Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for Hindu Identity," *Modern Asian Studies* 23 (2) (1989); and Robert Frykenberg, "Constructions of Hinduism at the Nexus of History and Religion," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 23 (3) (Winter 1993).

[33]M. S. Golwalkar, *We or Our Nationhood Defined* (Nagpur: Bharat Publications, 1939).

[34]Savarkar, *Hindutva.* Savarkar and many other Hindu nationalists contest that *Hindutva* is a religious term. For them, it has a cultural meaning.

[35]Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 62.

[36]In a similar vein, Rajni Kothari writes: "In contrast to the great historical empires, the unity of India owed itself not to the authority of a given political system but to the wide diffusion of the cultural symbols, the spiritual values, and the structure of roles and functions characteristic of a continuous civilization. The essential unity of India has not been political but cultural." Kothari, *Politics in India,* 251. A contrast with another large multiethnic nation, the United States, can be drawn

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here. Several commentators argue that the unity of the United States lies in the political principles that founded the nation, while different communities evolved their distinctive cultures. See Michael Walzer, *What It Means To Be An American* (New York: Marsilio, 1993).

[37]Of these, some are past rulers, others purely cultural figures. Kabir and Nanak were saints that inspired syncretistic beliefs and preached interreligious understanding and love. See John S. Hawley and Mark Jurgensmeyer, *Songs of the Saints of India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[38]Nehru, *The Discovery,* 270.

[39]"Will and Testament," in S. Gopal, ed., *Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980), 647–48.

[40]Nehru, *The Discovery*, 63. Also see his discussion of the role of *Dharti* (land) in the peasant conception of *Bharat Mata* (Mother India) in Ibid., 57–60.

[41]For a fuller discussion of Kashmir, see Ashutosh Varshney, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism," *Asian Survey*, November 1991, and "Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir Has been a Problem," in Raju Thomas, ed., *Perspectives on Kashmir* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).

[42]Arun Shourie, *Religion in Politics* (Delhi: Roli Books, 1987), 91–124.

[43]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso Press, 1983).

[44]Judith Brown, *Prisoner of Hope* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990).

[45]Nanaji Deshmukh, *Rethinking Secularism* (Delhi: Suruchi Prakashan, 1989); H. V. Sheshadri et al., *Why Hindu Rashtra* (Delhi: Suruchi Prakashan, 1990).

[46]H. V. Sheshadri, "Hindu Rashtra: What and Why," *Hindu Vishva* (Prayag) 25 (12) (Silver Jubilee Special Issue 1989–1990): 30.

[47]Interview with L. K. Advani, *Sunday* (Calcutta), 22 July 1990.

[48]Frykenberg, "Constructions of Hinduism."

[49]Interviews in Lucknow with Hindu nationalists, December 1991.

[50]Ashis Nandy has suggested the distinction between faith and ideology in "The Politics of Secularism."

[51]How could Gandhi be a Hindu as well as respect other religions? In a metaphorical statement that has become legendary, Gandhi described his pluralism thus: "I do not want my house to be walled on all sides and my windows stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any." Statement made on 1 June 1921.

[52]Eugene Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976).

[53]The United States is perhaps the best successful case of multiethnic nation-building in the world. See Michael Walzer, *What It Means To Be An American.*

[54]Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983),1–42, 128–71.

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[55]Earlier in 1991, the Congress had its first party elections since 1973.

[56]The debate between those who argue that Indira Gandhi was a prisoner of social forces and those that argue that she led her party's decline will never be settled. See Atul Kohli, *Democracy and Discontent: The Crisis of Governability in India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[57]Interview with Atal Behari Vajpayee in *India Abroad,* 18 December 1992.

[58]The BJP has formed state goverrnments, though at the central level, it has been part of the ruling coalition only for two years (1977–1979).

[59]Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance," 155.

[60]Madan, "Secularism in its Place," 749.

[61]For literature, see Milan Kundera, "The Depreciated Legacy of Cervantes," in his *The Art of the Novel* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988); for philosophy, see Isaiah Berlin, *Against the Current* (Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980), and L. Kolakowski, *Modernity on Endless Trial* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1990); and for natural sciences, see Albert Einstein's essays on science and religion in *Ideas and Opinions* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1954, 1982).

[62]Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions,* 36 –53.

[63]Also see the paper by Chris Bayly, "The Pre-History of Communalism? Religious Conflict in India, 1700 –1860," *Modern Asian Studies* 19 (2) (1985).

[64]Distinctions have thus far been drawn between the secularism of Nehru (a-religious tolerance) and the secularism of Gandhi (interreligious tolerance based on religiosity). See, for example, Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, "Rethinking Secularism," *Pacific Affairs* 56 (Spring 1983). Distinctions within the modernist secularism, as opposed to between modernist and "traditional" secularisms, have not yet been drawn.

[65]See Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, *Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle* (London: J. Cape, 1985).

[66]See Paul Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

[67]There were other ways to deal with the problem: the Rajiv Gandhi government later flushed out its targets by constructing a siege around the temple, not by desecrating it.

[68]Donald Eugene Smith, *Religion and Politics in South Asia* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1963). For a comparison of Indian and American secularism, see Marc Galanter, "Hinduism, Secularism and the Indian Judiciary," *Law and Society in Modern India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

[69]The Supreme Court also argued that even the *Shariat,* if read carefully, permitted maintenance. Muslims argued that a secular court had no business to pass judgments on religious matters. Strictly speaking, the second argument was not required for the judgment. For the political controversy around the Shah Bano case, see Asghar Ali Engineer, *The Shah Bano Controversy* (Delhi: Ajanta Publishers, 1987). For the legal issues involved, see John Mansfield, "Personal Laws or a Uniform Civil Code?," in Robert Baird, ed., *Religion and Law in Independent India* (Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1993).

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[70]Mansfield, "Personal Laws or a Uniform Civil Code?," argues that legally speaking, both the secularists and Muslim leaders had a case. First of all, Indian courts since British times have mostly given precedence to religious laws on personal matters. The Supreme Court in the Shah Bano case broke the tradition—declaring the superiority of the civil code. By legislating on the basis of the *Shariat*, Rajiv Gandhi merely restored an old practice. Secondly, the existing mosque, in legal terms, was also Muslim property, which called for protection. The legal verities, unfortunately, lost their meaning against the emerging political verities. Advani's political mobilization was indeed enormous, making legal intricacies largely irrelevant against the rising political tide.

[71]Based on numerous field interviews conducted from 1990–1992.

[72]*India Today,* 15 February 1993. Javed Habib, a member of the Babri Masjid Action Committee, was perhaps the only Muslim politician to have publicly demonstrated a keen appreciation of the problem. He was, however, no match for the senior and more prominent Muslim politicians. See Javed Habib, "Main Bhi Ram ko Maryada Purushottam Manta Hun" ("I also accept Ram as a Symbol of Moral Excellence"), *Dharmayuga,* 16 January 1991.

[73]For further implications, see Myron Weiner, *The Indian Paradox* (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1989), chap. 7. On how the term "minority" is used in India, see Myron Weiner, "India's Minorities: Who Are They? What Do They Want?," in Ibid.

[74]Theoretically, a Muslim judge married according to the *Shariat* can have four wives, yet he can annul the marriage of a Hindu and grant divorce on grounds of adultery. This theoretical possibility pointed out by Ainslie Embree, *Utopias in Conflict* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990), has not yet become a reality.

[75]Sarvepalli Gopal, *Anatomy of a Confrontation* (London: Zed Books, 1992), 17–20.

[76]Interview with Atal Behari Vajpayee, "Mere Adavaniji Se Matbhed Hain" ("I Have Differences with Advani"), *Dharmyuga* (Bombay), 16–31 January 1991. Vajpayee is the leader of the moderate faction. He was Minister for External Affairs in the Janata Government (1977–1979) and led the BJP from 1981–1986.

[77]Interview with Vajpayee, *India Abroad,* 19 December 1992. Also see Ashutosh Varshney, "Battling the Past, Forging a Future?."

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To break through the barriers of stagnation in a backward country, to ignite the imaginations of men, and to place their energies in the service of economic development, a stronger medicine is needed than the promise of better allocation of resources or even of the lower price of bread. Under such conditions even the businessman, even the classical daring and innovating entrepreneur, needs a more powerful stimulus than the prospect of high profits. What is needed to remove the mountains of routine and prejudice is faith—faith, in the words of Saint-Simon, that the golden age lies not behind but ahead of mankind.

Alexander Gerschenkron

From *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*
1966

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NOTES FROM THE ACADEMY

Periodically, *Dædalus* publishes *Notes from the Academy*. In this instance, the review by Noel Annan is published for many reasons. It is a way of announcing our intention to publish in 1994 a special issue devoted wholly to biography. To review a biography of Churchill in a *Dædalus* issue devoted to the nation and the state is highly appropriate. He, like a number of others in the twentieth century, helped to make many societies aware of nations and states in a way that they might not otherwise have been. If he is now the subject of "revisionist" biography, one must ask whether Franklin Roosevelt and Charles de Gaulle will not soon follow, and whether they too will not be subjected to comparable criticisms.

Noel Annan

A Review of John Charmley, *Churchill, The End of Glory: A Political Biography*

JOHN CHARMLEY HAD A STROKE OF GOOD FORTUNE. He handed his publishers a book, seven hundred pages long, about a man of whom millions of words had been written. Although they trumpeted that it was a notable piece of revisionist history cutting Churchill down to size and exposing his long catalog of errors, they judiciously printed a limited run of fifteen hundred copies.[1]

An article later appeared in the London *Times* praising the book and going far beyond Charmley's claims. Churchill was the man, it said, who, instead of defending the British Empire, undermined it. In 1940–1941 he turned down three chances to make peace with Germany. Hitler— or more likely Göring— could have been persuaded to accept a demilitarized European seaboard, in return for which he could have been given a free hand in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Had Churchill done so, the British Navy could have been sent to the Far East, Japan thwarted, and the Empire preserved.

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The author of this article was Alan Clark, a former junior minister of defense, a fervent Thatcherite, and the son of the celebrated art historian Kenneth Clark. Predictably, this article provoked thunderous denunciation, and the temperature in London rose. So did the sales of Charmley's book, and in haste the publishers reprinted it.

Charmley does not specifically endorse this scenario, but he too takes the line that, fighting a war to preserve Britain's independence, Churchill ended it to find that his country was a client state of America. Declaring that he had not been made the King's first minister to preside over the eclipse of the British Empire, he saw the Empire crumble soon after the war because Britain was too impoverished to sustain an imperial role. Determined that no single Great Power should dominate Europe, he could not prevent Soviet Russia from towering over the Continent. But there is more to it than that. Charmley wants to show that the faults of this Great Man outnumber his virtues. His elder contemporaries were justified in regarding his character unstable, his policies wrongheaded, his judgment wayward, and his personality caddish, impetuous, and self-centered to the point of mania.

Let us start with the mythology. Charmley calls the summer of 1940 —"their finest hour"— a myth. When France was collapsing and Churchill had become prime minister, Chamberlain said that "the public don't in the least realise the gravity of the situation." Ignorant of that situation, the hungry sheep of the British public fed upon Churchill's rhetoric. But surely those in the Cabinet, who thought that the art of leadership lay not in exploiting the ignorance of the public but rather in trying to save what could be saved from the wreckage, were to be praised more than Churchill. Had the British people received instead "the manly and soothing tones" of Viscount Halifax, they would have learned that since America would not enter the war, the British could not hope to win it by themselves. They should have been persuaded to ask for an "honorable peace." Lloyd George was waiting in the wings ready to take Churchill's place. What sense did it make to talk of "victory" or "going forward with our united strength"?

As France fell apart, Halifax was coming round with some misgivings to the French view that Mussolini should be asked to call a conference and negotiate a peace settlement. He thought "Winston talked the most frightful rot" in opposing this view. Politically,

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Churchill was weak. Chamberlain was still the leader of the Conservative party, and Churchill had been obliged to include practically all the leading appeasers when he formed his government. He found himself in a minority in the War Cabinet meetings of May 26 and 27. Undaunted, he called a meeting of some other ministers (including the Labour members of the coalition government) and cast such a spell over them that they become as resolute to fight as he was; on May 28, the waverers in the War Cabinet were outflanked.

This did not dissuade his opponents. What they were proposing seemed so eminently reasonable. To Halifax, a fellow of All Souls College, Churchill had a "disorderly mind. . .his process of thought is one that has to operate through speech," so exactly the reverse of his own. To John Reith, former Director General of the BBC and now a minister, Churchill's rhetoric was "unreal and insincere." To Rab Butler, Halifax's junior minister at the Foreign Office, "the good clean tradition of English politics, that of Pitt as opposed to Fox, had been sold to a half-breed American, the greatest adventurer of modern political history." Butler continued to intrigue behind Churchill's back, probably with Halifax's connivance. On June 17 he held a conversation with the Swedish Minister in London, Bjorn Prytz. According to Prytz, Butler said that, although the war would continue, no "diehards" would be allowed to stand in the way of compromise "on reasonable conditions." The telegram which the Foreign Office sent that evening is still kept secret, as well as an item on the next day's agenda of the War Cabinet. Cadogan, the head of the Foreign Office and an appeaser, referred to it in his diary with the words "No reply from Germans."

That there were people in high positions who thought that summer that the best hope was to sue for peace has never been in dispute. But Charmley refuses to acknowledge that Churchill was right when he said that the ministers whom he addressed on May 28 would "rise up and tear me down from my place" if he talked of surrender. And it was not only these men. The Labour Party would have withdrawn from the coalition government if the old appeasers had had their way. Charmley sneers that the British, in true imperial spirit, displayed their xenophobia when many openly said that they were glad to be free of the French as allies. I remember that well. And while being amused by this bravado, I can remember only one don who prided himself on his realism in believing defeat was

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inevitable among the mass of people of whatever class I talked to. People simply echoed in their hearts Queen Victoria's words of December 1899: "We are not interested in the possibility of defeat. They do not exist." Charmley makes much of the absurdity of the arguments Churchill used to justify fighting: that the economic blockade would wear Germany down, or that the entry of America into the war, though distant, was inevitable. Absurd they were. But when Charmley says "If the reasons he gave were wrong, how could the decisions be right?," he judges Churchill on Halifax's terms. Whether Churchill believed that the German economy was at a breaking point in 1940 is problematical: he had to scratch around for reasons. The real reason was that Hitler would inflict on Britain terms as humiliating and disastrous as those that he had inflicted on France.

Charmley praises Churchill's willpower and resolution, but he does not understand what willpower is. He quotes Churchill as saying that "wars are won by superior will-power" and at once mocks him by quoting Wavell's riposte that they were won by superior firepower. In fact, although the German invasion of Britain looked imminent, Churchill took the calculated risk of adding to Wavell's firepower by sending the reinforcements he needed to defeat the Italian army in Egypt in the winter of 1940–1941. Willpower means acting in the hope that something will turn up. It accepts that the future is always imponderable. Churchill was right. The willpower of the British people—which Churchill always said he did no more than give expression to — saw them through the defeat of Dunkirk, the victory of the Battle of Britain, and the terror of the Blitz. The fact that there were some sagacious men in governmental circles, and a few intellectuals on the Left who, hating the ruling class, were convinced that they would give in—plus, of course, the handful of communists who supported the Nazi-Soviet pact—was neither here nor there. The finest hour was not a myth. It was a reality.

Well, Charmley replies, "look what happened afterwards to the Empire Churchill had sworn to preserve." Charmley writes as if the Empire in 1940 was identical to the Empire in 1900. Native civil servants in the colonies were being trained and Whitehall had accepted that self-government was inevitable. In India, the process was so far advanced that when independence came, a highly competent

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and uncorrupt Indian civil service was at the right hand of the triumphant Congress party. On India, Churchill was a diehard, but his younger political friends, Macmillan and Boothby, did not support him, nor did his schoolmate Amery whom he made secretary of state at the India Office. If Amery, imperialist though he was, had had his way, India would have been given independence during the war. In fact, the Empire was already being prepared for its transformation into a commonwealth.

Yet, surely, Charmley continues, Churchill was forced to surrender to America throughout the war. That was certainly not what the American military in Washington thought: they complained that Churchill opposed Overlord almost to the day when the troops landed on the beaches. They complained that America was dragged into Britain's Mediterranean strategy. Charmley writes as if Britain was a power in every way equal to America; indeed America's isolationist policy between the wars had disguised the fact that she was infinitely more powerful potentially than any European nation. Where else could Britain buy arms, oil, and food? From the first day of the war, Britain was a suppliant. Charmley makes much of the hard terms Roosevelt exacted for the cession of bases in return for which Britain received fifty clapped-out destroyers. In fact, Chamberlain in 1939 had offered Roosevelt the bases for nothing. Roosevelt might tease Churchill about the Empire and declare that he was not going to pull imperial chestnuts out of the fire for his friend, but he treated Churchill as an equal with generosity and sensitivity, particularly after the deplorable surrender of Tobruk in 1942, a year in which calamity sat on Britain's shoulders.

Charmley writes as if there was some alternative to the American alliance. Beaverbrook, an inveterate anti-American, enjoyed making mischief by playing the Soviet card; but Churchill, even when nursing delusions about Uncle Joe, never doubted that the war could be won only by conciliating Roosevelt first, Stalin second. Charmley suggests that Churchill would have done better by following de Gaulle's tactics of being consistently bloody-minded to his allies. The answer is that de Gaulle had only one division to commit in battle: political control in France was his sole objective. Churchill's first objective was to win the war at a minimum cost of lives. Moreover, he recognized that Britain could not survive after the war without America's friendship. That was a far more fundamental insight than the deficiencies in judgment about the postwar world that Charmley saddles him with.

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It would not be worthwhile dissecting Charmley unless his book had merits. And it does. He writes with elegance; he is lively, readable, never flashy, his industry is exemplary, and he knows how to marshal his sources and fashion a compelling narrative. In all of his pages, there is no padding, but rather much justifiable criticism. Yet, the way he uses these sources arouses one's suspicions. The doyen of mid-twentieth-century British international studies, Douglas Cameron Watt, has taken him to task for limiting his study of his sources to his own country, but perhaps more suspect is his refusal to weight the value of his sources. Just as Arthur Bryant would cite a Tory pamphleteer, L'Estrange, in order to bolster a favorable interpretation of Charles II's policies, so Charmley will cite as evidence judgments on events by an inveterate appeaser, the cafe society Member of Parliament, "Chips" Channon, to whom hardly anyone attached much weight. Nor should any reputable historian quote in support of an argument the conclusions of David Irvine, Hitler's apologist who denies Hitler's connivance with, or even the existence of, the Holocaust.

Take a single instance such as the landings at Anzio. Charmley describes how Churchill persuaded Roosevelt against General Marshall's advice to sanction this operation which "turned out to be a typically Churchillian affair where the promised easy gains failed to materialise." Who would guess from this that the landing was a brilliant stroke that took the Germans by surprise, but for the fact that US General Lucas and the higher command failed to exploit the unopposed landing? Charmley makes the most of Churchill's failings as a strategist, and I recently wrote retailing these failings. I do not criticize him for that.[2] But he does not acknowledge how Churchill, fulminating at seeing his pet schemes for winning the war turned down by the Chiefs of Staff, nearly always accepted their advice. Charmley is suggesting that had some action been taken earlier, the decline in Britain's power in 1945 might have been averted. He never says categorically what that action could have been. He undermines the hero by vague innuendo.

Charmley states in his introduction that, although the hero of his boyhood evaporated once he began to research, he accepts that Churchill remains a "great man." What made Churchill's actions questionable was that they were nearly always wrong. Charmley follows Robert Rhodes James who showed how Churchill's career

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up to 1937, for all the brilliance of his youth and the high offices he held, seemed to be ending in failure. People thought of him as the silly schoolboy Home Secretary crouching with Guardsmen waiting to assault a house on Sidney Street believed (erroneously) to harbor a gang of desperate anarchists; as the author of the failed Dardanelles campaign; as the Chancellor who had disastrously put Britain back on the Gold Standard; as the die-hard opponent of independence for India; and as the supporter of Edward VIII during the abdication crisis. They thought of him as impetuous, romantic, and ambitious to a degree that made him often insufferable as a colleague in office and ignominious out of office in his attempts to crawl back. They saw him as an adventurer who preferred the company of other buccaneers such as F. E. Smith, Beaverbrook, Bob Boothby, and Brendan Bracken; an egoist of gargantuan proportions, oblivious to the plight of those who worked for him, tyrannical to those who opposed him, ungrateful to those who stood by him, and obsessed by the belief that even if we are all worms, he was a glowworm whose destiny was to follow his star. So, by 1937 was it any wonder that men failed to take his warnings about Hitler to heart? And after 1940 did not his wavering strategy to win the war by terror bombing, or by invading Germany through Italy and the Balkans, or by any of the other harebrained schemes to land in Norway or Portugal, blind him to the realities of the postwar world in which Soviet Russia was the new menace? Who should wonder that his countrymen tired of the Churchill who was absorbed by world events and voted in 1945 for rulers who would concentrate on rebuilding Britain in a different mold.

Yet, undeniable as his failings were, Churchill indisputably emerges as a Great Man— and by that I mean a man who significantly changes the course of history in his time. Some may be brutal tyrants, Tammerlane or Genghis Kahn, or in our days Hitler and Stalin, reveling in the human suffering they cause. Some bring benefactions that outweigh their extortions such as Napoleon; some found a state such as Bolívar or Ben-Gurion. At the other end of the scale are men who are remembered as the saviors of their country, most notably a statesman like Abraham Lincoln. History will not pardon Great Men if they are bloodthirsty, ignoble, infamous, or perfidious. But it pardons their mistakes.

Yet Charmley does not ask himself what we mean by a Great Man. Two Oxford dons of very different character and temperament

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came to similar conclusions when they assessed Churchill. Isaiah Berlin's frequently quoted encomium saw him as:

> a man larger than life, composed of bigger, simpler elements than ordinary men, a gigantic historical figure during his own lifetime, superhumanly bold, strong and imaginative. . .an orator of prodigious powers, the saviour of his country, a mythical hero who belongs to legend as much as to reality.[3]

The super-public servant Oliver Franks thought it was "the size of the man and the way history met him" that made it impossible to judge him by weighing his excellencies against his many deficiencies. He "embodied the soul of the nation. He succeeded in being the nation."[4]

If Charmley had lifted his eyes from the twentieth century and looked back to the eighteenth, he would have found an analogue to Churchill: another Great Man—William Pitt, Earl of Chatham. Chatham's faults too were enormous. He was arrogant, haughty, vain, pompous, keeping even his allies at a distance, and he suffered more severely than Churchill from Black Dog— he was a manic-depressive. His contemporaries thought he was always playing a part— he did so to hide his disability. Like Churchill he was convinced of his destiny. "I know that I can save the country and nobody else can." Like Churchill his military plans were faulty; like Churchill he never had a secure political base because he lacked the political arts that transform a lively faction into a solid block of voting power. He too came most alive in war. He captured and inspired men by oratory rather than by reasoned argument. His courage and endurance were legendary. Both men lived to see their triumphs brought to disaster by the folly of their successors: Chatham dying as he denounced the war against the American colonies; Churchill the spectator of Suez and de Gaulle's veto on Britain joining the European Community. Chatham founded Britain's imperial epoch; Churchill stood at the end of that epoch yet, for better— and in some ways for worse — he retarded Britain's decline as a world power for fifty years.

Churchill's claim to greatness, like Chatham's, rests on his reputation as a leader in war, and it is much harder to win such a reputation in peace. Since his day, only one British politician has such a claim. Margaret Thatcher, the first woman to become prime minister, three times voted to power by the people of Britain, was determined to "turn the country around" and displayed a tenacity of purpose, a domination over colleagues, and a mastery of business that matched

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Churchill. No one yet can say how history will treat her. But, despite her remarkable qualities, she lacked two attributes that put the seal of greatness on Churchill's character. He could be overbearing in victory and surly in defeat, but he was never mean, bore no grudges, and his anger soon vanished. His vision of history, and his sense of his place in it, forbade him to descend to petty, vindictive measures. He was in the end magnanimous. The gods also granted him a gift that enabled him to see life in just proportion. That was his incomparable sense of humor. When his commanders and colleagues felt goaded beyond endurance, they would be disarmed by some sally or quip and would declare that there was no one whom they would rather serve.

It is tempting to see Charmley's book as a symptom of a disease that is afflicting Britain today. There was no doubt in 1979 that the country needed turning around when its industry was overmanned and uncompetitive, and the trade unions made it a byword for anarchic strikes. As divisive as Margaret Thatcher's policies were and as decimated as British industry was by the application of monetarism in 1980–1982, the shoots of hope broke through the soil. They were then blighted by another boom-bust cycle, which brought inflation, high interest rates, a world recession, and high unemployment. The joy at the end of the communist regimes melted as the Satan of nationalism once more went to and fro in the earth, walking up and down in it. This has provoked a sour pessimism about the future. Even stout Europeans in Britain distrust the Brussels bureaucracy and fear that the Community will be run by a quasi-autocratic France, secure in the alliance with a united Germany which will dictate the financial future. Meanwhile, divisions and bitterness between social classes, between north and south, have scarcely ever been as acute. The relief that many felt when the strident Margaret Thatcher had been replaced by a kindly, modest man who had not gone to college and who came from a simple family turned to scorn as his government proved to be inept and accident-prone. Meanwhile, the opposition is as divided as ever, and the leader of the Labour Party, John Smith, appears to be a photocopy of his decent opponent.

In this mood, every incident is interpreted as the writing on the wall at Belshazzar's feast. In April, the horses in the famous steeplechase race, the Grand National, got off to two false starts, and amid chaos the race

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for the first time in its history had to be canceled. The *Guardian* greeted the news with a grave leader citing the fiasco as another instance of national decline. The counterculture press flourishes. The belittling and lampooning of anyone in public life has reached new depths, and the monarchy is mocked. Charmley's book—though it is neither cheap nor nasty— is a manifestation in scholarship of the same malaise. Meanwhile in America, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. fears that the melting pot is no longer making an amalgam of the separate strains of immigrants, and Robert Hughes sees *e pluribus unum* endangered by political correctness among the liberal-progressives and political compulsion by the religious ideologues of the Right.

A historian may smile that we have seen all of this before. The 1920s was a deflationary age, and the young outraged the generation that had fought and suffered in the Great War, as it was then called. They, who had seen men climb from the trenches and face death and unimaginable misery uncomplaining, were cut to the quick when the young told them that there was no merit in flinging away one's life and only fools went to war. When G. M. Young was lent Strachey's *Eminent Victorians*, he handed it back saying, "We are in for a bad time." The urge to knock the grandees of the past generation off their plinths is perennial. But what are called myths are not phantoms: they grow from reality. Against the voices of the most powerful of his Cabinet colleagues in 1940, against all reason and common sense, with an army that had the will to fight but with few weapons and little training, Churchill decided to fight on in May 1940 with nothing but the hope that something would turn up. In so doing, he changed the course of history.

ENDNOTES

[1]John Charmley, *Churchill, The End of Glory: A Political Biography* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993).

[2]Noel Annan, "How Wrong Was Churchill?," *New York Review of Books* XL (7) (8 April 1993): 37–41.

[3]Isaiah Berlin, *Personal Impressions* (London: Hogarth Press, 1980), 22.

[4]Charles McMoran Wilson, *Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940–1965* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1966). Both quotations appear in Alex Danchev, *Oliver Franks: Founding Father* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 48.

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